dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
In Graven v. Vail Associates, 888 P.2d 310 (Colo.App.1994), the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Vail Associates (Vail), holding that the Ski Safety Act of 1979, as amended in 1990, §§ 33-44-101 to -114, 14 C.R.S. (1995) (Ski Safety Act), barred Graven’s negligence claim because he suffered his injuries from “inherent dangers and risks” of skiing: specifically, slushy snow, a ravine, and a failure to ski within his own abilities. The majority reverses the court of appeals, holding that because the ravine into which Graven fell did not as a matter of law constitute an inherent risk of skiing as defined in section 33-44-103(3.5), genuine issues of material fact exist which precluded the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Vail. Because I believe that the result reached by the majority runs contrary to the legislative intent of the Ski Safety Act and that the evidence before the district court at the summary motion stage established that Graven suffered his injuries from statutorily articulated inherent risks of skiing, I would affirm the court of appeals.
I
The Colorado Ski Safety Act defines the responsibilities of both skiers and ski area operators. §§ 33-44^101 to -114. The Ski Safety Act identifies the “inherent dangers and risks” of the sport of skñng, and precludes skiers from asserting claims against ski area operators for injuries resulting from those inherent risks. §§ 33^4-103(3.5), -112. Section 33-44-112 provides:
Notwithstanding any judicial decision or any other law or statute to the contrary, ... no skier may make any claim against or recover from any ski area operator for injury resulting from the inherent dangers and risks of skiing.
Graven filed an action to recover damages for injuries sustained in a skiing accident on the Vail ski slopes on April 3, 1993. His complaint alleges that:
As [he] was coming to a complete stop, he came upon some slushy snow and lost his edges, fell down, slid several feet, then plunged forty-fifty feet down an unmarked steep ravine or precipice (“Steep Ravine”) unable to stop until colliding with a cluster of trees at the bottom of the Steep Ravine.
Graven claimed that Vail’s failure to warn him of the dangerous conditions he encountered constituted negligence. Vail moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the *522Ski Safety Act barred Graven’s claim as a matter of law because his injuries resulted from inherent risks of skiing.
The Ski Safety Act defines inherent risks as:
[T]hose dangers or conditions which are an integral part of the sport of skiing, including changing weather conditions; snow conditions as they exist or may change, such as ice, hard pack, powder, packed powder, wind pack, com, crust, slush, cutup snow, and machine-made snow; surface or subsurface conditions such as bare spots,, forest growth, rocks, stumps, streambeds, and trees, or other natural objects, and collisions with such natural objects; impact with lift towers, signs, posts, fences or enclosures, hydrants, water pipes, other man-made structures and their components; variations in steepness or terrain, whether natural or as a result of slope design, snowmaking or grooming operations, including but not limited to roads and catwalks or other terrain modifications; collisions with other skiers; and the failure of skiers to ski within their own abilities.
§ 33^4-103(3.5) (emphasis added).
The trial court held that the Ski Safety Act barred Graven’s claim as a matter of law because his injuries were caused by inherent risks of skiing: specifically, the slushy snow, the ravine, the trees, and the failure to ski within his own abilities. Accordingly, the trial court granted Vail’s motion for summary judgment.
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the ravine into which Graven fell presented a “variation in steepness or terrain” and met the statutory definition of an inherent risk of skiing. The court concluded that because Graven suffered his injuries from inherent risks of skiing, Vail did not owe Graven a duty to post a sign warning of the ravine. The court declined to reach the issue of whether Graven failed to ski within his own abilities.
II
The majority reverses the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Vail, concluding that the statutorily identified inherent risk of “variations in steepness or terrain” is limited to those changes occurring within skiable areas and does not include terrain changes encountered adjacent to ski runs. Maj. op. at 519. The majority’s interpretation of the definitional language “derives from the legislature’s references to the source of variations ‘as a result of slope design’ and of ‘snowmaking or grooming operations,’ situations to be encountered within the areas intended for skiing.” Id.
