dissenting.
I dissent from the majority opinion.
The majority concludes that the plaintiffs failed to make a clear showing that 8.17.808, ARM, adds provisions not envisioned by the Legislature, and therefore, that 8.17.808, ARM, should stand. However, a party challenging the validity of a regulation is not restricted exclusively to making a clear showing that the regulation adds provisions not envisioned by the Legislature. Under Board of Barbers, and § 2-4-305(5), MCA, an administrative regulation may also be overruled upon a clear showing that the regulation adds requirements which are contrary to the statutory language. At issue is the correct interpretation of the phrase “as needed.” In any manner of construction, “as needed” is an expression of discretion, rather than compulsion. Had the intent of § 37-29-403(l)(b), MCA, been to mandate referring a partial denture patient first to a dentist, “as needed” would have been omitted from subsection (l)(b).
*403The majority adopts the Board’s argument that plaintiffs’interpretation of subsection (l)(b) would render subsection (l)(c) superfluous. The Board asserts that the statute should be read “as a whole to give effect to the purpose of the statute.” However, the only way to reach the Board’s, and the majority’s, conclusion that the phrase “as needed” is compulsory, is to read subsection (l)(c) in isolation. If read in isolation, subsection (l)(c) mandates that the denturist shall make and fit the partial denture after the dentist has completed the procedures listed in subsection (l)(b). If read as a whole, the procedures referred to in subsection (l)(b) by subsection (l)(c) are employed “as needed.” If those procedures are not needed, the denturist will simply make the partial denture and fit it to the existing teeth.
The purpose behind § 37-29-403, MCA, is to provide less expensive denture services for those who seek to avoid the additional expense of involving a dentist in the process of fitting dentures where his or her services are not needed. The phrase “as needed” gives effect to that purpose. The record shows that the plaintiffs’ made a clear and compelling showing that 8.17.808, ARM, adds requirements which are contrary to the statutory language of § 37-29-403, MCA. As a result, I would affirm the District Court’s decision to grant plaintiffs’ request for an injunction barring the enforcement of 8.17.808, ARM.
JUSTICES TRIEWEILER and NELSON join in the foregoing dissenting opinion.