concurring.
I believe that this case should be decided under rules of law applying to public officers generally, it being my position that the immunity statute at issue in this case codifies those rules as applicable to physicians employed at state hospitals.
Public officers acting within the scope of their authority are not answerable for ordinary negligence, but may be held liable if they act maliciously or corruptly.
A defendant acts with malice when he wantonly does that which a man of reasonable intelligence would know to be contrary to his duty and which he intends to be prejudicial or injurious to another. . . . ‘An act is wanton when it is done of *349wicked purpose, or when done needlessly, manifesting a reckless indifference to the rights of others.’ . . .
In re Grad v. Kaasa, 312 N.C. 310, 321 S.E. 2d 888 (1984) (quoting Givens v. Sellars, 273 N.C. 44, 159 S.E. 2d 530 (1968)).
In her complaint, plaintiff alleges facts and circumstances showing that plaintiffs family, including herself, were in great fear of harm from plaintiff’s brother, who was in defendant’s care; and that these fears were clearly and forcefully expressed to defendant, while the family was imploring defendant not to release Daniel Pangburn from Cherry Hospital.
Plaintiff alleges that defendant, though aware of Daniel’s violent and dangerous propensities and aware of his family’s fear of him, “persisted in releasing Daniel Olin Pangburn and thus exhibited gross negligence and wanton conduct.” These allegations were sufficient to state a claim for relief against defendant, sufficient, at the pleadings level to overcome defendant’s immunity.