dissenting:
I respectfully but resolutely dissent. I do not agree with the majority’s decision to direct the entry of a remittitur (or in lieu thereof, if the plaintiff elects, a new trial1). *505Syllabus point 6 of the majority opinion overrules, without so stating, a long line of cases which, I believe, are well-reasoned.2 The majority opinion is also repugnant to a provision of the Constitution of West Virginia, specifically, W.Va. Const, art. Ill, § 13.3 The Great Cathedral in Salisbury, England, exalted in the majority opinion, is not as far “off dead center” as the legal architecture of the majority opinion on the issue of the propriety of a remittitur in a case involving indeterminate damages.4
In light of my opinion that a remittitur is improper in a case involving indeterminate damages, I also wish to disclaim any opinion on the validity of syllabus point 7 of the majority opinion concerning the Court’s use of pretrial settlement negotiation amounts to determine the amount of a remittitur which will encourage out-of-court settlements.
I. OVERRULED PRECEDENTS
A. WRONGFUL DEATH DAMAGES: A JURY QUESTION
A fundamental principle must be kept in mind: “[ajssessment of damages [where the law gives no specific or fixed measure] is the jury’s job.” Mooney v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 174 W.Va. 350, 353, 326 S.E.2d 427, 430 (1984). While this principle applies to damages for pain and suffering in personal injury cases, it is especially applicable to damages for solatium in wrongful death cases. See Hawkins v. Nuttallburg Coal & Coke Co., 66 W.Va. 415, 416, 66 S.E. 520, 520 (1909).5 Prior to the majority opinion herein, this Court has been definite and consistent in its holdings limiting judicial review of the size of jury verdicts in wrongful death cases. Heretofore, it was well settled in this jurisdiction that where the jury finds the defendant liable in a wrongful death action, it has virtually absolute discretion, under the express terms of the wrongful death statute, without regard to proof of actual damages, pecuniary loss and the like, to make any award it deems “fair and just,” subject only to the passion-and-prejudice rule discussed infra. Kesner v. Trenton, 158 W.Va. 997, 1002, 1007, 216 S.E.2d 880, 884, 886 (1975); Legg v. Jones, 126 W.Va. 757, 762, 30 S.E.2d 76, 79 (1944); Keesee v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 120 W.Va. 201, 204, 197 S.E. 522, 523 (1938); syl. pt. 4, Black v. Peerless Elite Laundry Co., 113 W.Va. 828, 169 S.E. 447 (1933); Hawkins v. Nuttalburg Coal & Coke Co., 66 W.Va. *506415, 416-17, 66 S.E. 520, 520-21 (1909); Kelley v. Ohio River R.R., 58 W.Va. 216, 223, 52 S.E. 520, 523 (1905); Sample v. Consolidated Light & Ry., 50 W.Va. 472, 473-74, 40 S.E. 597, 598 (1901); Couch v. Chesapeake & O. Ry., 45 W.Va. 51, 55-56, 30 S.E. 147,149 (1898); syl. pt. 5, Turner v. Norfolk & W.R.R., 40 W.Va. 675, 22 S.E. 83 (1895); Dimmey v. Wheeling & E.G.R.R., 27 W.Va. 32, 56-57 (1885). Indeed, the amount of the verdict of the jury in a wrongful death case will ordinarily not be disturbed as long as there is a rational basis for such verdict taking into consideration all of the evidence. Salerno v. Manchin, 158 W.Va. 220, 227, 213 S.E.2d 805, 809 (1974). While the majority opinion herein does not, intentionally, overrule this line of cases, I fear the effect of the majority opinion, at least long term, will be to overrule this line of cases and to encourage judicial interference with wrongful death (and personal injury) verdicts as being “excessive.”
