dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the defendant impliedly waived his physician-patient privilege in this case. As such, the focal issue of this appeal is whether, in fact, the defendant’s records contained any information “relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(1) (1990).
*31In State v. Wingard, 317 N.C. 590, 346 S.E.2d 638 (1986), our Supreme Court reiterated the test for relevancy by stating that “[ejvidence is relevant if it has any logical tendency, however slight, to prove a fact in issue in the case.” Id. at 597, 346 S.E.2d at 643. This Court in Shellhorn v. Brad Ragan, Inc., 38 N.C. App. 310, 248 S.E.2d 103, disc. review denied, 295 N.C. 735, 249 S.E.2d 804 (1978), differentiated the relevancy test for discovery from the relevancy test for admissibility into evidence: “To be relevant for purposes of discovery,” the Court stated, “the information need only be ‘reasonably calculated’ to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Id. at 314, 248 S.E.2d at 106. As such, this Court in Shellhorn concluded that “[a] determination that particular information is relevant for discovery is not conclusive of its admissibility as relevant evidence at trial.” Id.
The majority concludes here that even if there is evidence in the medical records that would be reasonably calculated to lead to discovery, the plaintiff was not prejudiced because there was evidence to show that the plaintiff was the actual driver of the car. In short, the majority concludes that even if the evidence in the medical records is relevant, it is not material and is therefore not prejudicial to the plaintiff. For this proposition they cite, Warren v. City of Asheville, 74 N.C. App. 402, 328 S.E.2d 859, disc. review denied, 314 N.C. 336, 333 S.E.2d 496 (1985), a case that is, in my opinion, distinguishable because the evidence in that case was admitted erroneously at trial and found not to have been prejudicial; whereas, in the case at hand, the evidence is sought for purposes of discovery. This puts an added qualification on the discovery of information before trial by requiring that nonprivileged information be not only relevant, but also material.
I do not believe such a materiality requirement exists under North Carolina law. Rule 26(b)(1) “demonstrates the broad and liberal scope of the discovery provisions contained in the rules. Questions of materiality do not come into play.” W. Shuford, North Carolina Civil Practice and Procedure § 26-5 (3d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1990). Likewise, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 34, which controls the production of documents and things, contains the same broad scope of discovery set out in Rule 26. “The original [Rule 34] had been limited to inspection of documents and things that were ‘material to any matter involved in the action.’ The amendment struck this language and substituted the words, ‘relating to any of the matters within the scope of the examination permitted by Rule 26(b).’ ” *328 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2201 (1970). I disagree with the majority and, therefore, would conclude that relevant information that is not privileged is discoverable.
Moreover, even if we consider the information here under the standard set by the majority, there was evidence in the medical records that was both relevant and material. Clearly, the statement entered in the medical records by the physician assistant indicating that the defendant “apparently ran off the road” was not only relevant but material to the issue of who was driving the car at the time of the accident. Moreover, the medical records contain information on the identity of the physician assistant which would allow the plaintiff the opportunity to depose him for information that could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The medical records detail the nature of the injuries suffered by the defendant which could support the plaintiffs contention that the defendant was driving. To suggest that this information could not have produced a different result is, in my opinion, a speculation that could be well avoided by allowing the discovery of the information in the medical records.