dissenting.
Although I fully concur with Divisions 2, 3, 4 and 5, I must respectfully dissent as to Division 1.
In prosecutions under OCGA § 40-5-58, the State is required to prove that the accused was declared a habitual violator, was properly notified of such status, and operated a vehicle without having obtained a valid driver’s license.13 The majority rejects Keller’s argument that the trial court erred in admitting two documents showing that he had been properly notified.
The first document at issue is an Official Notice of Revocation, which states that Keller has been declared a habitual violator. Attached to this document is a stamp certifying that the document is a true and correct copy of the original. However, there is no evidence that this document was ever sent to or received by Keller, either through a return receipt requested or otherwise. The second document is an Official Notice of Revocation and Service by the Court, which is signed by Keller in recognition that he was personally served with the document. There is no stamp certifying this document.
At trial, Keller did not object to these documents on grounds that they did not meet the statutory requirements of OCGA § 40-5-58. Thus, I agree with the majority that Keller waived this argument.14 With respect to Keller’s hearsay argument, however, I agree with Keller that the State’s failure to certify the second document rendered it hearsay and thus inadmissible.15
*83Contrary to the majority’s argument that both documents were certified as a matter of fact, the State specifically states that the first document was certified but makes no such representation as to the second document. And the record simply reflects one certified document and one uncertified document. Given that the second document, which was signed by Keller, is the only document indicating that Keller was actually notified of his habitual offender status, its admission does not constitute harmless error.16 Accordingly, Keller’s conviction for being a habitual violator should be reversed.
I am authorized to state that Judge Adams joins in this dissent.
See Buggay v. State, 263 Ga. App. 520, 522 (2) (588 SE2d 244) (2003).
See In the Interest of C.W., 227 Ga. App. 763, 767-768 (3) (490 SE2d 442) (1997).
See Shapiro v. State, 233 Ga. App. 620, 621-622 (3) (504 SE2d 719) (1998).
See Bowers v. Southern R. Co., 10 Ga. App. 367, 374 (73 SE 677) (1912).