. In Bond v. City of Huntington, 166 W.Va. 581, 276 S.E.2d 539 (1981), this Court traced the legislative history of the wrongful death statute, W. Va. Code, 55-7-5, -6 and -7, and noted that the Legislature in the year 1976 removed the statutory “ceiling” on recovery, so that there are no maximum limits, under the statute, on the amount of recovery. 276 S.E.2d at 541. W. Va. Code, 55 — 7—6(b)[1982]6 provides that the jury “may award such damages as to it may seem fair and just[.]” W.Va.Code, 55-7-6-(c)(l)(A)[1982] contains a noninclusive list of the types of emotional injuries for which the jury must determine — necessarily, subjectively — an amount of money as “compensation”: “The verdict of the jury shall include, but may not be limited to, damages for the following: (A) Sorrow, mental anguish, and solace which may include society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advice of the decedent[.]” Thus, for these indeterminate, nonpecuniary damages, “ ‘[t]he law furnishes no measure of damages other than the enlightened conscience of impartial jurors guided by all the facts and circumstances of the particular case.’ ” Couch v. Chesapeake & O. Ry., 45 W.Va. 51, 55, 30 S.E. 147, 149 (1898) (citation omitted). See also Kesner v. Trenton, 158 W.Va. 997, 1007, 216 S.E.2d 880, 886 (1975).
One of the factors enlightening the jurors’ conscience in a wrongful death case, as in a personal injury case, is the deterrent aspect of compensatory damages. “A jury award for pain and suffering [or for solatium] is an inherently subjective undertaking, and the degree of moral fault which the jury imputes to the tortfeasor is almost inevitably reflected in the liberality or parsimony of the pain and suffering [or solati-um] award.” Freshwater v. Booth, 160 W.Va. 156, 161, 233 S.E.2d 312, 315-16 (1977) (also see n. 2 therein).
Despite the jury’s almost absolute discretion in determining the amount of the damages in a wrongful death case, and despite the lack of a statutory “cap” on the amount of the recovery in a wrongful death case, a jury verdict in a wrongful death case is subject to judicial review and, in an appropriate case, will be set aside as clearly excessive or clearly inadequate, and a new trial will be granted. Such a case, though, is exceptional. “Courts must not set aside jury verdicts [in tort cases] as excessive unless they are monstrous, enormous, at first blush beyond all measure, unreasonable, outrageous, and manifestly show jury passion, partiality, prejudice or corruption.” Syl., Addair v. Majestic Petroleum Co., 160 W.Va. 105, 232 S.E.2d 821 (1977). See also syl. pt. 10, Ilosky v. Michelin Tire Corp., 172 W.Va. 435, 307 S.E.2d 603 (1983); syl. pt. 2, Elsey Ford Sales, Inc. v. Solomon, 167 W.Va. 891, 280 S.E.2d 718 (1981). “This rule is no[t] objective. ... [It] does not of course remove the final judgment from the judges, [para.] But we are hereby admonishing our judges and ourselves ... not to interfere in the jury’s domain except with extreme reluctance.” Addair, supra, 160 W.Va. at 112, 232 S.E.2d at 825.
*507There is no specific line of demarcation in this nebulous realm where the rights, duties and responsibilities of a court and jury meet. Bower v. Brannon, 141 W.Va. 435, 441, 90 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1955). Nonetheless, one point is certain: “a person who comes to an appellate court with a verdict of a jury, approved by the trial court, is in the strongest position known to the law.” Id., 141 W.Va. at 440, 90 S.E.2d at 346. Equally certain is that “[t]he law recognizes that the aggregate judgment of twelve duly selected and properly qualified jurors represents the best method yet devised for fixing the amount of just compensation to the injured plaintiffs in such cases [involving pain and suffering, mental anguish or other indeterminate damages].” Sargent v. Malcomb, 150 W.Va. 393, 400, 146 S.E.2d 561, 566 (1966).7 Judge Calhoun, writing for a unanimous court in Sargent v. Malcomb, expressed these vitally important principles:
A jury verdict in a personal injury case may not be set aside as excessive by the trial court [and a new trial awarded] merely because the award of damages is greater than the trial judge would have made if he had been charged with the responsibility of determining the proper amount of the award. This Court cannot set aside a verdict as excessive in such a case [and award a new trial] merely because a majority or all members of the Court would have made an award of a lesser amount if initially charged with the responsibility of determining the proper amount of the award.
