dissenting.
I agree with Division 1 of the majority opinion that OCGA § 9-*74711-4 (k) permits ordinary process as a means of service in a mandamus action. However, I respectfully dissent to the holding in Division 2 that the superior court properly dismissed the taxpayer’s petition on substantive grounds. The superior court erred in its application of OCGA § 48-8-121 (g) (1) (B) to find that taxpayer Haugen’s claims failed as a matter of law.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the $11.8 million in net tax revenues, collected over and above the $60 million amount specified in both the authorizing resolution and the referendum voted on by the taxpayers of Henry County, qualifies as “excess proceeds” under OCGA § 48-8-121 (g) (1) (B), and therefore, is required to be used to reduce ad valorem taxes. See OCGA § 48-8-121 (g) (2).1 The strained analysis of the majority completely nullifies the statutory provision and deprives the taxpayers of the rightful reduction of their tax burden.
OCGA § 48-8-121 (g) (1) (B) plainly defines “excess proceeds” as net tax proceeds “in excess of the maximum cost of the project or projects stated in the resolution or ordinance calling for the imposition of the tax or in excess of the actual cost of such project or projects.” (Emphasis supplied.) The statute is not ambiguous. As the majority acknowledges, the statutory language is in the disjunctive, and the well-settled meaning of the connective “or” is that it presents an alternative choice, that is, an election of one of two things. Gearinger v. Lee, 266 Ga. 167, 169 (2) (465 SE2d 440) (1996); Ga. Paper Stock Co. v. State Tax Bd., 174 Ga. 816, 819 (164 SE 197) (1932). “[W]hen the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, judicial construction is forbidden. Six Flags Over Ga. v. Kull, 276 Ga. 210, 211 (576 SE2d 880) (2003).” Jennings v. McIntosh County Bd. of Commrs., 276 Ga. 842, 845 (3) (583 SE2d 839) (2003). Yet, the majority takes it upon itself to reconstruct the statute in order to avoid what it characterizes as the “anomalous result that the County cannot use available SPLOST revenues to complete those very projects for which the tax was expressly proposed, approved [,] and imposed.” But the majority’s reasoning is the anomaly.
The statute provides that there are “excess proceeds” in two instances - when the net tax revenues exceed the maximum cost of the project or projects specified in the resolution or ordinance, or *748when these revenues exceed the actual cost of such project or projects. The majority scoffs at the estimated cost component of the statute and focuses solely on the fact that certain projects funded by the SPLOST remain uncompleted. Yet it is the estimated cost, in this case $60 million, that is proposed and presented to the taxpayers for their approval. And it is this estimated cost that the General Assembly has clearly determined to be one of two yardsticks by which to measure “excess proceeds” under OCGA § 48-8-121 (g) (1) (B).
Decided March 1, 2004 — Reconsideration denied April 14, 2004. James L. Haugen, pro se.Even if the forthright language of the statute could be characterized as ambiguous, and thus susceptible of judicial construction, basic rules of statutory construction will produce the same result. This Court must give a sensible and intelligent effect to each part of the statute. It cannot be presumed that the legislature intended that any part of a statute would be without meaning and mere surplus-age. Transportation Ins. Co. v. El Chico Restaurants, 271 Ga. 774, 776 (524 SE2d 486) (1999); Brown v. Liberty County, 271 Ga. 634, 635 (522 SE2d 466) (1999). What is more, the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly. Kemp v. City of Claxton, 269 Ga. 173, 175 (1) (496 SE2d 712) (1998). A stated purpose of Ga. L. 1994, p. 1668, applicable to the SPLOST in this case is “to change certain provisions regarding the expenditure of excess proceeds.” Id. at 1669. This demonstrates the clear legislative intent that “excess proceeds” can exist in the two instances specified in OCGA § 48-8-121 (g) (1) (B).
Last, but certainly not least, the majority’s decision works a grave injustice to the taxpayers of Henry County. The result is that the burden of the uncompleted county projects is shifted to the unwitting taxpayer, rather than holding the taxing authority accountable for a seemingly unrealistic assessment of cost and/or project scope. It forces the taxpayers of Henry County to fund county projects in an amount which was never disclosed, and certainly never approved by them. In the final analysis, it is simply that the taxing authority should say what it means and mean what it says. The taxpayers deserve no less.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Sears and Justice Thompson join in this dissent.
*749O’Quinn & Cronin, Michael A. O’Quinn, Donald A. Cronin, Jr., for appellees.OCGA § 48-8-121 (g) (2) provides:
Excess proceeds subject to this subsection shall be used solely for the purpose of reducing any indebtedness of the county other than indebtedness incurred pursuant to this article. If there is no such other indebtedness or, if the excess proceeds exceed the amount of any such other indebtedness, then the excess proceeds shall then next be paid into the general fund of the county, it being the intent that any funds so paid into the general fund of the county be used for the purpose of reducing ad valorem taxes.