The question presented by this appeal is whether the North Carolina General Statutes require the Wake County Board of Education to obtain parental consent before assigning students to year-round calendar schools. Because the plain language of the statutes authorizes the creation and assignment to year-round calendar schools, we conclude the Board may assign students to year-round schools without parental consent, and we therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
I. Background
The underlying facts of this appeal, as found by the trial court and recited by the Court of Appeals, are undisputed. The Wake County public school system (WCPSS) is the second-largest school system in the state and one of the fastest-growing school systems in the country, having grown more than thirty percent since 2000. Over 128,000 students were enrolled during the 2006-2007 school year, and the school population is expected to gain an additional 65,000 students by 2015. The most dramatic growth and overcrowding are in schools along the N.C. 55 corridor, which includes Cary, Apex, and Holly Springs.
To accommodate the tremendous student population growth, the Wake County Board of Education (the Board) has opened thirty-three additional schools since July 2000, renovated many other schools, and plans to build thirty-one new schools by 2012. Despite the extensive construction, many Wake County schools remain extremely overcrowded and are forced to use cafeterias, libraries, auditoriums, *167offices, common areas, teacher lounges, and even converted storage rooms as classrooms. School campuses are also increasingly resorting to using mobile classrooms, a situation that overtaxes facilities such as restrooms, media centers, and cafeterias.
In addition to building new schools and using more mobile classrooms, the Board has attempted to alleviate overcrowding by operating a limited number of elementary and middle schools on a multitrack year-round‘calendar. The WCPSS operates on three different calendars: a traditional calendar, in which school begins in late August and continues until early June; a modified calendar (a single-track year-round calendar), in which the school year begins in late July and ends in late May; and a multi-track year-round calendar. In the multi-track year-round schools, students are divided into four “tracks,” each with its own schedule. Track schedules are staggered so that three tracks are in school and one track is on break at all times. Because the multi-track system allows year-round schools to use their buildings twelve months a year, rather than nine, a year-round school can accommodate up to one-third more students than a traditional calendar school. Regardless of which calendar students follow, all students attend school for 180 days. Year-round students receive the same amount of vacation time as those at traditional calendar schools; the vacation time is simply spread throughout the year, rather than limited to the summer months. Year-round students also have the same holidays as students on the traditional calendar.
In September 2006 the Board voted to convert nineteen elementary and three middle schools to a year-round calendar starting in the 2007-2008 school year. On 6 February 2007, after holding three public hearings, the Board approved its final student assignment plan for the 2007-2008 school year. Under that plan, 20,717 students were assigned to newly-converted or newly-built year-round schools. Previously 17,855 of those students had been assigned to traditional calendar schools.1
On 13 March 2007, plaintiffs filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief from the Board’s assignment plan, asserting that the Board lacked the authority to convert traditional *168calendar schools to year-round schools and then assign WCPSS students to those schools on a mandatory basis. Upon hearing the matter, the trial court concluded the Board was authorized to operate and assign students to year-round calendar schools, but only with “informed parental consent.” Accordingly, the trial court entered an order prohibiting the Board from requiring “the attendance of students at year round calendar schools without informed parental consent.”
The Board appealed to the Court of Appeals, which unanimously reversed the trial court, holding that “the Board is authorized by the General Assembly to establish year-round schools and to assign students to attend those schools without obtaining their parents’ prior consent.” Wake Cares, Inc. v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Educ., - N.C. App. -, -, 660 S.E.2d 217, 220 (2008). We dismissed plaintiffs’ appeal based on a substantial constitutional question, but allowed their petition for discretionary review. We now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
II. Analysis
The trial court and plaintiffs agree that the Board has the authority to create and to assign students to year-round calendar schools. Plaintiffs argue, however, that the Board must obtain parental consent before assigning students to year-round schools. We must therefore determine whether parental consent is a prerequisite condition to year-round school assignment by the Board under the North Carolina General Statutes.
We begin by recognizing that local boards of education have broad general statutory power to control and supervise public schools:
All powers and duties conferred and imposed by law respecting public schools, which are not expressly conferred and imposed upon some other official, are conferred and imposed upon local boards of education. Said boards of education shall have general control and supervision of all matters pertaining to the public schools in their respective administrative units and they shall enforce the school law in their respective units.
N.C.G.S. § 115C-36 (2007); see also id. § 115C-40 (2007) (“Local boards of education, subject to any paramount powers vested by law in the State Board of Education or any other authorized agency shall have general control and supervision of all matters pertaining *169to the public schools in their respective local school administrative units . . . .”). Thus, unless such power is expressly delegated elsewhere, local school boards possess the inherent authority to control and supervise “all matters pertaining to the public schools.” Id.