150 W.Va. at 401, 146 S.E.2d at 566. Accord, syl. pt. 5, Earl T. Browder, Inc. v. County Court, 145 W.Va. 696, 116 S.E.2d 867 (1960). The majority in the case now before this Court did not follow these precedents (and yet did not expressly overrule them), by arriving at its remittitur, as the majority opinion states, “after substantial collegial discussion[.]” Such action is an unconstitutional invasion of the province of the jurors. After a review of the cold pages of the record, three of my colleagues in this case have substituted their opinions for that of the jury and the trial court on the factual question of the amount of damages, on the basis of undefined “sound public policy.”
B.. REMITTITUR: NOT PROPER FOR INDETERMINATE DAMAGES
In a case involving indeterminate damages and where the amount of the jury’s verdict is a clearly excessive sum under the passion-and-prejudice test set forth in Ad-dair, supra, the appropriate remedy is the award of a new trial (perhaps limited to the issue of damages), not the entry of a remit-titur. In such a case there would be no clearly ascertainable, illegal excess to remove from the total amount, leaving an amount properly found by the jury. While the amount aftér a remittitur is mathematically part of the larger sum found by the jury, it is a fiction to say that the jury “found” the smaller amount. Instead, the court would be substituting its opinion for the jury’s. This Court has heretofore consistently adhered to this view that a remit-titur is proper only where the excessive portion of the verdict is clearly distinguishable as a matter of law from the remainder of the verdict. For example, syllabus point 20 of Jordan v. Bero, 158 W.Va. 28, 210 S.E.2d 618 (1974), states the holding in this language:
“When the illegal part of the damages ascertained by the verdict of a jury is clearly distinguishable from the rest, and may be ascertained by the court without assuming the functions of the jury and substituting its judgment for theirs, the court may allow plaintiff to enter a re-mittitur [italics here in original] for such part, and then refuse a new trial.” Syllabus point 2, Earl T. Browder, Inc. v. The County Court of Webster County, 145 W.Va. 696, 116 S.E.2d 867 (1960); syllabus point 4, Chapman v. [J.W.] Beltz & Sons Co., 48 W.Va. 1, 35 S.E. 1013 (1900).
*508See also Cochran v. Appalachian Power Co., 162 W.Va. 86, 96, 246 S.E.2d 624, 630 (1978); syl. pt. 3, Fortner v. Napier, 153 W.Va. 143, 168 S.E.2d 737 (1969); Bragg v. C.I. Whitten Transfer Co., 125 W.Va. 722, 730, 26 S.E.2d 217, 221 (1943). The rule has also been stated more succinctly. “A remittitur is not proper unless the excessive part of the verdict is a sum certain determinable from the record.” Syl. pt. 3, Earl T. Browder, Inc. v. County Court, 145 W.Va. 696, 116 S.E.2d 867 (1960) (collecting numerous cases decided by this Court).
I note that the practice of remittitur has been judicially abolished in all cases in the State of Missouri, in favor of the exclusive use of new trials. Firestone v. Crown Center Redevelopment Corp., 693 S.W.2d 99, 110 (Mo.1985) (en banc).
II. CONFLICT WITH CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
As noted in Fortner v. Napier, supra, and Earl T. Browder, Inc. v. County Court, supra, this Court has consistently followed the minority rule by refusing to allow a remittitur where the amount of the excess damages is indeterminable. Leo Carlin, then Professor of Law in the College of Law at West Virginia University, authored an excellent article on the subject of remittiturs and additurs. Carlin, Remit-titurs and Additurs, 49 W.Va.L.Q. 1 (1942). Professor Carlin also noted that this Court consistently adhered to this minority rule. 49 W.Va.L.Q. at 29. He argued, forcefully, that such a rule is valid, especially in this jurisdiction in light of our relatively unique state constitutional provision (W.Va.Const, art. Ill, § 13, quoted supra at n. 3) preserving not only the right to a jury trial but also preserving the fruits thereof.
