(dissenting).*
Appellant’s conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence to prove the corpus *916delicti under the relevant statutory provisions and caselaw. I dissent from the majority opinion affirming the conviction and would reverse for lack of evidence.
Appellant “confessed” to A.B. and ultimately confessed to police, after lengthy and leading questioning, that she and E.M. held the infant Sydney under water, preventing her from breathing. There was little evidence apart from these statements to prove the corpus delicti — the death of a live-born child who could be considered a “human being.” See generally Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2004) (defining second-degree murder to require the death of a “human being”); State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 629-30 (Minn.1985) (rejecting argument that term “human being” in homicide statutes includes viable fetus).
The majority concludes that there was sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti under Minn.Stat. § 634.03, which requires that a defendant’s confession be corroborated by independent evidence of the corpus delicti. There was evidence that appellant had stated to R.C. her “intention” to kill her baby, if born alive. I suggest future speculation does not support a murder conviction when there is no body, no solid proof of a body (baby) being born alive, and no solid proof that if there was a birth, that the baby (body) was not stillborn. DNA evidence from blood found at the scene could not exclude one of the contributors being a child of appellant and E.M. But so what. The “exclusion” was that 75% of the population could be excluded, but 25% of the population could not. Is that 25% of the people in Minnesota, about 1.3 million, or 25% of the population of the metro area, about 600,000? In paternity cases, where blood work is vital, the statute calls for 99% before a presumption arises, and a presumption is never proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Minn.Stat. § 257.62, subd. 5(b) (2008) (establishing evidentiary presumption of paternity at 99% probability based on blood or genetic tests). The majority concludes that there was other corroboration in appellant’s later admissions to people other than police officers. I disagree. A confession may not be used to corroborate another confession under Minn.Stat. § 634.03 merely because it was not made to police. In the similar situation of accomplice testimony, in which the legislature has specified that accomplice testimony must be corroborated by other evidence in order to support a conviction, the corroboration may not come from another accomplice’s testimony. Minn.Stat. § 634.04 (2008); State v. Harris, 405 N.W.2d 224, 227 (Minn.1987); State v. Her, 668 N.W.2d 924, 927 (Minn.App.2003), review denied (Minn. Dec. 16, 2003). The same basic principle that evidence whose sufficiency is suspect should not be corroborated by evidence of the same suspect form should apply here. The confession-corroboration statute, MinmStat. § 634.03, and the accomplice-corroboration statute, MinmStat. § 634.04, should be read consistently in this regard. See State v. Herbert, 601 N.W.2d 210, 213 (Minn.App.1999) (stating that statutes having common purpose should be construed in light of each other).
The majority itself cites State v. Vaughn, 361 N.W.2d 54, 56 (Minn.1985), for the proposition that a “confession” is “any statement by a person in which he explicitly or implicitly admits his guilt of a crime.” I agree. Appellant’s “statements/confessions,” before and after whatever happened, were used extensively by the state at trial, and extensively in its appellate brief, as a plain old confession of guilt by appellant. The state pounds on them. If these statements to others, not police, were not “confessions,” under the rules of evidence they would not even be relevant. Minn. R. Evid. 403. Of course the state used them as confessions. Therefore, MinmStat. § 634.03 is in play. *917A defendant cannot be convicted by an uncorroborated confession, and other uncorroborated confessions cannot corroborate what the state might consider the “chief confession.”
A statement to a person who is not a police officer is just as much a “confession” as a statement to a person concealing his status as an officer. To ignore that is to ignore the Constitution and seek only an outcome.
The majority relies on State v. Koskela, 536 N.W.2d 625 (Minn.1995), to justify the use of appellant’s other statements to corroborate her confession to police. But in Koskela, the supreme court discussed the role of such other statements without analyzing whether it was permissible to consider them. Id. at 629. Without that analysis, Koskela does not provide precedent for using appellant’s other statements as corroboration under Minn.Stat. § 634.03. See generally State v. Thoma, 569 N.W.2d 205, 207 (Minn.App.) (declining to consider opinion deciding appeal without discussing jurisdictional basis for the appeal as being precedential on the jurisdictional issue), aff'd mem., 571 N.W.2d 773 (Minn.1997). And, significantly, there is no attempt in Koskela to distinguish Vaughn and its broad definition of “confession.”
The majority suggests a rule that would not require corroboration of post-crime statements made to friends before the commencement of a police investigation. Minn.Stat. § 634.03 does not include such a limitation. See generally State v. Hulst, 510 N.W.2d 262, 264 (Minn.App.1994) (noting that this court may not supply statutory language that the legislature has omitted or overlooked). The purpose behind the confession-corroboration rule goes beyond a concern with police coercion. See In re Welfare of M.D.S., 345 N.W.2d 723, 735 (Minn.1984) (stating one purpose of the rule is to ensure the defendant’s admission is reliable).
