dissenting.
The simple, straightforward terms of both our statutes and this Court’s case law require an absolute embargo on the proceedings and records of peer review committees performing credentialing reviews. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
OCGA §§ 31-7-133 (a) and 31-7-143, and the opinions of this Court make it clear that “the General Assembly has placed an absolute embargo upon the discovery and use of all proceedings, records, findings and recommendations of peer review groups and medical review committees in civil litigation.” (Emphasis supplied.) Emory Clinic v. Houston, 258 Ga. 434, 434-435 (369 SE2d 913) (1988). See also Freeman v. Piedmont Hosp., 264 Ga. 343 (444 SE2d 796) (1994). It is also explicit in our statutory law that the credentialing process may be performed by a peer review committee as a legitimate peer review function. OCGA § 31-7-15. Reading these two unambiguous directives together, it becomes equally clear that there must be “an absolute embargo upon the discovery of all proceedings, records, findings and recommendations [relating to credentialing of doctors performed by] peer review groups and medical review committees in civil litigation.” Emory Clinic v. Houston, 258 Ga. at 434-435.
In relevant part, OCGA § 31-7-133 (a) provides:
Except in proceedings alleging violation of this article, the proceedings and records of a review organization shall be held in confidence and shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action. . . . The confidentiality provisions of this article shall also apply to any proceedings, records, actions, activities, evidence, findings, recommendations, evaluations, opinions, data, or other information shared between review organizations which are performing a peer review function or disclosed to a governmental agency as required by law.
(Emphasis supplied.) In addition, OCGA § 31-7-143 further mandates: “The proceedings and records of medical review committees shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action against a provider of professional health services arising out of the matters which are the subject of evaluation and review by such committee. ...” The clear import of these two statutory provi*526sions is that any proceedings or records produced by a medical or peer review committee while considering matters properly subject to their review are not discoverable.1
One such matter properly subject to the consideration of a peer review committee is the credentialing of doctors. OCGA § 31-7-15 makes this explicit. It first states that a
hospital or ambulatory surgical center shall provide for the review of professional practices in the hospital or ambulatory surgical center for the purpose of reducing morbidity and mortality and for the improvement of the care of patients in the hospital or ambulatory surgical center.
OCGA § 31-7-15 (a). The statute then provides that the
functions required by subsection (a) of this Code section may be performed by a “peer review committee,” defined as a committee of physicians appointed by a state or local or specialty medical society or appointed by the governing board or medical staff of a licensed hospital or ambulatory surgical center or any other organization formed pursuant to state or federal law and engaged by the hospital or ambulatory surgical center for the purpose of performing such functions required by subsection (a) of this Code section.
OCGA § 31-7-15 (b). Therefore, it is evident from this statute that one of the functions of a peer review committee recognized by the Legislature is the credentialing of doctors. Given the broad discovery rules set forth in OCGA § 31-7-133, it follows that any proceedings, records, actions, activities, evidence, findings, recommendations, evaluations, opinions, data, or other information shared during a peer review meeting for the purpose of credentialing may not be discovered in civil litigation.
Rather than applying these statutes in the simple and unambiguous manner in which they are written, the majority employs many unnecessary levels of construction and misconstruction to diminish and limit the absolute embargo both the statutes and our prior cases mandate.2 If the Legislature had intended for the discov*527ery embargo not to be absolute, it could have said so. It did not, and it is inappropriate for the majority to now impose judicial limitations on statutory laws which have none.
Decided June 8, 2009. Reinhardt, Whitley, Summerlin & Pittman, Glenn Whitley, Karen H. Summerlin, Walter H. New, Alston & Bird, Donna P. Bergeson, Angela T. Burnette, for appellants. O. Wayne Ellerhee, Adams, Jordan & Treadwell, Marc T. Tread-well, Caroline W. Herrington, Hall, Booth, Smith & Slover, Thomas M. Burke, Jr., Anthony A. Rowell, Coleman Talley, WadeH. Coleman, for appellees.For all of the reasons set forth above, I would reverse in this case. I am authorized to state that Justice Hines joins in this dissent.
Statutory exceptions to this rule are made only for information otherwise available from original sources or testimony unrelated to a committee hearing. OCGA § 31-7-133 (b).
Both the Court of Appeals and the majority rely heavily on McCall v. Henry Medical Center, 250 Ga. App. 679 (551 SE2d 739) (2001). That case, however, dealt largely with the civil liability of the members of a peer review committee. It did not reach the issue of the extent of *527the discoverable nature of the proceedings and records of a peer review committee beyond those items made explicitly discoverable under OCGA § 31-7-133 (b).