In addition to the broad grant of authority reserved under N.C.G.S. § 115C-36, section 115C-47 sets forth a list of fifty-four specific powers and duties vested in local boards of education. N.C.G.S. § 115C-47 (2007). Such powers and duties include the duty to provide “adequate school systems,” id. § 115C-47(1), to “assure appropriate class size,” id. § 115C-47(10), and, notably, to “determine the school calendar,” id. § 115047(11). Indeed, N.C.G.S. § 115047(11) instructs that “[l]ocal boards of education shall determine the school calendar under G.S. 115C-84.2.” Clearly, local boards of education are not only authorized, but statutorily required to set school calendars, subject to N.C.G.S. § 115C-84.2. With these broad powers and duties in mind, we therefore turn to the specific school calendar guidelines of N.C.G.S. § 115C-84.2.
Subsection 115C-84.2(a) states that “[e]ach local board of education shall adopt a school calendar consisting of 215 days all of which shall fall within the fiscal year.” Id. § 115C-84.2(a) (2007). School calendars must include a “minimum of 180 days and 1,000 hours of instruction covering at least nine calendar months.” Id. § 115C-84.2(a)(1). The statutory requirement of school calendars covering at least nine calendar months comports with Article IX of the North Carolina Constitution, which states that a “general and uniform system of free public schools . . . shall be maintained at least nine months in every year.” N.C. Const. art. IX, § 2, cl. 1. These nine months represent only the minimum amount of time required for instruction; the legislature may provide for a longer term if desired. Harris v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 274 N.C. 343, 353, 163 S.E.2d 387, 394 (1968); Frazier v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 194 N.C. 49, 63, 138 S.E. 433, 440 (1927). The local board “shall designate when the 180 instructional days shall occur.” N.C.G.S. § 115C-84.2(a)(1); see also id. § 115C-84.2(d) (2007) (“Local boards of education shall determine the dates of opening and closing the public schools . . ..”).
Section 115C-84.2 does not classify school calendars as “traditional,” “modified,” or “year-round,” nor does it express any preference as to the school calendars local boards should adopt. N.C.G.S. § 115C-84.2 indicates, however, that local school boards may devise different types of school calendars to achieve educational goals: *170“Local boards and individual schools are encouraged to use the calendar flexibility in order to meet the annual performance standards set by the State Board.” Id. § 115C-84.2(a). Notably, N.C.G.S. § 115C-84.2 specifically recognizes year-round schools as a legitimate calendar option. While N.C.G.S. § 115C-84.2 places some limitations on school calendars, see id. § 115C-84.2(b) (2007), year-round schools are expressly exempted from several of these limitations. For example, a school calendar “shall include at least 42 consecutive days when teacher attendance is not required unless . . . the school is a year-round school.” Id. § 115C-84.2(b)(2) (emphasis added). Further, “[ejxcept for year-round schools, the opening date for students shall not be before August 25, and the closing date for students shall not be after June 10.” Id. § 115C-84.2(d) (emphasis added). Thus, N.C.G.S. § 115C-84.2 explicitly acknowledges year-round calendars as a valid school calendar option. We find no statutory restrictions or legislative disapproval of the use of year-round school calendars in N.C.G.S. § 115C-84.2. To the contrary, subsection 115C-84.2(a) encourages local school boards to utilize calendar flexibility.
Having determined that utilization of a year-round calendar is authorized and, indeed, even to some extent encouraged, there remains only the question of whether parental consent plays any role in the year-round school assignment process. The plain language of our General Statutes expressly rejects any such implication. School assignment is solely within the power of the local school board, and “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, the authority of each board of education in the matter of assignment of children to the public schools shall be full and complete, and its decision as to the assignment of any child to any school shall be final.” Id. § 115C-366(b) (2007).
Although N.C.G.S. § 115C-84.2(a) states that “[l]ocal boards of education shall consult with parents and the employed public school personnel in the development of the school calendar,” id. § 84.2(a) (emphasis added), it does not require parental consent in developing school calendars, nor does it implicate school assignment in any manner. Parents who are dissatisfied with their child’s school assignment may apply to the local school board for reassignment and receive a hearing on the matter. See id. § 115C-369 (2007). At such hearing, the local board must consider “the best interest of the child, the orderly and efficient administration of the public schools, the proper administration of the school to which reassignment is requested and the instruction, health, and safety of the pupils there *171enrolled, and shall assign said child in accordance with such factors.” Id. § 115C-369(c). Any final determination by the local board as to reassignment is then subject to judicial review. Id. § 115C-370 (2007).
In sum, the General Assembly has conferred broad, specific, and sole authority upon local school boards to determine school calendars. Moreover, N.C.G.S. § 115C-84.2 explicitly recognizes year-round calendars as acceptable school calendars. As such, parental consent is no more a factor in assignment to year-round schools than it is to traditional schools. When assignment to a particular school places too great a burden on individual children, as is alleged by plaintiffs in the instant case, parents may seek reassignment and judicial review of any assignment decision.
Plaintiffs argue, however, that N.C.G.S. § 115C-1 requires the Board to operate and provide equal access for all students to traditional calendar schools. N.C.G.S. § 115C-1 states:
A general and uniform system of free public schools shall be provided throughout the State, wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all students, in accordance with the provisions of Article IX of the Constitution of North Carolina. . . . There shall be operated in every local school administrative unit a uniform school term of nine months, without the levy of a State ad valorem tax therefor.
