We granted certiorari to review Division 3 of the Court of Appeals opinion in Daniels v. State, 158 Ga. App. 476 (282 SE2d 118) (1981).1
*592In Division 3 of its opinion, the Court of Appeals found no reversible error in the trial court’s refusal to allow appellant to physically exhibit scars he had received in a prior incident. See Daniels v. State, supra. Appellant, who was charged with murder and convicted of manslaughter, contends this evidence was relevant to his justification defense. Code Ann. § 26-902(a) provides: “... [A] person is justified in using force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself or a third person, or the commission of a forcible felony.”
During defense counsel’s examination of appellant, the following question was asked: “Mr. Daniel, have you ever been cut before?” The district attorney objected, stating that “ [a]ny prior acts of violence by this Defendant or anything else do not apply to this case. This case should be based on these facts as heard by this jury. And any prior crimes he was involved in don’t apply...” A conference was held at the bench wherein defense counsel stated, “He’s not involved in a prior crime. He was a victim.” The trial court inquired: “How is it relevant?” Defense counsel responded: “His background experience of having been cut before goes to the sum total of the reason of his acts, that it would be something the jury needed to know if it was reasonable for him to do what he did.” (Emphasis supplied.) The trial court “sustained] the objection for the time being,” on the ground that “[i]t would be the acts or the judgment of a reasonable man, not particularly him.”
Two basic issues are presented in this case: 1) whether the evidence of the scars was relevant to appellant’s claim of self-defense and 2) whether a sufficient offer of proof was made at trial. We answer both questions in the affirmative, and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
1. As the Committee Notes to Code Ann. Chapter 26-9 make clear, the reasonable belief test set forth in Code Ann. § 26-902 (a) “is a recodification of the reasonable belief test which is stated by former Code Ann. § 26-1012.” Thus, cases decided prior to the enactment of *593the Georgia Criminal Code are instructive. Moore v. State, 228 Ga. 662, 666 (187 SE2d 277) (1972).
Decided December 3, 1981“The law, in cases of homicide, does not take into account the actual fears of the slayer, but considers all the circumstances, with reference to a determination as to whether they were sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person.” Anderson v. State, 117 Ga. 255, 258 (43 SE 835) (1903).
In our view, evidence that appellant was previously attacked with a knife and received scars to his chest is relevant to whether he reasonably and honestly believed that deadly force was “necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself...” “The lapse of time between the prior occurrences and the homicide ... go to the weight and credit to be accorded the testimony by the jury and not to its admissibility. In cases of doubt, the testimony should be admitted.” Milton v. State, 245 Ga. 20, 26 (262 SE2d 789) (1980); If the state can exhibit the victim’s ear to the jury (see Green v. State, 246 Ga. 598, 609 (272 SE2d 475) (1980) (Hill, J., dissenting)), then the defendant should be allowed to exhibit his scarred chest. If the state can exhibit gruesome pictures of the victim to the jury (see Godfrey v. State, 243 Ga. 302 (2) (253 SE2d 710) (1979) (Jordan, J., dissenting), revd. on other grounds, 446 U. S. 420 (1980)), then the defendant should be allowed to show the jury a picture of his chest. If the state can prove the defendant’s prior crimes to show his intent and motive (see State v. Johnson, 246 Ga. 654, 657 (272 SE2d 321) (1980) (Jordan, P. J., and Hill, J., dissenting)), then the defendant should be allowed to prove the crimes previously committed against him to show his intent and motive in defending himself. The jury can decide, when informed of all the circumstances surrounding the attack, whether the defendant’s actions meet the “reasonable man” standard.
2. The state asserts that the offer of proof in the instant case was inadequate since the record provides no indication of when or the circumstances under which the prior incident took place. See Curtis v. State, 141 Ga. App. 36 (232 SE2d 382) (1977). In our view, the offer of proof was adequate. Appellant sought to tell the jury that he had been attacked with a knife before and wanted the jury to see his numerous scars.
3. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur, except Gregory, J., who concurs specially, Marshall and Smith, JJ, who dissent, and Weltner, J., not participating. *594Rehearing denied December 15, 1981. Frank K. Martin, Bowles & Bowles, Jesse G. Bowles, for appellant. William J. Smith, District Attorney, J. Gray Conger, Assistant District Attorney, Tony H. Hight, for appellee.Certiorari was originally denied in the case. Appellant, however, filed a motion for reconsideration wherein he raised a ground that was not raised in his application for certiorari. We granted the motion in order to review the ground raised therein.
This court has the constitutional authority to require, by certiorari or otherwise, any case to be certified from the Court of Appeals, Const. Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. IV; Code Ann. § 2-3104, even before it is decided by that court, Collins v. State, 239 Ga. *592400(3) (236 SE2d 759) (1977), and without any application for certiorari being filed. Collins v. State, supra. Having the case before us, in its discretion this court can consider any matter presented to or decided by the Court of Appeals. On certiorari, the case comes before us, not an isolated issue in the case.
Although it is certainly better practice for counsel to include all grounds for certiorari in the original application, we consider the matter raised in the motion for reconsideration in the case at bar to be one of gravity and importance. We choose not to let this opportunity pass by merely because the issue was not raised in the original application for certiorari.