concurring specially.
I concur specially, because I do not agree with everything that is said in the majority opinion. Its result is appropriate however under *686the past holdings of this Court and our Supreme Court. I sympathize with the dissent’s dissatisfaction and frustration with the present state of premises liability analysis, which sentiments I expressed in my dissent in Blake v. Kroger Co., 224 Ga. App. 140 (480 SE2d 199) (1996). It is clear, however, that under the binding precedent of Supreme Court rulings, this Court is without authority to modify the law or create new rules of analysis, which are inconsistent therewith. Neither does this Court have the authority to overrule the Supreme Court as the dissent would effectively do. This is true without regard to the merits of the suggested changes. Only the Supreme Court or the General Assembly of Georgia has the authority to change the law of premises liability under the present state of the law.