dissenting.
I respectfully dissent and would affirm appellant’s convictions. I would hold that the evidence in this case failed to meet the requisite standard to order a new trial based on after-discovered evidence.
There is no dispute as to the applicable law.
“[M]otions for new trials based on after-discovered evidence are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, are not looked upon with favor, are considered with special care and caution, and are awarded with great reluctance.” A party who seeks a new trial based upon after-discovered evidence “bears the burden to establish that the evidence (1) appears to have been discovered subsequent to the trial; (2) could not have been secured for use at the trial in the exercise of reasonable due diligence by the movant; (3) is not merely cumulative, corroborative or collateral; and (4) is material, and such as should produce opposite results on the merits at another trial.”
*407Commonwealth v. Tweed, 264 Va. 524, 528-29, 570 S.E.2d 797, 800 (2002) (quoting Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 149, 314 S.E.2d 371, 387 (1984); Odum v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 123, 130, 301 S.E.2d 145, 149 (1983)). I agree with the trial court that appellant failed to establish both the second and fourth prongs of this test.
I. Due Diligence
The majority holds that the record in this case does not support the trial court’s finding that evidence of appellant’s Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) was discernible and available at the time of trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence. I disagree. The record is replete with examples of, and information about, appellant’s dissociative conduct and the possibility of the purported correct diagnosis of DID. While appellant was unable to obtain an expert who diagnosed the specific type of dissociative disorder until later in the case, this does not mean that the evidence was unavailable at the time of trial. In effect, appellant asks us to allow a different post-trial diagnosis of a possible mental illness to require a new trial. This is a continuum that the law does not encourage.
While we have not addressed this specific issue, two of our sister states have provided guidance. In State v. Fosnow, 240 Wis.2d 699, 624 N.W.2d 883 (Wis.App.2000), after the defendant’s conviction on several felonies, a prison psychiatrist diagnosed him with DID. After the diagnosis, he filed a motion to withdraw his pleas of no contest because the new diagnosis would show he was not criminally responsible for his acts. He argued that the new diagnosis constituted newly discovered evidence that entitled him to withdraw his earlier no contest plea. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, in affirming the trial court, held that the new diagnosis was merely the new appreciation of the importance of existing evidence. As in the instant case, extensive psychiatric information about Fosnow was available at the time of the plea and indicated dissociative personality features and other possible DID symptoms. The main factors underlying the new diagnosis existed and were available at the time of defendant’s initial mental examina*408tions. “Newly discovered evidence, however, does not include the new appreciation of the importance of evidence previously known but not used.” Id. at 886 (internal citations omitted), iSee also State v. Williams, 246 Wis.2d 722, 631 N.W.2d 623, 627 (Wis.App.2001) (an expert’s assessment of pre-existing information represents a “new appreciation of the importance of evidence previously known but not used,” not newly discovered evidence).
In Sellers v. State, 889 P.2d 895 (Okla.Crim.App.1995), the appellant was convicted of three counts of murder. In an application for post-conviction relief, appellant alleged that he was diagnosed after conviction with Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) and that this newly discovered evidence required a new trial. The court held that “[t]hough at that time MPD was perhaps a relatively new mental disease,” this fact does not provide a sufficient explanation for its failure to be addressed earlier because it was a recognized diagnosis at the time of trial. Id. at 897. “Trial counsel could have, with due diligence, discovered evidence of [appellant’s] ... MPD prior to trial. Accordingly it was not ‘newly discovered’ and would not warrant a new trial.” Id. Fosnow and Sellers are factually analogous to the instant case, and I would adopt their reasoning.
At a pretrial hearing, appellant presented two mental health experts who gave detailed opinions concerning her mental health at the time of the shooting and thereafter.4 Dr. Feister testified that in September 2000, she personally met with *409appellant for over sixteen hours and spoke to her on additional occasions by phone. She had reviewed appellant’s psychological testing results, the 911 call and transcript, transcripts of earlier interviews with the police and other police reports. In response to counsel’s questions, she opined that appellant suffered from “Major Depression Disorder, Recurrent, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder,” and discussed several of appellant’s dissociative events including her involvement in an earlier automobile accident and the description of her conduct during the 911 call to police. Dr. Fiester stated that “[appellant] was in a dissociative episode for a period of time subsequent to her husband’s death.” In discussing the relationship of appellant’s “amnesia” resulting from the traumatic event of the murder, Dr. Fiester specifically noted that “[o]ne can experience amnesia as a part of a dissociative disorder, sometimes referred to as multiple personality disorder.” (Emphasis added.) The information on her psychological makeup was clearly available and capable of being analyzed in determining any potential diagnosis. In fact, this was the later diagnosis that appellant now asserts is newly discovered.
Additionally, the fact that after the jury’s finding of guilt, appellant’s symptoms became more pronounced and easier to categorize does not require a different result. All of the experts opined that DID is an illness that develops over a long period of time and has its etiology in childhood. Dr. Dell, in describing the failure of the other experts to properly diagnose appellant’s true condition earlier, listed a “profound lack of education and inability to recognize diagnostic signs” as the basis for any possible earlier misdiagnosis. He testified that it was clear from the transcript of the 911 call that appellant’s “alters” were present at that time. Even assuming that appellant’s acute episodes after the guilty verdict made a diagnosis of DID easier, this later diagnosis was really just a different diagnosis of a known condition. To hold otherwise would leave the door open for a new trial with each new diagnosis and, thus, dispense with the finality that a trial on the merits requires. I would hold that this evidence was *410available in the exercise of due diligence at trial. Accordingly, the new diagnosis does not warrant a new trial.
