dissenting.
I recognize that with State v. Johnson, 246 Ga. 654 (272 SE2d 321) (1980) the “other crimes” rule as enunciated in Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261 (71 SE2d 615) (1952) has been emasculated insofar as questions of identity are concerned. But even Johnson did not hold that evidence of other crimes was admissible merely to show intent. As Justice Hill, dissenting in Johnson, supra, pointed out, quoting from Bacon, “Criminal intent is an essential element in every crime where criminal negligence is not involved; and to hold . . . that evidence of other offenses is always admissible to show intent . . . would be to abolish the general rule, and to establish the exception.” I am still of the opinion that evidence of criminal possession of a drug for which the defendant is not on trial should not be considered, as the majority opinion holds, “in determining whether or not defendant had the requisite criminal intent to possess the heroin” for which he was on trial. For this reason I consider the jury instructions in question to be error and must respectfully dissent.