dissenting.
Because Brown could not show why his remedy at law, the suit on the contract, would not be adequate and complete, I respectfully dissent.
This is a breach of contract case. Cotton States stopped paying Brown post-termination payments pursuant to a clause in the contract permitting it to do so if Brown breached certain contract provisions. Brown sued for breach of contract, bad faith, and breach of fiduciary duty. Cotton States counterclaimed for breach of contract, alleging that Brown violated the contract’s noncompete provision. Cotton States filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court granted the motion. In that order, the trial court declined to find the covenant not to compete, the basis for Cotton States’ breach of contract claim, unenforceable. The court also granted Brown’s request for a temporary injunction and ruled that Cotton States must resume paying Brown his post-termination payments and must also pay all post-termination benefits that had accrued from the time that Cotton States discontinued payment. The reason for this injunction was “to preserve the status quo of the parties pending a final adjudication of the case.” It is not apparent from the order what danger threatened the status quo absent an injunction. The trial court also stated: “Defendants knew all disputes arising from alleged *664breaches of the Agent’s contract were to be adjudicated via arbitration, yet they essentially adjudicated the dispute themselves when they stopped making payments.” In its second order, the trial court stated that the injunction was necessary to “balance the equities” until the arbitrator decides the case.
There is nothing in the two orders that would support the grant of the injunction. Because the termination of payments was a remedy allowed to Cotton States under its contract with Brown, and because whether Brown was entitled to these payments was the ultimate issue to be decided, it is unclear why the above would have any bearing on the granting of the injunction.
“The granting and continuing of injunctions shall always rest in the sound discretion of the judge, according to the circumstances of each case. This power shall be prudently and cautiously exercised and, except in clear and urgent cases, should not be resorted to.” OCGA § 9-5-8. In exercising this discretion, a court should not “impose on defendant any greater restriction (burden) than is necessary to protect plaintiff from the injury of which he complains.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dawson v. Wade, 257 Ga. 552, 554 (361 SE2d 181) (1987).
Further,
it is axiomatic that the sole purpose of a temporary or interlocutory injunction is to maintain the status quo pending a final adjudication on the merits of the case. The status quo is not defined by the parties’ existing legal rights; it is defined by the reality of the existing status and relationships between the parties, regardless of whether the existing status and relationships may ultimately be found to be in accord or not in accord with the parties’ legal rights.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hampton Island Founders v. Liberty Capital, 283 Ga. 289 (658 SE2d 619) (2008).
In this case, the status quo is that both parties are awaiting a determination as to whether Brown is entitled to post-termination payments. The trial court’s injunction does not serve to maintain the status quo pending a final adjudication, but rather changes the status quo by ordering Cotton States to make payments that it may or may not in fact owe. See Green v. Waddleton, 288 Ga. App. 369, 371 (654 SE2d 204) (2007).
The court also failed to balance the equities properly. Atrial court may issue an interlocutory injunction to maintain the status quo until the final hearing if, by balancing the relative conveniences of the parties, it determines that they favor the party seeking the injunction. That is because an interlocutory injunction is a device to keep *665the parties in order to prevent one from hurting the other whilst their respective rights are under adjudication. There must be some vital necessity for the injunction so that one of the parties will not be damaged and left without adequate remedy. Green, supra.
Decided March 28, 2008 Jackson Lewis, Christopher T. Van Dyke, David L. Gordon, Melissa L. Kotun, for appellants. McNatt & Greene, Hugh B. McNatt, Hugh Peterson III, for appellee.Here, Brown has not shown that there is any “vital necessity” for the injunction; nor has he shown that, absent the injunction, he will be left without an adequate legal remedy. There is no contention that Cotton States will disappear or become insolvent, or otherwise be unable to respond to a judgment for damages if Brown prevails. See Maggi v. Sylvan Circle Apts., 207 Ga. 580, 581 (63 SE2d 368) (1951).
Therefore, Brown having an adequate remedy at law, and having shown no vital necessity for the injunction, and because the injunction does not in fact preserve the status quo, the trial court erred in granting an injunction compelling Cotton States to make payments under the contract until the claims for breach of that contract are settled. Housing Auth. v. MMT Enterprises, 267 Ga. 129 (475 SE2d 642) (1996); MARTA v. Wallace, 243 Ga. 491, 495-496 (254 SE2d 822) (1979); Maggi, supra; Green, supra.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Blackburn joins in this dissent.