The majority relies heavily on a Wisconsin decision adopting such a post-crime, pre-investigation admissions exception. See State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393 (Wis.Ct.App.2002), review dismissed (Wis. Sept. 18, 2002). But Hauk applies a Wisconsin common-law rule, not embodied in a statute, and it transforms the “main concern” of that rule with police coercion into the only concern, since it exempts admissions made to private individuals. See id. at 399-401. As indicated in M.D.S., the purpose of the Minnesota statute is broader. And if the statute were not also concerned with defendants manufacturing fictional crimes, why would the corroboration it requires be “evidence that the offense charged has been committed”? Minn.Stat. § 634.03.
But even if the statements to others were sufficient to corroborate appellant’s confessions under Minn.Stat. § 634.03, they still were not sufficient to prove that the child was “born alive” and attained a separate and independent existence, under Soto and State v. Kinsky, 348 N.W.2d 319, 324-25 (Minn.1984). The corpus delicti statute applicable to homicide offenses, Minn.Stat. § 634.051 (2008), provides support for this conclusion, and thus the need for a directed verdict for defendant.
Appellant’s statement of an intention at some time in the future to kill her baby (if it survived childbirth) does not provide evidence of a live birth. The DNA evidence is consistent with a miscarriage as well as a live birth (and that evidence is colored by the weak 25%/75% inclusion). Even assuming, which I do not concede, that Minn.Stat. § 634.03 is satisfied, that statute merely describes the required proof of corpus delicti in all criminal offenses. Prosecutions for murder, and particularly alleged infanticide, present differ*918ent problems of proof than other criminal cases. With alleged infanticide there is the possibility of miscarriage. Appellant argues that there are no American cases of infanticide being proven without the victim’s body. See generally Peter G. Guthrie, Annotation, Proof of Live Birth in Prosecution for Killing Newborn Child, 65 A.L.R.3d 413 (1975 & Supp.2009) (collecting cases). Recovery of a body is not required to prove the corpus delicti for homicide in Minnesota (but it is ignorance to ignore the benefit to the state to have a body, and its weakened case when it does not). See 1981 Minn. Laws ch. 147, § 1 (deleting language requiring that the death of the victim be proven by “direct proof’). Without a body, the state’s case is always weaker, and remaining evidence has to be satisfied against the constitutional standard of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Although corpus delicti may be proven without the infant’s body, the supreme court has strongly implied that there must be evidence that the child was “born alive” and had a separate and independent existence apart from its mother. The court in Soto, in rejecting the argument that a viable fetus was a “human being” for purposes of the homicide statutes, cited with approval cases from other jurisdictions adopting the “born alive” rule. Soto, 378 N.W.2d at 628-30. And earlier, the court in Kinsky had applied the “born alive” rule, although without explicitly stating that it was the law in Minnesota. 348 N.W.2d at 324-25. The Kinsky court also applied authority from other jurisdictions holding that “the state must prove that the infant ... had an independent and separate existence from its mother.” Id. (quotation and citations omitted). Neither Soto nor Kinsky explicitly adopted the “born alive” rule. See Boyd v. Minn., 274 F.3d 497, 501 n. 4 (8th Cir.2001). But the court in both cases strongly hinted at its acceptance of the rule.
Even if Soto and Kinsky have not categorically adopted the “born alive” rule, I do not see how the corpus delicti requirement for a homicide prosecution involving a newborn could be met without proving the fetus was “born alive.” Given the risks of childbirth, particularly an unattended birth, and the possibility of miscarriage, the corpus delicti in a charge of homicide of a newborn cannot, under Minn.Stat. § 634.051, be proven without proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the infant was born alive.
Minn.Stat. § 634.051 1 provides that:
No person shall be convicted of murder or manslaughter unless the death of the person alleged to have been killed, and the fact of killing by the defendant, as alleged, are each established as independent facts beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Emphasis added.) This statute, which was adopted from the New York Penal Code in 1885 and has been amended only once since then, codifies the common-law requirement of corpus delicti in homicide cases. See Baker v. Ploetz, 616 N.W.2d 263, 270 (Minn.2000) (noting enactment of New York Penal Code in 1885); Minn. Gen.Stat. tit. 9, ch. 2, § 150 (1889) (first appearance of the provision in Minnesota statutes); 1981 Minn. Laws ch. 147, § 1, at 453 (deleting language requiring that fact of death be established by “direct proof’ and only defendant’s responsibility need be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
MinmStat. § 634.051 can only be read as requiring that, in homicide cases, the cor*919pus delicti — the death of the alleged victim — be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence independent of the evidence proving the defendant’s responsibility. Since the defendant’s confession is evidence proving her responsibility, it follows that the death of the alleged victim must be proven by evidence independent of that confession, and must be proven by that other evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely shown to “some degree” by other evidence, sufficient to satisfy Minn. Stat. § 634.03. That higher standard of proof was not met in this case.
