State Ex Rel. Wyoming Ass'n of Consulting Engineers & Land Surveyors v. Sullivan

CARDINE, Justice,

dissenting.

I fail to see how the Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act (PRPA) is constitutionally defective “in the same manner as the previously enacted Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act.” Majority opin. at 4. The majority’s summary dismissal of this issue does not explain that statement. I found no problem with the constitutionality of the Medical Review Panel Act and would have upheld it against the challenge. Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780, 787-94 (Wyo. 1988) (Cardine, J., dissenting, with whom Brown, C.J., joined). I advocate reversing Hoem for the reasons explained in my dissent in that case. Yet even if this court allows Hoem to remain good law, Hoem should not control the outcome of this action. I dissent.

The majority takes the approach that this case is Hoem revisited.1 In doing this, it ignores the proper posture in which this court must review the legislation in question in this ease. Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and the burden is on the attacker of the statute to demonstrate its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. O’Brien v. State, 711 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Wyo.1986).

Hoem held that the Medical Review Panel Act was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The Act’s stated purpose was:

“to prevent where possible the filing in court of actions against health care providers and their employees for professional liability in situations where the facts do not permit at least a reasonable inference of malpractice and to make possible the fair and equitable disposition of such claims against health care providers as are, or reasonably may be, well founded.” W.S. 9-2-1502 (Cum.Supp. 1986) (declared unconstitutional in Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780 (Wyo.1988)).

The Medical Review Panel Act’s purpose contrasts sharply with the stated purpose of the PRPA. W.S. 9-2-1802 states:

“(a) The purpose of this act is to:
“(i) Reduce the costs of professional malpractice claims to both plaintiffs and defendants by a less formal professional review of claims before litigation is pursued in the courts; and “(ii) Improve the ability of the state to regulate professions and ensure professional competence.”

The Professional Review Panel Act’s first purpose is to reduce the cost involved in resolving professional malpractice claims regardless of merit of the claim. The Professional Review Panel Act has a second purpose: to improve the ability of the State to regulate professions and ensure professional competence. W.S. 9-2-1802(a)(ii). This latter purpose embraces a compelling state interest. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792, 95 S.Ct. 2004, 2016, 44 L.Ed.2d 572 (1975).

The majority, through its reliance on Hoem, implicitly applies the rational basis test to deny the constitutionality of the Professional Review Panel Act. It apparently finds no fundamental interest involved in the PRPA. Although a short delay in access to the courts is involved in the act, access is not denied. The fact that under Wyoming Constitution Art. I, § 8 the courts are required to be open and to afford justice for injury does not prevent setting standards for causes of action or placing limitations upon them if done in the interest of justice. Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, 1241 (Wyo.1982). Since a legitimate state objective surely includes a compelling state interest, as is involved here, the Act is constitutional if it bears a ration*832al relationship to the objective. Baskin v. State ex rel. Worker’s Comp. Div., 722 P.2d 151 (Wyo.1986). Such a relationship exists between the Act and its purposes. Moreover, the party challenging the statute has the burden to show otherwise. Id. at 155. The burden was not carried in this case by the challenging party.

In his specially concurring opinion in Hoem, Justice Thomas advocated the adoption of a “heightened scrutiny” test requiring “the statutory classification to substantially further a legitimate legislative purpose.” 756 P.2d at 785 (Thomas, Justice, concurring, with whom Urbigkit, Justice, joined). Justice Thomas found this test applicable to the Medical Review Panel Act because it did “not involve any political question of importance to the state but essentially touchjed] upon private interests.” Id. This Act does not contain the same infirmity but presents a compelling state interest. Additionally, the majority has not embraced the heightened scrutiny test. Justice Thomas' special concurrence also concluded that the class of claimants was too small — the result being unconstitutional special legislation. Id. at 786. That claimed infirmity likewise does not exist in the PRPA, for the legislature, by expanding that act to include essentially all professionals, also expanded by great numbers the class of claimants affected.

I expressed concern in my Hoem dissent that the Medical Review Panel Act was declared unconstitutional because the majority of the court simply did not like the statute. 756 P.2d at 790. I question again whether the same motive prompted the majority to unconstitutionality in this case. We should not concern ourselves with the wisdom of enacting this statute, only its constitutionality. 756 P.2d at 791; Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2780, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). With the holding in Hoem and its unjustified application to the PRPA, I fear the constitutionality of any legislation allowing for administrative pre-hearing processing of all professional liability claims is presently an impossibility. Absent reversing Hoem or sustaining the constitutionality of this Act, this type of legislation will never satisfy this court as constitutional. Thus, a constitutional amendment is now required for the legislature to even attempt to deal with this perceived problem. If this court had reviewed this Act under the standards we had adopted, such a drastic measure would be unnecessary.

. Respondent’s counsel provided the court at oral argument with a series of puns based on Hoem’s pronunciation as a homonym of "home.” I resist the temptation to continue the puns. If such occurs, it is unintentional.