Professor Carlin observed that this Court in Hickman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 30 W.Va. 296, 4 S.E. 654, 7 S.E. 4558 (1887), overruled on another point, Richmond v. Henderson, 48 W.Va. 389, 37 S.E. 653 (1900), held that the determination of not only the right to recovery but also of the amount of the recovery, where damages are unliquidated, is part of the jury trial guaranteed by W.Va.Const. art. Ill, § 13. He further observed that the state constitutions of only two .states, namely, West Virginia and Oregon,9 expressly safeguard the verdict in addition to guaranteeing the right to a jury trial. 49 W.Va.L.Q. at 21-22.
The “law” which is prescribed in our constitution as limiting the methods of reexamination of facts found by a jury is understood to be the common law which prevailed in the jurisdiction at the time when the constitution was adopted. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476, 55 S.Ct. 296, 297, 79 L.Ed. 603, 606 (1935); Kwass v. Kersey, 139 W.Va. 497, 514, 81 S.E.2d 237, 246 (1954). The language in W.Va.Const, art. III, § 13 prohibiting the reexamination of a jury’s findings of fact has remained unchanged since the adoption of the state constitution in 1872, with the exception of the addition in 1974 (in conjunction with the Judicial Reorganization Amendment) of the phrase, “according to rule of court[.] ” Preyiously, factual findings of a jury were subject to reexamination “according to the rules of the common law.”
The majority opinion does not purport to be, and certainly does not constitute, a “rule of court,” but is an alteration of the common law, as it existed in the year 1872, and is fatal to the essence of the constitutional right to a trial by jury. It is, thus, prohibited by W.Va.Const. art. Ill, § 13. Any interpretation of the “rule of court” language contained in W. Va. Const, art. Ill, *509§ 13 which would condone more than procedural elasticity would eviscerate the constitutional protection of the jury verdict. W.Va.Const. art. Ill, § 13 allows some elasticity with respect to matters of procedural form and trial and appellate practice by referring, obviously, to the power of this Court, under W.Va.Const., art. VIII, § 3, “to promulgate rules ... relating to ... practice and procedure, ...” For example, see W. Va.R. Civ.P. 49 on special verdicts and interrogatories. This rule modifies the common law use of special verdicts and general verdicts accompanied by answers to interrogatories. See M. Lugar and L. Silverstein, West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure 365-66 (1960). The use of these procedural devices is not, however, inimical to the right to a jury trial because the jury still finds the facts and the factual findings are not “reexamined” by the court in the sense of substitution of opinion. Directing the entry of a remittitur in a case involving indeterminate damages is not, however, a matter of form and practice but, instead, involves the very substance of the constitutional right to a jury trial. “If the result of the verdict (in this case the amount) is not a matter of substance, it may very well be asked, What constitutes the substance of a jury trial?” 49 W.Va. L.Q. at 24. “What interest any party can have in a jury trial, except on the expectation of a jury determination of his rights or liabilities, is difficult to imagine.” Id.
One of the rules of practice and procedure promulgated by this Court is W.Va. R. Civ.P. 38(a), which provides that “[tjhe right of trial by jury as declared by the Constitution or statutes of the State shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.” The majority opinion is in violation of this rule and the Bill of Rights.
At common law, with a few aberrations,10 a remittitur in a case involving indeterminate or unliquidated damages was not proper, and the only recourse to correct a verdict for a clearly excessive sum in such a case was to grant a new trial by jury. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 477-85, 55 S.Ct. 296, 297-300, 79 L.Ed. 603, 606-10 (1935).
The Court in Dimick rejected the argument that the constitutional right to a jury trial could be altered by court decision on the ground that such right was premised upon the common law right to a jury trial and the courts retain the power to change the common law to meet changed conditions:
It is said that the common law is susceptible of growth and adaptation to new circumstances and situations, and that the courts have power to declare and effectuate what is the present rule in respect of a given subject without regard to the old rule; ... The common law is not immutable, but flexible, and upon its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions, [citation omitted] But here, we are dealing with a constitutional provision which has in effect adopted the rules of the common law, in respect of trial by jury, as these rules existed in 1791 [the year in which the Federal Constitution was adopted]. To effectuate any change in these rules is not to deal with the common law, qua common law, but to alter the Constitution. The distinction is fundamental, and has been clearly pointed out by Judge Cooley in 1 Const. Limitations, 8th ed., 124.
