concurring specially.
I concur fully in Divisions 1 and 3 but rely on a different basis for the rejection of Jett’s second enumeration of error, which is ruled on in Division 2 of the majority opinion.
Jett’s enumeration is that “[t]he trial court erred in requiring Appellant to answer the State’s Complaint in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination.”
The State’s complaint for forfeiture was served on Jett on May 28, 1996, and Jett filed a purported answer on June 20 within the 30 days allowed by OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (3). In it he claimed only that he was part owner of the subdivision lot which the State sought forfeiture of, which he described, and he responded separately to each of the other allegations in the State’s complaint. He did not raise any Fifth Amendment right as a reason for not complying with the very specific listed requirements of OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (3) as to the real property, nor did he raise this as a reason for not filing a possible claim to any of the personal property involved. Nor, before the time for claims expired, did he seek a stay under subsection (w) of the statute on Fifth Amendment grounds.
Instead, long after the time had passed, Jett filed a purported amendment to his answer, stating that he “took an interest” in the real property on June 5, 1986 for $5,000, which conveyance was recorded in designated property records of the county. In this answer he also asserted a claim to $5,000 of the cash seized by the State and explained that it was the proceeds from settlement of an auto collision and included damages for “the Jett vehicle.” It was initially at this time, by a separate motion, that Jett claimed his Fifth Amendment rights were “violated by the State in forcing Claimant to respond to a civil action after a criminal action has begun.”
Regardless of the merits of such a theory, it was advanced too late. The time for raising it would be within the time for filing an answer, as his privilege is waived if not invoked at the “first opportunity.” Cohran v. Carlin, 165 Ga. App. 141, 144 (297 SE2d 738) (1982); see Axson v. Nat. Surety Corp., 254 Ga. 248 (327 SE2d 732) (1985) (party must raise Fifth Amendment privilege as to each question asked). As the trial court pointed out, “[h]ad he [raised his Fifth Amendment issues prior to filing his purported answer], the Court would have had the opportunity to conduct an in camera review or *659other proceedings to determine the validity of his Fifth Amendment claim.”
Decided February 19, 1998. James E. Voyles, for appellant. J. Tom Morgan, District Attorney, Stephen D. Sencer, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.Jett’s first answer, although it was timely, did not provide the information required by OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (3) and thus was not an answer at all. State of Ga. v. Alford, 264 Ga. 243, 245 (2) (b) (444 SE2d 76) (1994); Jarrett v. State of Ga., 220 Ga. App. 559, 561 (1) (472 SE2d 315) (1996). The attempted amendment had nothing to relate back to, even if such were permitted. Jarrett, supra at 561 (2). And the Fifth Amendment assertion was not a part of it anyway but instead apparently related to possible claims to the other personal property the State wished to subject to forfeiture (cocaine, three cars, two guns, a beaker, a triple beam scale, three packages of razor blades, and a camcorder).
Consequently, there is no proper Fifth Amendment challenge to rule on. For that reason I conclude that Jett’s second enumeration of error does not call for a full review of the merits, much less a reversal of the judgment.