In my view, the majority employs a restrictive reading of the definitional language of section 33^4-103(3.5). The statutory definition of inherent risks includes “variations in steepness or terrain, whether natural or as a result of slope design, snowmaking or grooming operations.” § 33-44-103(3.5) (emphasis added). The inclusion of natural terrain variations in section 33-44-103(3.5), demonstrates that, under the statute, inherent risks include terrain variations that might be encountered adjacent to ski runs, not solely those occurring within skiable areas. The ravine into which Graven fell was a natural unaltered part of the Vail ski area. Virtually every trail at a ski resort is bounded by inherent risks such as trees, natural objects, and terrain variations. Restricting the definition of variations in steepness or terrain to include only topographical conditions occurring within sites delineated as ski runs would require ski area operators to mark the edge and boundaries of every ski run. The Ski Safety Act does not impose a duty on ski area operators to separate and define the skiable parts of a mountain, and it would be virtually impossible for operators to comply with such a requirement. The 1990 amendment recognizes that downhill skiing entails specified inherent risks that are inseparable from the sport of skiing, and, accordingly, the Ski Safety Act does not require that ski area operators mark areas presenting inherent risks of skiing. See § 33-44^107(2)(d).
Graven’s complaint and affidavit indicate that he fell down a ravine or precipice located next to the ski run. A ravine or precipice refers to a drop-off that is a variation in steepness or terrain. Under the plain word*523ing of the statute, the ravine into which Graven fell presented a variation in steepness or terrain and, accordingly, Vail did not owe Graven a duty to warn him of the inherent risk he encountered.
The majority states that the legislative history of the 1990 amendment is consistent with a narrow construction of inherent risks that limits variations in steepness or terrain to those changes that occur within skiable areas. See maj. op. at 519-520. However, portions of the legislative history support the contrary conclusion that the definition of inherent risks included variations in steepness or terrain such as a ledge or a ravine that could cause serious bodily injury. During the legislative debates on Senate Bill 80, the bill ultimately adopted as the 1990 amendment to the Ski Safety Act, those opposed to the bill presented a document entitled “Reasons for Opposition to S.B. 80.” Under a subheading entitled “Accident/Injuries which will not be Covered if S.B. 80 Passes,” the following example appeared:
Skier injured when he/she strikes unmarked ledge. (ACTUAL CASE)1
NO RECOVERY
Reason: Variations in terrain (even man made) are inherent dangers.
Legislative Summary of Hearings on S.B. 80 Before the Senate State of Affairs Committee, 57th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess., Jan. 30, 1990, Attachment A (emphasis in original). Because the legislative history offers conflicting interpretations as to what risks were included within the meaning of variations in steepness or terrain, I do not find it helpful in interpreting the plain language of the statute.
In determining the scope of the definition of inherent risks of skiing, the majority states:
The dangers and risks detailed in section 33-44-103(3.5) are intended to describe those “which are an integral part of the sport of skiing.” The detailed listing of dangers and risks must be read with that intent and limitation in mind. Accord Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1044-15 (Utah 1991) (distinguishing between risks on the basis of whether they are an integral part of the sport of skiing).
Maj. op. at 519. The majority’s interpretation requires a determination under the facts of each case as to whether the encountered inherent risk is one that is an “integral part of the sport of skiing.” In my view, the legislative intent and the plain wording of the 1990 amendment to the Ski Safety Act do not warrant such an interpretation.
The majority follows the approach taken by the Utah Supreme Court in Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991) (interpreting Utah’s Inherent Risk of Skiing Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-51 to 54 (1992 & 1995 Supp.) (Utah Act)).2 The Utah Supreme Court held that because the list of inherent dangers in the Utah Act is “expressly nonexclusive,” the determination of whether an inherent risk is an “integral part of the sport of skiing” must be made on a case-by-case basis. Clover, 808 P.2d at 1044-45. Unlike the Utah Act, the Colorado Ski Safety Act’s list of inherent risks does not contain express language of limitation. See § 33-44-103(3.5). The Utah Act states that the inherent dangers of skiing are “not limited to” those risks specifically identified in the Act. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-52(1) *524(“ ‘Inherent risks of skiing’ means those dangers or conditions which are an integral part of the sport of skiing, including, but not limited to ...”) (emphasis added). To the contrary, the Colorado Act does not contain any language indicating that the statute contemplates inherent risks other than those specifically identified.3 § 33-44-103(3.5), (“‘Inherent dangers and risks of skiing’ means those dangers or conditions which are an integral part of the sport of skiing, including ...”) (emphasis added)).
The plain language of the Colorado Act demonstrates that the General Assembly specifically identified a list of the inherent risks of skiing and intended that those inherent risks are per se “an integral part of the sport of skiing.” The General Assembly enacted the 1990 amendment in response to the threat posed to ski area operators by an escalating numbers of claims for personal injuries sustained by skiers.4 The 1990 amendment clarified the law by precisely defining the inherent risks of skiing, but its primary purpose was to alter ski resort liability by prohibiting recovery for injuries resulting from those inherent risks.5 The case-by-case approach adopted by the majority will effectively frustrate the legislative intent of the 1990 amendment because it allows a skier who was injured by statutorily identified inherent risks to avoid summary judgment merely by alleging that the inherent risk encountered was not “an integral part of the sport of skiing.”