293 U.S. at 487, 55 S.Ct. at 301, 79 L.Ed. at 611.
*510The following is a good summary of the unconstitutionality of a remittitur in a case involving indeterminate damages:
[A]s long as the law, particularly in the form of constitutional sanctions, gives to a party the right to a jury trial, it would seem that the right should carry with it the privilege of determining its expediency. [emphasis in original] The only object in protecting the right with constitutional sanctions must have been to give a litigant power to make an arbitrary choice and prevent legislatures and courts from determining any question of expediency. Otherwise, the whole matter would have been trusted to legislative and judicial regulation.
... If there ever was anything which needed the aid of sophistry and artificial logic, it would seem to be a demonstration that the court, when it allows a remittitur or an additur under ordinary circumstances in a personal injury case, does not substitute its judgment for that of the jury. If the substitution takes place, how can it be asserted with any semblance of realism that the jury has tried the case and the parties have had a jury trial? Those who assert the contrary do not need to resort to the ‘legal scrap heap’, or any other source of precedents, to defend their stand. All that is necessary is to face the situation with a realism unadulterated with preference and let common sense have full sway.
49 W.Va.L.Q. at 36-37. The common sense of the people as expressed in the state constitution should prevail. “The constitutional scriveners did not repose in the bench the responsibility for finding facts, but in the peers of those seeking justice.” Addair v. Majestic Petroleum Co., 160 W.Va. 105, 112, 232 S.E.2d 821, 825 (1977).
III. DAMAGES NOT EXCESSIVE
As discussed above, a remittitur is not proper in this case. A new trial is not proper, either, because the finding of liability is supported by the evidence, and the amount of damages found is not “monstrous, ...” as set forth in Addair, supra.
The $10,000,000.00 verdict in this case would be divided among four individuals.11 The emotional damages sustained were substantial, permanent12 and “extraordinary” (according to the undisputed testimony of the plaintiff’s expert witness, a clinical psychologist). While no amount of money will “compensate” for the inconsolable grief, the wrongful death statute requires the jury to determine an amount of damages which is “fair and just” in the jury’s opinion, and there is no maximum limit of recovery under the statute. To determine whether the jury’s verdict should be set aside as “monstrous” and a new trial awarded, it is usually not very profitable to compare verdicts in other cases because “the character of the injuries sustained, and their resultant effect upon the injured party, ... are never identical, and but seldom similar.” Williams Paving Co. v. Kreidl, 200 Va. 196, 204, 104 S.E.2d 758, 764 (1958).13 A couple of comparisons, *511however, may be made as illustrative of the relative size of the verdict in this case to show that it is not a “shocking” amount.
In Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 615 F.Supp. 1546 (D.Colo.1985), the court denied the defendant’s motion for a remittitur or new trial after a jury verdict of $19,000,-000.00, including $5,000,000.00 for pain, suffering and humiliation, in favor of a 60-year-old plaintiff who had been discharged in violation of a state age discrimination statute. Compared to an award of $5,000,-000.00 for emotional injuries sustained by an individual, the verdict in the case now before this Court is not excessive at all, much less “monstrous.” Here, the award is to be divided among four individuals who have much longer life expectancies than the plaintiff in Rawson, supra, and the emotional injuries are far more severe.
A second indicator of the relative size of the verdict in this case is the fact that, according to Jury Verdict Research, Inc., the average verdict in the year 1985 in medical malpractice cases in this country exceeds $1,000,000.00. Church, Sorry, Your Policy is Canceled, Time, Mar. 24, 1986, 16, 20. The evidence in this case indicates that each of the four individuals who would recover damages (before deducting attorney’s fees, etc.) sustained “extraordinary,” not merely “average,” damages.