Id. § 115C-1 (2007). Plaintiffs contend there are fundamental differences in the educational experiences and opportunities available to children attending year-round schools and those attending traditional calendar schools. According to plaintiffs, year-round schools are therefore not part of a “uniform system” of public schools under N.C.G.S § 115C-1. Thus, plaintiffs reason, while the Board may offer year-round schools as an alternative to traditional schools, it must give all students the option of attending a traditional calendar school, and the Board cannot compel students to attend a non-traditional calendar school. Further, contend plaintiffs, N.C.G.S. § 115C-1 requires “a uniform school term of nine months,” and that the word “term” indicates that such nine months must be consecutive, rather than spread throughout the calendar year. We are not persuaded.
Section 115C-1 merely codifies our state’s constitutional requirement of “a general and uniform system of free public schools, which shall be maintained at least nine months in every year.” N.C. Const, art. IX, § 2, cl. 1. This constitutional requirement that the public *172school system be “uniform” in no way implicates the school calendar. See Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 174 N.C. 469, 473, 93 S.E. 1001, 1002 (1917) (noting that the term “uniform” qualifies the word “system” and requires only that provision be made “for establishment of schools of like kind throughout all sections of the State and available to all of the school population of the territories contributing to their support” (citations omitted)). The “general and uniform” system of public schools indicates “a fundamental right to a sound basic education.” Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 348, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (1997). The constitutional guarantee of the opportunity for a sound basic education does not require, however, “that equal educational opportunities be afforded students in all of the school districts of the state.” Id. at 351, 488 S.E.2d at 257. Plaintiffs do not argue that year-round schools fail to provide a sound basic education. In fact, the trial court found that “there is no contention that the educational opportunity offered by a year round school is better or worse than the educational opportunity offered by a traditional elementary or middle school.” Thus, while the educational opportunities available to children attending year-round schools may differ from those available to pupils at traditional schools, these differences do not remove year-round calendar schools from the “uniform system” of public schools.
Further, on its face, N.C.G.S. § 115C-1 does not require that the school term consist of nine consecutive months or otherwise dictate the manner in which the school term should be calendared. Plaintiffs’ reading of the word “term” to mandate nine consecutive months places the very general language of section 115C-1 in conflict with the specific guidelines of section 115C-84.2, a position repugnant to our canons of statutory interpretation. See Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 240 N.C. 118, 126, 81 S.E.2d 256, 262 (1954) (stating that “ ‘[a]n unnecessary implication arising from one [statutory] section, inconsistent with the express terms of another on the same subject, yields to the expressed intent’ ” (citations omitted)). We agree with the Court of Appeals that N.C.G.S. § 115C-1, “consistent with the purpose of the constitutional provision it was designed to implement, does not mandate equal access to a school term of nine consecutive months, but rather refers to the minimum quantum of educational instruction required.” Wake Cares, - N.C. App. at -, 660 S.E.2d at 231. Plaintiffs offer no other statutory support for their position, and we have found none. We conclude N.C.G.S. § 115C-1 does not limit the Board’s authority to assign students to year-round schools.
*173III. Conclusion
We hold that the Board is statutorily authorized to compel attendance at year-round calendar schools. The Board’s action in converting traditional calendar schools to year-round calendar schools comports with its statutory duty to provide a school system adequate to the needs of increasing student enrollment while assuring appropriate class sizes in its schools. See N.C.G.S. § 115C-47(1), (10). Moreover, the more efficient use by year-round calendar schools of existing school facilities complies with the public policy of the state to create a public school system “in the most cost-effective manner” while ensuring a sound basic education for all North Carolina children. Id. § 115C-408(a) (2007).
We recognize the emotional nature of this case, but we must emphasize that our duty goes no further than to determine the legal authority for implementing mandatory year-round schools, not the wisdom of such a decision. This Court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the Board. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 357, 488 S.E.2d at 261 (“[T]he administration of the public schools of the state is best left to the legislative and executive branches of government.”); see also Coggins ex rel. Coggins v. Bd. of Educ., 223 N.C. 763, 769, 28 S.E.2d 527, 531 (1944). As noted by the Court of Appeals, “if plaintiffs disagree with mandatory assignment to year-round schools, their remedy lies with the electoral process or through communications with the legislative and executive branches of government.” Wake Cares, - N.C. App. at -, 660 S.E.2d at 233. We agree, and we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
AFFIRMED.
. Contrary to Justice Martin’s assertion that this case arises from the Board’s decision to “change its year-round school program from voluntary to mandatory.” each year-round school has had a portion of students involuntarily assigned to it since 2003. Thus, the Board has not “changed” its program, merely expanded it to encompass more students, including plaintiffs’ children. It is this expansion of mandatory year-round school assignment that has prompted the instant case.