Concurring and dissenting. I respectfully dissent from syllabi 10 and 16 and the corresponding portions of the majority opinion which uphold the constitutionality of the “threshold provision” of section 17 of the two statutes involved in this case. I have no quarrel with the remaining syllabi and corresponding portions of the opinion. In my judgment the “threshold provision” *625is constitutionally impermissible as a denial o£ “remedy by due course of law” guaranteed by Section 18 of the Kansas Bill of Rights. Furthermore I am convinced that such provision creates arbitary and discriminatory classifications in violation of the equal protection clause of tire Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Sections 1 and 2 of the Kansas Bill of Rights.
Section 18 of the Kansas Bill of Rights declares as follows:
“AE persons, for injuries suffered in person, reputation or property, shaE have remedy by due course of law, and justice administered without delay.”
The “threshold provision” abolishes the right of a person to recover for pain and suffering and other non-pecuniary loss incurred in an automobile accident unless the medical expenses incurred have a reasonable value of $500 or more or unless certain specified injuries result therefrom. The record before the court in my opinion does not reasonably justify the conclusion that the purpose and benefits sought by the legislation could not be fully attained by the requirement of first party accident insurance coverage without the threshold provision.
The exercise of the police power by legislative act depends for its validity upon whether the means employed are reasonably necessary to accomplish the ends in view; and whether the regulations proposed are reasonable, in turns depends upon the seriousness of the evil to be overcome, the magnitude of the curtailment of individual rights affected, and the availability and effectiveness of other less drastic measures. (Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590, 595, 8 L. Ed. 2d 130, 82 S. Ct. 987.) I fully recognize the broad power of both the legislature and the courts to make reasonable changes in the substantive and procedural law when the public good requires it. I cannot, however, accept the view that the legislature may destroy or seriously restrict a traditional and long standing cause of action upon mere legislative whim, or when an alternative approach is available. There should be some compelling public interest to justify such drastic action.
At the beginning of this century the Kansas legislature sought to curtail the right of our citizens to sue in the courts of this state to recover general damages by way of mental suffering and anguish and personal and public humilitation, resulting from the malicious publication of false and libelous matters by newspapers. In 1904 in Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68 Kan. 670, 75 Pac. 1041, we held that stat*626ute unconstitutional as being in conflict with Section 18 of the Kansas Bill of Rights in that it denied in certain cases to one injured in his reputation a remedy therefor by due course of law. Syllabus ¶ 3 of Hanson might well have been written to cover the legislation now before us in 1974. That syllabus reads as follows:
“3. Constitutional Right Not Satisfied by Statute. The right to a remedy by due course of law is not satisfied by the requirement contained in a statute to make specific reparation for the injury done, which reparation is the same in all cases, bears no relation to the injury suffered, and has not been decreed by a tribunal after ascertainment of the extent of such injury.”
It is clear from a careful analysis of the no-fault legislation that those statutes make a specific reparation for the injury done; that the reparation is the same in all cases; that the reparation bears no relation to the injury suffered and that such reparation has not been decreed by a tribunal after ascertainment of the extent of such injury.
It has always been a maxim of Anglo-American jurisprudence that the law does not suffer a wrong without a remedy. We have held that Section 18 guaranteeing to every person a remedy by due course of law for injury done him in person or property means that for such wrongs that are recognized by the law of the land the courts shall be open and afford a remedy, or that laws shall be enacted giving a certain remedy for all injuries or wrongs. We have further declared that it is the primary duty of the courts of this state to safeguard the declaration of right and remedy guaranteed by the constitution insuring a remedy for all injuries. (Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P. 2d 934; Neely v. St. Francis Hospital & School of Nursing, 192 Kan. 716, 391 P. 2d 155.) In Neely we emphasized that the provisions in Section 18 of the Bill of Rights guaranteeing to persons a remedy by due course of law cannot be watered down by diluting the definition of “remedy” to mean something other than a judicial means or method for enforcing a right or redressing a wrong. The Kansas no-fault legislation does not provide such a judicial method.
In these days when the rights of the individual are being eroded by continually encroaching claims of public interest and public need, the courts of this state must carry out their constitutional responsibility to protect and safeguard the rights afforded the people by the United States and Kansas Constitutions. I agree with the Supreme Court of Florida that the legislature is without power to abolish a right or legal remedy existing at common law *627without providing a reasonable alternative to protect the rights o£ the people of the state to redress for injuries, unless the legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of such right, and that no alternative method of meeting such public necessity can be shown. (Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, declaring the “threshold provision” of the Florida no-fault statute unconstitutional in 1973.) Even though the legislative purpose is legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties or rights when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative adbridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose. (Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231, 81 S. Ct. 247.) I have no quarrel with the proposition that improvements are necessary in the judicial system of this state or that some type of no-fault legislation might improve the system now provided for making reparations to persons injured in automobile accidents. I do not in this dissent oppose the basic concept of no-fault. I do strongly oppose, however, statutory provisions which violate basic rights of Kansas citizens.
