The Superior Court of Toombs County granted Stephen Brown Insurance Agency, Inc.’s motion for an interlocutory injunction compelling certain payments from the defendants below, Cotton States Mutual Insurance Company, Cotton States Life Insurance, and Shield Insurance (collectively, “Cotton States”), pending arbitration of the parties’ dispute about a contract. Along with a notice of appeal, Cotton States filed a motion to stay the injunction during the pen-dency of the appeal. The trial court entered another order that reconsidered and “affirm[ed]” the order entering the injunction, which Cotton States “openly ignore[d]” for at least seven months,1 and denied the motion for a stay. Cotton States appeals the first order in Case No. A07A1720 and the second order in Case No. A08A0960; we have consolidated these cases for decision. In both appeals, Cotton States contends that there is no evidence in the record that Stephen Brown Insurance Agency’s legal remedy is not adequate and that the trial court failed to properly balance the equities between the parties. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.2
*661The trial court has broad discretion to decide whether to grant or deny a request for an interlocutory injunction, and the appellate courts will not disturb the trial court’s exercise of its discretion unless a manifest abuse of discretion is shown or there was no evidence on which to base the ruling.
(Citations omitted.) Chambers v. Peach County, 268 Ga. 672, 673 (1) (492 SE2d 191) (1997). See also OCGA § 9-5-8 (“[t]he granting and continuing of injunctions shall always rest in the sound discretion of the judge, according to the circumstances of each case”).
The record shows the following undisputed facts. Stephen Brown Insurance Agency (hereinafter “Brown”) agreed to serve as an agent for Cotton States under a Multi-Line Exclusive Agent’s Contract. Under the contract, Brown agreed not to compete with Cotton States. In addition, Cotton States agreed to pay Brown commissions on policies Brown had generated that were renewed during the 48 months following the termination of the contract. For three months after Brown terminated the contract, Cotton States paid the post-termination payments and then stopped. Brown filed suit for breach of contract. Cotton States counterclaimed for breach of contract and moved to compel arbitration of the dispute.
The trial court granted Cotton States’ motion to compel arbitration of the dispute. In addition, the trial court found that an injunction was “necessary to preserve the status quo of the parties pending a final adjudication of the case.” As the trial court explained in the order appealed in Case No. A08A0960, it found that Brown’s
legal remedy, if any, is inadequate because it does not preserve the status quo until an arbitrator can decide the merits of the case . . . [and] because it does not place the parties in the same position they would have been in had Cotton States decided to arbitrate its initial claim that Steve Brown violated the covenant not to compete.
Based on its finding that Brown’s legal remedy was not adequate and that the relative conveniences of the parties favored him, the trial court granted his motion for an interlocutory injunction and ordered Cotton States to immediately pay all post-termination commissions it had withheld and to make monthly post-termination payments until the matter was resolved by arbitration.
*6621. Cotton States contends that Brown’s breach of contract claim for money damages is an adequate remedy at law, and, therefore, that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Brown’s motion for an interlocutory injunction.
Under Georgia law, “[t]he purpose of an interlocutory injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a final adjudication of the case.” (Footnotes omitted.) Univ. Health Svcs. v. Long, 274 Ga. 829 (561 SE2d 77) (2002). In other words, an interlocutory injunction “is a device to keep the parties in order to prevent one from hurting the other whilst their respective rights are under adjudication.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Price v. Empire Land Co., 218 Ga. 80, 85 (126 SE2d 626) (1962). Although
[e]quity will not take cognizance of a plain legal right where an adequate and complete remedy is provided by law[,] . . . the mere privilege of a party to bring an action at law or the existence of a common-law remedy not as complete or effectual as the equitable relief shall not deprive equity of jurisdiction.
OCGA § 23-1-4.3 In this case, the record supports the trial court’s determination that Cotton States conducted itself, to Brown’s detriment, as though arbitration of the dispute had been completed and it had been absolved from complying with its post-termination obligations under the agreement. In addition, the post-termination payments due Brown can only be determined on an ongoing basis, as policies Brown originated are renewed. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court manifestly abused its discretion when it concluded that Brown’s legal remedy was not complete and that an interlocutory injunction was necessary to maintain the status quo. Univ. Health Svcs. v. Long, 274 Ga. at 830; Outdoor Advertising Assn. of Ga. v. Garden Club of Ga., 272 Ga. 146, 147 (1) (527 SE2d 856) (2000).
2. Cotton States contends the trial court failed to properly balance the equities between the parties. “The superior court may issue an interlocutory injunction to maintain the status quo until a final hearing if, by balancing the relative equities of the parties, it *663would appear that the equities favor the party seeking the injunction.” (Citations omitted.) Outdoor Advertising Assn. of Ga. v. Garden Club of Ga., 272 Ga. at 147 (1). “[I]n determining whether to preserve the status quo [by issuing an interlocutory injunction], a trial court must balance the conveniences of the parties pending the final adjudication, with consideration being given to whether greater harm might come from granting the injunction or denying it.” (Footnotes omitted.) Univ. Health Svcs. v. Long, 274 Ga. at 829. After a hearing, the trial court found in this case that Cotton States unjustifiably refused to arbitrate its claim that Brown breached the agreement and, instead, unilaterally decided to stop making payments due Brown. The trial court concluded that the equities favored Brown, comparing the harm that might come to Cotton States from granting the injunction to the harm that would come to Brown from denying it and, later, considering Cotton States’ conduct in flouting the first order. We will not interfere with the trial court’s exercise of discretion in this regard. Id.; Outdoor Advertising Assn. of Ga. v. Garden Club of Ga., 272 Ga. at 147 (1).
3. Cotton States’ Renewed Motion to Suspend Injunction in Case No. A07A1720 is hereby denied as moot.
Judgments affirmed.
Johnson, P. J., Phipps, Mikell and Adams, JJ., concur. Andrews, P. J., and Blackburn, P. J., dissent.Indeed, there is no evidence in the record that Cotton States has ever complied with any aspect of the injunction, despite the absence of a stay or supersedeas.
Even though this appeal is from an order granting an interlocutory injunction, we conclude that the underlying dispute framed by the complaint and the answer concern legal, rather than equitable, issues. Regal Textile Co. v. Feil, 189 Ga. 581, 588 (1) (6 SE2d 908) (1940). As a result, these appeals fall within the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, rather than that of the Supreme Court. Redfearn v. Huntcliff Homes Assn., 271 Ga. 745, 748 (3) (524 SE2d 464) *661(1999); Saxton v. Coastal Dialysis &c., 267 Ga. 177,179 (476 SE2d 587) (1996); Allen v. Hub Cap Heaven, 225 Ga. App. 533, 535 (2) (484 SE2d 259) (1997).
See generally OCGA §§ 9-5-1 (“Equity, by a writ of injunction, may restrain proceedings in another or the same court, a threatened or existing tort, or any other act of a private individual or corporation which is illegal or contrary to equity and good conscience and for which no adequate remedy is provided at law.”); 23-1-3 (“Equityjurisdiction is established and allowed for the protection and relief of parties where, from any peculiar circumstances, the operation of the general rules of law would be deficient in protecting from anticipated wrong or relieving for injuries done.”).