(dissenting). I respectfully dissent because I believe that the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board committed an error of law in determining that plaintiff’s injuries did not arise out of his employment.
While at work, plaintiff was assaulted by a co-employee. Plaintiff suffered serious head injuries and is now totally and permanently disabled. Plaintiff brought this workers’ compensation claim and a civil claim against the co-employee. The civil suit was dismissed on the basis that plaintiff’s exclusive remedy was under the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act.
A hearing referee ruled that plaintiff was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits since his injuries were sustained during the course of, and arose but of, plaintiff’s employment. The workers’ Compensation appeal board reversed, making the following findings of fact:
"The record was consistent concerning the origin of the animosity against plaintiff by his assailant, Ralph *775Miller, then married to plaintiffs ex-wife. Miller admitted hating plaintiff since becoming acquainted with the ex-wife at defendant’s plant complex where they also worked, but in a different plant from plaintiff. * * * All of their earlier confrontations, at or away from work, were admittedly of a personal nature, and Miller admitted knowing plaintiff only through his ex-wife’s relationship with plaintiff. * * * The incident producing plaintiffs disability resulted from plaintiffs refusal to pay the expenses for his own daughter’s dental braces while she continued to live with her mother and stepfather.
"Miller testified that phone calls to their home and at least one personal contact at work from plaintiff caused his wife to become more nervous and resulted in his taking over her job on occasion, making him more 'uptight’ about his job performance. * * * However, there was no evidence that these disagreements involved plaintiffs job duties, or that Miller’s presumed extra work contributed to the personal anger provoking his attack on plaintiff. This admittedly was building since his becoming acquainted with plaintiffs ex-wife and especially since learning that plaintiffs daughter had attempted (two weeks before his assault) to commit suicide after plaintiff reportedly visited the Friend of the Court concerning his support payments. * * *
"Miller’s testimony established that, after learning of plaintiffs refusal to pay for the braces, he became angry and drove two and a half miles from his home on his day off to confront plaintiff at defendant’s plant complex. * * * He gained admittance to the complex by lying to the guard at the second gate that he was late for work after being refused entry at the first gate by disclosing the personal nature of his mission. * * * Discovering plaintiffs new reassigned work station within the multiplant area, he hitched a ride on a maintenance truck to that location. * * * Miller’s own testimony, plus that of plaintiffs co-employees who witnessed the assault, described Miller as the clear aggressor without any physical provocation or defense by plaintiff. Plaintiff was never given the opportunity to retreat because Miller stated that he did not allow plaintiff out of 'hands reach’ and stayed with him for *776several minutes, pushing and shoving plaintiff before hitting him on the jaw with his fist and knocking him back onto the concrete floor.”
I agree with the majority that appellate review of a decision of the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board is limited. The appeal board’s findings of fact will not be set aside in the absence of fraud if there is evidence in the record to support the board’s findings. Const 1963, art 6, § 28; MCL 418.861; MSA 17.237(861); Howard v General Motors Corp, 132 Mich App 639; 348 NW2d 286 (1984). The appeal board’s decision, however, can be reversed if the board has operated within the wrong legal framework or where its decision is based upon erroneous legal reasoning. Schaefer v Williamston Community Schools, 117 Mich App 26; 323 NW2d 577 (1982), lv den 417 Mich 928 (1983). There is no dispute that plaintiffs injuries were sustained during the course of his employment. Plaintiff was injured at his work station during work hours. The critical issue in this case is whether plaintiffs injuries arose out of his employment. The determination of whether certain injuries arise out of the claimant’s employment may be a question of law, a question of fact, or a mixed question of law and fact depending upon the circumstances presented in each case. Koschay v Barnett Pontiac, Inc, 386 Mich 223, 225; 191 NW2d 334 (1971); Marcotte v Tamarack City Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 120 Mich App 671, 676; 327 NW2d 325 (1982).
An injury occurring to an employee on an employer’s premises is not per se compensable. MacDonald v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 132 Mich App 688; 348 NW2d 12 (1984). To be compensable the worker’s injury must result from the work itself, or from the stresses, tensions, or associations *777of the working environment, as a circumstance or incident to the employment relationship. MacDonald, supra. In essence, the injury must be work-related.
While I accept the WCAB’s findings of fact, I would find that the board made an error of law in determining that the injuries arose totally from a personal dispute and were not related to plaintiff’s employment.1 The relevant law is stated in 1 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, Assaults, § 11.00, p 3-161:
"Assaults arise out of the employment either if the risk of assault is increased because of the nature or setting of the work, or if the reason for the assault was a quarrel having its origin in the work. A few jurisdictions deny compensation if the claimant himself was the aggressor; most reject this defense if the employment in fact caused the fight to break out. An increasing number accept the idea that the strain of enforced close contact may in itself provide the necessary work connection. Assaults for private reasons do not arise out of the employment unless, by facilitating an assault which would not otherwise be made, the employment becomes a contributing factor. Assaults by lunatics, drunks, and children have generally been found to arise out of the employment, and the same has been held by some courts in the case of unexplained or mistaken-identity assaults, although there is authority to the contrary.”
Applying the proper legal standard to this case, the facts as found by the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board support a finding that plaintiff’s injuries were work-related. Plaintiff’s assailant began hating plaintiff because of an incident that occurred at work. The "personal” dispute, which *778led to the assault, concerned the question whether plaintiffs employee benefits could be applied toward his daughter’s braces. The assailant was the stepfather of plaintiffs daughter. The cause for the dispute, employee benefits, is clearly work-related.
The employer’s negligence also aided the assailant in making a surprise attack. The assailant did not work the same shift as plaintiff, but was allowed on the premises even though he did not have a proper color-coded badge. The appeal board attempts to explain away this undisputed fact by finding that the assailant lied when he told the security guard that he was late for his shift. The assailant’s lie, however, is legally irrelevant in light of the undisputed fact that the assailant did not work the shift that he claimed he was late for and did not have a proper color-coded badge, which should have been checked by the security guard. Despite the fact that the assailant was obviously on the premises without authority, the assailant was driven to the plaintiffs work site by one of the employer’s maintenance crews. These actions allowed the assailant to trap the unsuspecting plaintiff at his work station. The WCAB clearly found that plaintiff was trapped at his work station since it accepted the assailant’s testimony that he would not allow plaintiff out of hand’s reach and would not give plaintiff the opportunity to retreat. Had the assault occurred elsewhere, plaintiff may have seen the assailant coming and taken the opportunity to retreat. Instead, plaintiff fell and hit his head on the plant’s concrete floor. The working environment therefore exacerbated this altercation.
The hearing referee in this case applied the proper legal standard and reached this same result finding that plaintiffs injuries are compensable. I would agree and reverse the decision of the WCAB.
Since I accept the WCAB’s findings of fact, I feel that Brady v Clark Equipment Co, 72 Mich App 274; 249 NW2d 388 (1976), rev’d 400 Mich 806 (1977), is distinguishable.