dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The issue here differs in substance from those discussed in Porquez v. Washington, 268 Ga. 649 (492 SE2d 665) (1997), and Hewett v. Kalish, 264 Ga. 183 (442 SE2d 233) (1994). The affidavits in those cases were, indeed, “affidavits” subject to amendment. The initial affidavit filed by Skipper, however, was not merely insufficient in content or otherwise deficient or defective; it was wholly invalid, because the notary was not present when Capps signed it. As recently reiterated by this Court, “In order to make an affidavit, there must be present the officer, the affiant, and the paper, and there must be something done which amounts to the administration of an oath.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Harris v. Murray, 233 Ga. App. 661, 664 (3) (504 SE2d 736) (1998). Furthermore, “[i]n the absence of a valid jurat, a writing in the form of *538an affidavit has no force, no validity, amounts to nothing, when standing alone, or when construed in connection with other evidence.” (Punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Harvey v. Kidney Center of Central Ga., 213 Ga. App. 319, 320 (444 SE2d 590) (1994). The notary, or “officer,” was not present when Capps signed the affidavit. Additionally, unlike Harris, supra, in which we concluded that an oath was administered, because of the understanding between the notary public and affiant that the affiant’s actions “complete[d] the act of swearing,” id. at 665, Capps did not sign the purported affidavit in a notary’s presence, and no evidence was presented to the court showing that any oath was administered. The purported affidavit in this case was not an affidavit at all; Skipper in essence filed no affidavit to amend.
Decided December 2, 1998 Langley & Lee, C. Richard Langley, Clyatt, Clyatt, Wallace & DeVaughn, Carl G. Fulp III, for appellant. Farkas & Ledford, Leonard Farkas, Thomas G. Ledford, Diane L. Perry, David E. Perry, for appellee.Liberal construction of the right to amend malpractice affidavits has been mandated by the Supreme Court because that approach “helps to insure that the complaint is not frivolous.” Porquez, supra at 652 (1). But the Supreme Court has not held that such an approach dispenses with the pleading requirement imposed by former OCGA § 9-11-9.1. Nor should we so hold here. Skipper did not file an “affidavit” as required by former OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a), and she did not supplement the complaint with a valid affidavit within 45 days of filing the complaint as permitted by subsection (b) of that statute. Phoebe Putney generally raised Skipper’s failure to comply with OCGA § 9-11-9.1 in its answer and specifically raised the failure to file a valid affidavit by filing a motion to dismiss after learning that Capps did not sign the complaint in the presence of a notary. No allegation was made that Skipper had the affidavit available prior to filing the complaint or that the failure to file the affidavit was the result of a mistake. Skipper’s complaint was therefore subject to dismissal under former OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (e) and could not be cured by amendment under OCGA § 9-11-15.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Andrews joins in this dissent.