II. Materiality
I also would hold that appellant failed to establish that the “new” DID diagnosis was “such as should produce opposite results on the merits at a new trial.” Odum, 225 Va. at 130, 301 S.E.2d at 149. The standard for a new trial based on after-discovered evidence also includes the admonition that “[bjefore setting aside a verdict, the trial court must have evidence before it to show in a clear and convincing manner ‘as to leave no room for doubt’ that the after-discovered evidence, if true[,] would produce a different result at another trial.” Carter v. Commonwealth, 10 Va.App. 507, 513, 393 S.E.2d 639, 642 (1990).
The unique procedural posture of this case clearly shows that appellant failed to meet this criteria. Initially it is important to note, that the “after discovered” evidence, which is actually a new diagnosis of earlier behavior indicators, was presented to the jury during the sentencing phase of the trial, yet they found it unconvincing even as possible mitigation of punishment. When defense counsel filed a motion requesting a new trial based on appellant’s new diagnosis, he asked the trial court to defer ruling on the motion until after the jury could consider the information and recommended a sentence. Thus, the jury actually heard all the newly discovered evidence. The evidence, as outlined in the majority opinion, was extensive. Several psychologists and psychiatrists described in great detail the nature of DID, appellant’s background, why her diagnosis was not made earlier, that one of her “alters” was responsible for the murder of her husband and even opined that she was not a malingerer. Simply put, the jury discounted the new diagnosis of DID and sentenced her to far in excess of the minimum sentence for the offense. This resolves the question of whether this additional evidence would produce a different result at a retrial.
It is true, as noted by the majority, that a part of the “materiality” prong of the after-discovered evidence test is *411that the new evidence would produce a different verdict “at another trial.” They contend that because the jury heard the new evidence as a part of the same proceeding, it does not meet the “other trial” requirement. The procedural course of this case as dictated by the appellant’s request to allow the evidence in the same trial precludes this argument. She requested it and should not now be heard to challenge it. Additionally this requirement assumes that the newly discovered evidence is, in fact, discovered after trial and is unavailable for the fact finder to consider. I agree with the trial judge who succinctly stated that appellant failed to prove that the new evidence would produce a different verdict at another trial because the jury heard all of the evidence underlying her claim and discounted it. A new trial presenting the same evidence to a new jury would not produce a different result. Thus, I would affirm her convictions.
III. Additional Questions
Appellant raises two additional questions on appeal that were not addressed by the majority as they did not consider them likely to arise on retrial. I would also affirm the trial court on these issues. First, she contends that the trial court erred in sentencing her because she was incompetent.
The party alleging incompetency has the burden to prove it by a preponderance of the evidence. See Code § 19.2-169(E). The trial court’s competency finding is a question of fact and is reviewed under a plainly wrong standard. See Delp v. Commonwealth, 172 Va. 564, 570-71, 200 S.E. 594, 596 (1939). The evidence, properly viewed, established that appellant was competent to be sentenced.
Appellant was sent to Central State Hospital for a post-trial evaluation pursuant to Code §§ 19.2-169.1 and 19.2-176. Dr. Wolber and the Central State treatment team found her to be competent and opined that a “lot of her behavior was strictly manipulative and controlling ... and did not give credence to a true dissociative identity.” While appellant’s experts put on evidence supporting a different conclusion, I cannot say that *412the evidence, when properly viewed, did not sustain the trial court’s finding or was plainly wrong.
Appellant also contends the trial court erred by failing to allow her experts to testify that her mental illness was a basis for several inconsistencies in her behavior, including the 911 call made on the night of the murder.
“The admission of expert testimony is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and we will reverse a trial court’s decision only where that court has abused its discretion.” Brown v. Corbin, 244 Va. 528, 531, 423 S.E.2d 176, 178 (1992). “It is well settled that an expert may not express an opinion as to the veracity of any witness.” Davison v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 496, 504, 445 S.E.2d 683, 688 (1994) (internal quotations omitted). “An expert witness may not express an opinion as to the veracity of a witness because such testimony improperly invades the province of the jury to determine the reliability of the witness.” Pritchett v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 182, 187, 557 S.E.2d 205, 208 (2002).
The appellant proffered that her experts would offer an explanation other than “intentional fabrication” for several of her actions subsequent to her husband’s death. In effect as the trial court found, appellant wished to put on expert testimony “that she [was] in a dissociative state and that she’s suffering from amnesia and it is not because she’s lying.” The trial court allowed the experts to testify as to the general effect of trauma and' that some lay observers might consider a dissociative act to be faking. However, he would not allow expert testimony cdmmenting on the credibility of the appellant’s statements. I find no error in that ruling.
Accordingly, I would affirm the convictions.
. At the pretrial hearings on appellant's mental state, two mental health experts were retained by appellant, Dr. Susan J. Fiester, a forensic psychiatrist, and Dr. Wilfred G. van Gorp, a clinical psychologist and neuropsychologist. Neither could state that appellant met the test for insanity based on their extensive evaluations. At the sentencing stage the following additional mental health experts testified, Dr. Greg Wolber, Chief of the Forensic Team at Central State Hospital where appellant was sent for post-trial evaluation, Dr. Paul Frederick Dell, the clinical psychologist who diagnosed appellant as suffering from DID, Dr. Richard Joseph Loewenstein, a defense retained psychiatrist, and Dr. Daniel Sheneman, the attending psychiatrist for appellant at Central State who testified for the Commonwealth in rebuttal.