In granting summary judgment in favor of Vail, the trial court held that the facts established that Graven’s injuries were caused by slushy snow, the ravine, trees, and the failure to ski within one’s own abilities. Vail presented the affidavit of Lawrence Lane which described the accident area as a “snow covered transition” off of the groomed portion of the ski run which presented “a variation in terrain as a result of natural conditions, slope design, and grooming operations.” In opposition, Graven filed an affidavit stating: “The accident occurred at the side of the ski run, after I had left a transition area. When attempting to stop at the side of the ski run, I fell down a 40 to 50 foot precipice.”
Vail’s motion for summary judgment and accompanying affidavit tracked the language of the Ski Safety Act, stating that Graven’s suffered his injuries as a result of inherent risks, specifically, slush, a variation in steepness or terrain, and trees. Graven’s description of the accident site as a ravine and a precipice did not refute Vail’s showing that *525Graven’s injuries resulted from inherent risks of skiing. I believe that denying summary judgment under the facts of this case •will encourage the use of imaginative terminology in characterizing a statutorily identified inherent risk in order to avoid application of the Ski Safety Act’s preclusion on recovery for injuries resulting from inherent risks of skiing. Because Graven failed to rebut Vail’s affirmative showing of non-liability for the accident as a matter of law under the specific wording of the 1990 amendment, I would affirm the court of appeals.
I am authorized to say that Chief Justice VOLLACK and Justice KOURLIS join in this dissent.
. The document does not identify the "actual case” to which it refers. However, Peer v. Aspen Ski Co., No. 88CA0190 (Colo.App. Aug. 10, 1989), a case decided by the court of appeals in an unpublished opinion that we later reviewed on certiorari, Aspen Skiing Co. v. Peer, 804 P.2d 166 (Colo.1991), was discussed at length during the legislative debates.
. The Utah Act provides that "no skier may make any claim against, or recover from, any ski area operator for injury resulting from any of the inherent risks of skiing." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-53. Under the Utah Act, inherent risks of skiing are defined as:
[TJhose dangers or conditions which are an integral part of the sport of skiing, including, but not limited to: changing weather conditions, variations or steepness in terrain; snow or ice conditions; surface or subsurface conditions such as bare spots, forest growth, rocks, stumps, impact with lift towers and other structures and their components; collisions with other skiers; and a skier's failure to ski within his own abilhy.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-52(1) (emphasis added).
. On March 13, 1990, before the House State of Affairs Committee, Poncho Hayes, a lobbyist for Colorado Sid Country USA, spoke on Senate Bill 80. He explained certain amendments to the proposed bill:
The first amendment to page three, line ten [referring to the section defining the inherent risks and dangers of skiing] we have stricken the words "but not limited to” so that it simply reads the sport of skiing, including, it goes on to say, changing weather conditions, snow conditions, and so forth. This was specifically requested by Representative Paulson and it’s a clarification that the items that follow are the “inherent risks and dangers” that are being referred to.
Hearings on S.B. 80 Before the House State of Affairs Committee, 57th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess., Mar. 13, 1990, Audio Tape No. 90-18.
. The legislative declaration introducing the 1990 amendment stated in pertinent part:
The general assembly ... finds that, despite the passage of the "Ski Safety Act of 1979,” ski area operators of this state continue to be subjected to claims and litigation involving accidents which occur during the course of the sport of snow skiing, which claims and litigation and threat thereof unnecessarily increase Colorado ski area operator costs. The general assembly further finds that such increased costs are due, in part, to confusion under the "Ski Safety Act of 1979” as to whether a skier accepts and assumes the dangers and risks inherent in the sport of skiing. It is the purpose of this act, therefore, to clarify the law in relation to skiing injuries and the dangers and risks inherent in that sport, to establish as a matter of law that certain dangers and risks are inherent in that sport, and to provide that, as a matter of public policy, no person engaged in that sport shall recover from a ski area operator for injuries resulting from those inherent dangers and risks.
Ch. 256, sec. 1, Legislative Declaration, 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 1540.
.In introducing Senate Bill 80, Senator Bishop, the primary sponsor of the bill, stated: "This [amendment] will allow ski area operators to get rid of frivolous claims very early in the legal process, hopefully.” Floor Debate on S.B. 80 Before the Senate State of Affairs Committee, 57th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess., Jan. 30, 1990, Audio Tape No. 90-11.