It must also be remembered that the verdict here was for permanent damages. Damages in a wrongful death case for non-pecuniary losses, such as mental anguish (unlike damages for pecuniary losses), should not be reduced to present value. Syl. pt. 3, Mooney v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 174 W.Va. 350, 326 S.E.2d 427 (1984). The jury is not to determine its award for solatium in a wrongful death case by determining a lump sum amount which, when invested, will result in an annual amount which is at once fair and just. Whether an award for solatium is excessive is not properly determined by calculating its annual yield. Pippen v. Denison, 66 Mich.App. 664, 677, 239 N.W.2d 704, 710 (1976); Wry v. Dial, 18 Ariz.App. 503, 514, 503 P.2d 979, 990 (1972), review denied (1973).14
No one doubts that the verdict is large. No one doubts, either, that the parents and siblings of Michael, the decedent, have endured and will continue to endure the ultimate loss. “The highest privilege that is given one in this life is to ‘rear and conduct through the vicissitudes of childhood and educate and maintain’ one’s children; no greater source of happiness pertains to this life.” Sample v. Consolidated Light & Ry., 50 W.Va. 472, 473, 40 S.E. 597, 598 (1901). Accord, Compania Dominicana de Aviacion v. Knapp, 251 So.2d 18, 24 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1971), cert. denied, 256 So.2d 6 (Fla.1971). That a damage award is “precedent shattering” is of little moment when the damages are in fact supported by the record. Pippen v. Denison, 66 Mich.App. 664, 677, 239 N.W.2d 704, 709-10 (1976). While the amount of the verdict is substantial, in a relative sense it is no more substantial than the injuries sustained by the decedent’s survivors. Kiniry v. Danbury Hospital, 183 Conn. 448, 464, 439 A.2d 408, 416 (1981); Pisel v. Stamford Hospital, 180 Conn. 314, 344, 430 A.2d 1, 16 (1980).15
*512IV. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
I compliment all trial counsel in this case for their very able representation of their respective clients. I believe, however, that the majority opinion will create more problems and raise more questions than it has resolved.
For example, may a trial court also direct a remittitur (with the option of a new trial) in a case involving indeterminate or unliqui-dated damages? If trial judges may direct a remittitur they will be “flying solo” because they will be unable to engage in “substantial collegial discussion” to arrive at sound amounts for remittiturs. If a reviewing court is to consider the parties’ deliberations (the pretrial settlement negotiations) in arriving at a “proper remit-titur,” why should the trial court or the reviewing court not also have access to the jury’s deliberations to assist them in substituting their opinions on the amount of damages for the jurors’ essentially advisory opinions on the same? May a trial court or the appellate court substitute its opinions for the jurors’ opinions on the amount of indeterminate damages and direct addi-turs?
The majority opinion gives no guidelines for its “state of the art” remittitur concept. It is difficult, therefore, to predict the ramifications of this amorphous decision. It has “junked” valuable precedents into the “legal scrap heap,” and. virtually all that remains is the thick “smoke” from the “bulldozer’s” operations. I do predict, though, that the majority will “torture” the facts in future cases to attempt to distinguish this case from those cases which may also involve remittitur issues.
V. CONCLUSION
In all of this discussion I do not forget the senseless and tragic death of Michael and the unbearable loss sustained by Mr. and Mrs. Roberts and their other children, “Pepper” and Ritchie.
“Those who have not brought a child into the world and loved it and planned for it, and then have it suddenly snatched away from them and killed can hardly have an adequate idea of the mental pain and anguish that one undergoes from such a tragedy. No other affliction so tortures and wears down the physical and nervous system.”
Barrett v. Charlson, 18 Md.App. 80, 93, 305 A.2d 166, 174 (1973), quoting Winner v. Sharp, 43 So.2d 634, 636-37 (Fla.1949).
My primary concern lies with the citizens of our State who have become victims of the tort system turbulence. In time, this issue will fade on the yellowed pages of history but the short-term expedient solutions reached by the major decision makers of our State will have inflicted permanent damages on innocent injured parties.
Based upon all of the above, I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice McGRAW joins me in this dissent and files a further dissent.