The purpose of the no-fault legislation is set forth in section 2 of both acts. These sections provide:
“The purpose of this act is to provide a means of compensating persons promptly for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of motor vehicles in lieu of liability for damages to the extent provided herein.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The record does not show that the “threshold provision” is reasonably necessary to accomplish the legislative purpose. It seems clear to me that the provisions which make compulsory first party insurance coverage fully accomplish the legislative purpose of compensating persons promptly for bodily injury arising out of the operation of motor vehicles. Since all owners of motor vehicles are required to buy such insurance coverage (and at least supposedly will be protected thereby), what is the reasonable basis for restricting their right to proceed against the negligent driver in the courts of this state? It has been suggested that restricting the right of our citizens to sue will have the salutory effect of reducing the insurance premium which must be paid to purchase this kind of insurance. I question whether such a reason establishes an overpowering public necessity justifying the abolishment *628of the right of injured persons to sue for pain and suffering except in certain limited cases.
Also on the question of the public necessity for no-fault legislation I think it important to note that in the trial court the parties stipulated and agreed that there is no serious court congestion problem in this state arising from automobile collision litigation and further that automobile insurance premiums are not “spiraling out of control” in this state. Furthermore the district court specifically found on the uncontradicted testimony of W. Fletcher Bell, Kansas Commissioner of Insurance, that the adoption of the no-fault plan in Kansas will result in an increase in the cost of automobile insurance premiums in this state. The finding of the trial court that automobile collision litigation does not present a serious congestion problem to the Kansas court system is fully supported and substantiated by the statistical report of the office of the Judicial Administrator of Kansas. For 1973 only 4.5 percent of the total cases commenced in the Kansas district courts involved automobile collisions. As of July 1, 1973, only 9.1 percent of total cases pending in the district courts were automobile collision cases. In view of these undisputed findings of the trial court that there is no serious court congestion problem in Kansas, that automobile insurance premiums are not spiraling out of control in Kansas, and that the adoption of the no-fault plan would actually increase the cost of automobile insurance, I fail to see any justification whatsoever for abolishing the right of our citizens to sue for pain and suffering and other non-pecuniary damages except in certain restricted cases. I agree wholeheartedly with the statement of Justice William A. Grimes and Justice Laurence I. Duncan of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire that “society cannot escape its responsibility to provide justice by simply eliminating the rights of its citizens.” (Opinion of the Justices, _ N. H. _, 304 A. 2d 881.)
I do not believe that the record supports the conclusion that the legislature has provided a reasonable alternative method to justify the partial abolition of the right to sue to recover damages for personal injuries. The appellants argue here that the legislature has provided an appropriate remedy to persons injured in automobile collisions by making possible prompt payment of benefits under the first party insurance coverage. Let us examine this statement more closely. The owner of an automobile is not given anything! He is required to pay out of his own pocket the cost of first *629party insurance to provide benefits to him in the event o£ personal injury arising from an automobile accident. What has he received by way of a quid pro quo in exchange for the elimination of his right to resort to the courts to recover for his pain and suffering and other non-pecuniary losses? He has received nothing from anyone. He has simply been forced to give up a valuable right and remedy and in lieu therefor has been compelled to purchase at his own expense first party insurance coverage. I simply cannot accept the proposition that under these circumstances the legislature has provided a reasonable alternative remedy to justify the partial abolishment of his remedy at law.
I am also convinced that the threshold provision is invalid as a denial of equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Sections 1 and 2 of the Bill of Rights of the Kansas Constitution. In Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518 P. 2d 362, we held that a classification of persons in the exercise of the police power cannot be made arbitrarily and that there must be some rational basis for the classification. I am convinced from the evidentiary record before the court that there is no rational basis for treating a person who has suffered personal injury in an automobile collision whose medical expenses are less than $500, any differently than a person suffering a similar injury who has expended $500 or more for medical expenses. Furthermore I do not believe that there is any rational basis for treating a person who has suffered personal injury in an automobile collision differently than persons who have sustained personal injuries in other types of accidents. I frankly cannot see how such a discrimination has any reasonable basis to accomplish the purpose of no-fault legislation — to provide a means of compensating persons promptly for bodily injury arising out of automobile accidents. If there is such a rational basis neither the briefs of counsel nor the majority opinion of the court have shown to me what it is. For the reasons set forth above I respectfully dissent.