Dissenting in Part II.(B) and concurring in Part II.(C).
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that Idaho’s sex offender registration requirement is a collateral consequence of a defendant’s guilty plea. Idaho Criminal Rule 11(c)(2) requires that a trial court must, before accepting a guilty plea, inform the defendant of the direct consequences of the guilty plea. Idaho’s extensive and punitive sex offender registration requirement is, in my analysis, a direct consequence; thus, the district court erred in not notifying the defendant of the sex offense registration requirement. The statute imposes additional punishment upon a person pleading guilty to a wide array of sexual offenses. This is a legitimate punitive measure imposed by the legislature, but defendants negotiating pleas should be aware of the punishment they are about to receive.
In Idaho, the registration requirement is “definite, immediate and largely automatic,” the factors that, as our neighbor state of Washington pointed out, distinguish direct consequences of a plea from collateral consequences. State v. Ward, 123 Wash.2d 488, *104869 P.2d 1062, 1075 (1994). The Idaho statute’s combination of an annual lifetime registration requirement along with its broad notification provisions amounts to a form of punishment. In determining that registration is not punitive, the majority relies upon ease law from states where registration requirements are far less onerous and notification provisions are extremely narrow.
The Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community Righb-to-Know Act, I.C. §§ 18-8301 to -8326, applies to all persons convicted of specified felony sex crimes after July 1, 1993, even if judgment is withheld. I.C. § 18-8304(1), (3). The statute applies to those convicted of nonviolent, consensual adult behavior (crime against nature, I.C. § 18-6605, and incest, I.C. § 18-6602) as well as to those found guilty of sex crimes involving forcible acts or minor children. I.C. § 18-8304(l)(a). Unlike the future possibility of persistent violator status addressed in Carter v. State, 116 Idaho 468, 468-69, 776 P.2d 830, 830-31 (Ct.App.1989), the registration and notification provisions of the statute are automatic upon the district court’s acceptance of a defendant’s guilty plea. I.C. § 18-8304(1), (3). Moreover, registration is an additional requirement over and above the sentence served, unlike the restricted parole eligibility challenged in Brooks v. State, 108 Idaho 855, 702 P.2d 893 (Ct.App.1985), which merely changed the proportion of the defendant’s sentence that was required to be spent in confinement.
Unlike some other states, Idaho’s statute imposes a continuing obligation to register. In addition to registering with local law enforcement upon release from confinement and when moving to a new residence, registrants must re-register every year. I.C. §§ 18-8306(3), -8307(1), -8309. At each registration, they must provide updated personal information, fingerprints, and a photograph. I.C. § 18-8307(4). They must also pay a fee every time they re-register. Id. Any registrant who fails to register or send required notices to local law enforcement is subject to a $5000 fine and up to five years’ imprisonment. I.C. § 18-8311.
In addition to requiring a registrant to register every year, Idaho’s Act imposes a lifelong registration requirement. I.C. § 18-8310(1). Compare State v. Ward, 869 P.2d at 1073-74 (duty to register ends for most Washington registrants ten or fifteen years after the date of release from confinement). Even after the registrant meets the exacting requirements mandated by the statute, the decision to exempt a person from further registration after ten years is discretionary with the district court. I.C. § 18-8310(1). Judges in many instances may be reluctant to exempt offenders because of public attitudes or pressures. The practical effect of this discretionary standard will be that the registration requirement will be lifelong for many, perhaps most, registrants.
Furthermore, even if the person is judicially exempted from further annual registration, it is still within the district court’s discretion whether to order that information regarding the registrant be expunged from the Idaho Department of Law Enforcement’s central registry. I.C. §§ 18-8305(2), - 8310(2). It should be noted that no mechanism is provided for expunging the information in federal or local law enforcement records. See id.
Idaho’s statute appears to have been drafted to indicate that a form of punishment was intended. Any person may obtain information about named individuals, (including addresses, birth dates, and photographs), or a list of registered offenders by geographical area. I.C. § 18-8323(2)(a), (b), (e), (3). Schools and organizations may obtain statewide lists of registrants. I.C. § 18-8323(2)(c). Statewide lists of registrants are released quarterly to the Department of Health and Welfare and the Superintendent of Public Instruction. I.C. § 18-8324(2). In addition, a list of registrants who are delinquent in re-registering is released quarterly to the public. I.C. § 18-8324(3). Any person or entity receiving registry information may distribute it further. I.C. §§ 18-8323(7), -8324(6). Compare State v. Ward, 869 P.2d at 1070 (under Washington’s statute, registrant information remains confidential with state agencies unless there is evidence that the registrant poses a threat to the community); State v. Noble, 171 Ariz. 171, 829 P.2d 1217, 1222-24 (1992) (holding *105that Arizona’s registration statute was not punitive where only government licensing agencies, and employers and social service agencies in certain sensitive areas, had access to registrant information); People v. Adams, 144 Ill.2d 381, 163 Ill.Dec. 483, 581 N.E.2d 637, 641 (1991) (holding that Illinois statute was not punitive where statute provided criminal penalties for law enforcement personnel who conveyed registration information to the public).
Because of the definite, immediate, and automatic requirements of Idaho’s sex offender registration statute, judges should be mandated to notify a defendant of these direct consequences when the defendant voluntarily enters a guilty plea to an enumerated sex offense.
Justice SCHROEDER concurs.