This construction of Minn.Stat. § 634.051 is the only reasonable interpretation of that provision. The statute is poorly written because proof of “the fact of killing by the defendant” necessarily implies a “killing,” i.e. a felonious death of the victim. But the statute is completely superfluous unless it is read to require that the proof of the “death of the person alleged to have been killed” be separate from the proof of “the fact of killing by the defendant.” The fact of “the death of a human being” is an element of second-degree murder, which must, therefore, necessarily be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Minn.Stat. § 609.19,' subd. 1(1). And the criminal agency of the defendant in causing that death is also, obviously, an element to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. It would be completely unnecessary to restate these two elements in Minn.Stat. § 634.051. See generally Urban v. Am. Legion Dep’t of Minn., 723 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn.2006) (recognizing presumption that no statutory language should be deemed superfluous). Thus, the statute must be read as specifying the manner in which those elements are to be proved— that the corpus delicti is to be proven separately from the defendant’s confession or other evidence of the defendant’s responsibility, and that that separate proof must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Section 634.051 has obscure origins. See People v. Lipsky, 57 N.Y.2d 560, 457 N.Y.S.2d 451, 443 N.E.2d 925, 930 (1982) (interpreting language in New York statute, removed from Minnesota statute in 1981, requiring “direct proof’ of victim’s death). But the statute was plainly intended to impose a burden on the state beyond that imposed by the homicide statutes themselves, or by Minn.Stat. § 634.03, the general confession-corroboration statute, and it should be read with that intent in mind.
This stricter corpus delicti requirement for homicides is justified by the more serious penalties attached to homicide. The “corpus delicti rule” was developed in response to erroneous confessions to homicides, particularly in cases in which the alleged victim reappeared, to the court’s embarrassment, after the confessing defendant had been executed. See Note, Confession Corroboration in New York: A Replacement for the Corpus Delicti Rule, 46 Fordham L.Rev. 1205,1208 (1978).
The independent evidence of the corpus delicti here — the death of a live-born baby — falls far short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. As discussed above, only appellant’s stated intention to commit such an act and the DNA evidence establishing the possible presence of fetal blood, possibly connected to defendant, provided evidence independent of appellant’s confessions to prove that a child was born live and then died. The other evidence cited by the district court — the evidence of appellant’s pregnancy and E.M.’s description of the incident, which was consistent with a miscarriage — merely establishes that the corpus delicti was possible.
The humanity of the law, as reflected in Minn.Stat. § 634.051, as well as Soto and Kinsky, requires this result. The corpus delicti rule recognizes the risk of false confessions and states that it is unaccepta*920ble to base a criminal conviction solely on the defendant’s confession. In re Welfare of C.M.A., 671 N.W.2d 597, 601 (Minn.App.2003). Here, we must also consider the perceptions of a woman impregnated by an abusive boyfriend eager for the pregnancy to come to a bad end, and who had gone through labor, allegedly, and lost her child, whether by miscarriage or by a wrongful act, entailing grief or guilt or both. See Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 89-90, 75 S.Ct. 158, 162, 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954) (noting extent of confession-corroboration requirements is based in part on recognition that “the self-interest of the accomplice” and “the aberration or weakness of the accused under the strain of suspicion” affect the reliability of confessions). A criminal conviction for the serious offense of second-degree murder cannot rest on the confession of a person in such circumstances without independent proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the live birth and subsequent death of the infant.2
This record falls far short of providing that proof. Appellant’s conviction should be reversed.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. VI, § 10.
. The parties have not cited Minn.Stat. § 634.051. But this court has an obligation to decide cases in accordance with applicable law. State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n. 7 (Minn.1990). Minn.Stat. § 634.051 is closely associated with Minn.Stat. § 634.03, and plainly bears on the corpus delicti issue.
. This analysis finds support in the case of Leslie Berg, who confessed to infanticide initially in chemical-dependency treatment and later to police. Berg v. State, 557 N.W.2d 593, 594 (Minn.App.1996). Although the infant’s body was never found, counsel encouraged Berg to plead guilty. Id. The district court ultimately granted postconviction relief, in part because Berg’s attorney did not tell her of the state’s lack of physical evidence to corroborate her confessions. State v. Berg, No. C7-97-795, 1997 WL 639413, at *2 (Minn.App. Oct.14, 1997).