concurring in the result.
I concur in the decision to remand this case so that defendant can be resentenced. I write this concurring opinion, however, because I believe that an additional basis exists for a resentenc-ing hearing — that is, the trial court erred in finding as an aggravating factor that Thompson lied on the stand during trial. The rationale and holding of State v. Setzer, 61 N.C. App. 500, 301 S.E. 2d 107 (1983) impels this conclusion. In Setter, this Court said at p. 6 of the slip opinion:
If, in any case in which the defendant testifies and is found guilty, the court may then find as an aggravating factor that the defendant did not testify truthfully, it would virtually repeal presumptive sentencing in a large percentage of cases. ... In order to carry out presumptive sentencing ... we hold that a judge cannot find as an aggravating factor that the defendant did not testify truthfully when the only evi*45dence of his untruthfulness is his contradicted testimony at a voir dire hearing or during the trial (Emphasis added.)
Other legal and policy reasons, equally fundamental, equally sound, and equally persuasive, suggest that Setzer was decided correctly. First, it would be fundamentally unfair, in the context of our Fair Sentencing Act, to increase a defendant’s sentence as a form of punishment for a new crime (perjury) without benefit of charge or trial. Second, fear of a greater punishment could deter even the defendant who would have given truthful testimony from testifying. Third, in adopting the Fair Sentencing Act, our legislature rejected the prevalent sentencing philosophy of fitting the punishment to the offender through long statutory maximum terms and broad judicial discretion and adopted a sentencing philosophy of fitting punishment to the crime by application of presumptive sentences. Therefore, as suggested by defendant, if the Fair Sentencing Act is to achieve its goal of eliminating disparate sentencing, it must be read to limit the myriad of factors that were considered appropriate when fitting the punishment to the offender was the watchword. See Juneby v. State, 641 P. 2d 823, 833 (Alaska App. 1982). Fourth, although perjury may be an indication of poor prospects for rehabilitation, it does not necessarily indicate that a longer sentence will improve the chances.
For these reasons, and on the basis of State v. Setzer, I believe the trial court erred in finding as an aggravating factor that defendant lied on the stand during trial.