The sole issue presented on this appeal is whether the Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority (FDHA) is an employer for the purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The FDHA contends Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Gaither, 241 Ga. 572, 574 (247 SE2d 89) (revg. Gaither v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 144 Ga. App. 16 (240 SE2d 560)) (1977), controls this case by its 1978 holding that the hospital authority was not an employer and was not a corporation “ ‘engaged in any business.’ ” We do not agree. The changes in the definition of employer as now found in OCGA § 34-9-1 (3) (Code Ann. § 114-101) clearly brings the hospital authority within the requirement that it is an employer required to have workers’ compensation.
The definition of an employer in OCGA § 34-9-1 (Code Ann. § 114-101) now includes “the State of Georgia and all departments, instrumentalities, and authorities thereof; each county within the state, including . . . any political division thereof; any . . . public or private corporation engaged in any business, except as hereinafter provided.” The definition of employer now encompasses a very broad spectrum including the State of Georgia and its various subdivisions including “each county within the state.”
Therefore, the State Board of Workers’ Compensation (which ruling was affirmed on appeal to the superior court) correctly determined as a matter of law that the 1980 amendment (Ga. L. 1980, p. 1145) to former Code Ann. § 114-101 (now OCGA § 34-9-1, effective November 1, 1982) brought the hospital authority within the definition of employer. In view of the 1980 amendment, supra, the 1978 decision of the Supreme Court in Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Gaither, 241 Ga. 572, 574, supra, as to whether or not the hospital authority was at that point in time included by the most recent legislation (Ga. L. 1970, p. 235 and Ga. L. 1975, p. 190) would not be controlling in the case sub judice. The present definition is ample to declare the FDHA an employer within the Workers’ Compensation Act, required to have workers’ compensation. See OCGA § 34-9-1 (3) (Code Ann. § 114-101) which adopts in toto the change in the definition of employer following the amendment of Code Ann. § 114-101 in 1980 by Ga. L. 1980, p. 1145.
Judgment affirmed.
Deen, P. J., Carley, Sognier and Pope, JJ., concur. Shulman, C. J., Quillian, P. J., Banke and Birdsong, JJ., dissent. *278Rehearing denied December 13, 1983 Eugene T. Branch, Scott R. Owens, for appellant. Arnold S. Kaye, for appellee.