. The new trial option extended by the majority is apparently not restricted to the issue of damages. This conclusion is curious because the majority concludes that there was no reversible error in the conduct of the trial and that the finding of liability is "plainly right.” Indeed, as noted by the majority; Dr. Magnus does not contest on this appeal the finding of liability. (At trial Dr. Magnus did not call any expert witnesses on his behalf.) The hospital, on the other hand, does contest its liability. My review of the record indicates that the evidence supporting the hospital’s liability was so weak that I, as a member of the jury, would have contended for a percentage much less than the 18 percent of the total fault found by the jury to be the hospital’s comparative negligence. Even counsel for the plaintiff conceded during closing argument that there was no evidence that the nurses were negligent. The majority is correct, though, in its holding that there was sufficient *505evidence of the hospital’s negligence (relating to its initial investigation and annual evaluation of Dr. Magnus) to withstand the hospital’s motion for a directed verdict. In any event, for the sake of internal consistency, the majority opinion should extend the option of a new trial limited to the issue of damages.
. In the body of the majority opinion, two of the precedents of this Court contrary to the majority’s holding on remittitur are cited but are not expressly overruled: Fortner v. Napier, 153 W.Va. 143, 168 S.E.2d 737 (1969); Earl T. Browder, Inc. v. County Court, 145 W.Va. 696, 116 S.E.2d 867 (1960). This covert manner of overruling cases is not new to the author of the majority opinion. See Board of Church Extension v. Eads, 159 W.Va. 943, 956 n. 6, 230 S.E.2d 911, 918 n. 6 (1976) (expressly overruling a precedent deep within a lengthy footnote, a fact not overlooked in the concurring and dissenting opinions therein).
. W.Va. Const, art. Ill, § 13, part of this State’s Bill of Rights, provides:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars exclusive of interest and costs, the right of trial by jury, if required by either party, shall be preserved; and in such suit in a court of limited jurisdiction a jury shall consist of six persons. No fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any case than according to rule of court or law. (emphasis added)
. The majority opinion is encumbered with unnecessary dicta. I will resist the temptation to dissent to the dicta, such as whether there are similarities between the legal system and the Great Cathedral in Salisbury, because "a dissent to dicta is like the sound of one hand clapping[.j” Pittsburgh Elevator Co. v. West Virginia Board of Regents, 172 W.Va. 743, 757-759, 310 S.E.2d 675, 690 (1983) (Neely, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). ”[L]aw must be written with care. It is meant to be an exercise of the mind, not a venting of the spleen." Id.
. I use the term "solatium” in this opinion to categorize those emotional injuries listed in W.Va.Code, 55-7-6(c)(l)(A) [1982], quoted infra in the text after the discussion of Bond v. City of Huntington, 166 W.Va. 581, 276 S.E.2d 539 (1981), in which this Court used the term "sola-tium” in the identical manner. See also Black’s Law Dictionary 1248 (5th ed. 1979).
. Citations herein are to the statute as amended in the year 1982. The 1985 amendment to W.Va.Code, 55-7-6(d) is not relevant in this case.
. IV. Va. Code, 56-6-11 [1985] now provides that a jury in a civil case shall consist of six members.
. The dissenting opinion of Judge Woods is separately published in the unofficial reports at 7 S.E. 455.
. See Van Lom v. Schneiderman, 187 Or. 89, 210 P.2d 461 (1949). The court held that Or. Const. art. VII, § 3 prohibits a trial court or an appellate court from setting aside a jury verdict for unliquidated damages, and awarding a remit-titur, regardless of the size of the verdict, or awarding a new trial, on the ground that the damages are excessive, unless “there is no evidence to support the verdict." See also State ex rel. Young v. Crookham, 290 Or. 61, 68, 618 P.2d 1268, 1272 (1980).
. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 55 S.Ct. 296, 79 L.Ed. 603 (1935), holding an additur to be improper in federal courts as a violation of the right to a jury trial under the Federal Constitution, also contains a discussion of, and attempts to distinguish, remittiturs. The opinion recognizes but strongly questions as unreasoned the few older English precedents, antedating adoption of the seventh amendment in 1791, which permit remittiturs in cases involving unliqui-dated damages. The opinion also strongly questions, therefore, the validity of prior opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States upholding, without citation of common law authority on point, remittiturs in such cases in federal courts. The Court in Dimick felt compelled, however, under stare decisis, to continue to allow remittiturs in cases in federal courts involving a clearly excessive, unliquidated-damage award. Prior to the majority opinion in the case now before this Court, the contrary rule, in accord with the common law embedded in W.Va. Const, art. Ill, § 13, was stare decisis in this jurisdiction.
. An equal allocation of $2,500,000.00 for each of the four plaintiffs is assumed for purposes of this opinion because the jury did not direct a different allocation as W.Va.Code, 55-7-6(b) [1982] authorizes. I also note that the jury failed to comply with W. Va. Code, 55-7-6(c)(2) [1982], which requires the jury to set forth separately the amount of pecuniary damages for reasonable funeral, hospital, medical, etc., expenses (here totalling $6,872.55). Consequently the entire verdict will be deemed, for purposes of this opinion, to be for nonpecuniary, emotional damages.
. The life expectancies of these four individuals, the father, mother and two siblings, were, respectively, 33.6 years, 46.6 years, 64 years and 66.9 years.
.For collections of cases involving the wrongful death of a minor child see annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 934 (1973 and Supp.1985), especially § 5 on infants under seven years of age; 2 S. Speiser, Recovery For Wrongful Death § 9:21 (2d ed. 1975 and current Cum.Supp.) (decedents below seven years of age); J. Stein, Damages and Recovery: Personal Injury and Death Actions § 253 (1972 and Cum.Supp.1985).
Comparing verdicts in other cases, from our own jurisdiction or others, is a dangerous game, to say the least. No two persons are alike. No two injuries are alike. No two juries are alike. Unlike workers’ compensation, awards for pain and suffering in personal injury actions or for solatium in wrongful death actions should not be based upon pre-determined schedules. The worth and dignity of the individual is a touch*511stone of our society. Wry v. Dial, 18 Ariz.App. 503, 514-15, 503 P.2d 979, 990-91 (1972), review denied (1973).
. Mooney v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., supra in the text, effectively overruled Brewer v. Appalachian Constructors, Inc., 138 W.Va. 437, 453, 76 S.E.2d 916, 925 (1953), to the extent that Brewer calculated an annual yield on a verdict (including an award for pain and suffering) and found the verdict to be excessive when the annual interest on the verdict nearly equalled the plaintiffs lost annual future earnings and would also leave the lump sum award intact at the end of the plaintiffs life expectancy.
. I will not extend this already lengthy dissenting opinion with a discussion of essentially public policy issues which are raging in the state legislatures and in Congress, specifically, whether there is a need for "tort reform," such as, “ceilings" on pain-and-suffering awards, limits on attorneys’ fees, etc., and who is to "blame” for the so-called liability insurance "crisis”— judges, juries, lawyers, doctors or other health care providers, insurance companies, etc.
Statutory "ceilings” on pain-and-suffering and solatium awards would not run afoul of the second sentence of W.Va. Const, art. Ill, § 13 because the ceilings would not constitute a legislative "reexamination” of facts (amount of dam*512ages) found by a jury but would merely place a limit in advance on the amount of damages to be found by the jury. There would be no substitution of opinion on the amount of damages.
I express no opinion here on whether ceilings on pain-and-suffering awards in common law tort cases would violate the first sentence of W.Va. Const, art. Ill, § 13 or any other state constitutional provision. See generally Note, Medical Malpractice — Constitutionality Of Limits On Liability, 78 W.Va.L.Rev. 381, 386-90 (1976) (suggesting that statutory limits on liability in common law personal injury actions violate the right to access to the courts guaranteed by W. Va. Const, art. Ill, § 17; contrasting statutory limits on liability in statutory actions, such as wrongful death actions or workers’ compensation cases, and distinguishing the statutory abol-ishment of alienation of affections actions, as the latter involved disruption of personal relations as opposed to “an injury done to [a person], in his person, property or reputation" set forth in W.Va. Const, art. Ill, § 17).