dissenting.
Were there no statutory constraints in this case, I would concur in the majority’s conclusion that with regard to application of strict liability principles to a manufacturer, the situation sub judice is certainly logically and reasonably equivalent to a “sale.” However, this is a court for the correction of errors of law and we are without power or authority to prescribe a remedy for what we perceive to be legislative inadequacies. In this case, the plain wording of the statute makes it clear that “in order to impose strict liability under OCGA § 51-1-11, the ‘manufacturer’ must sell the product, a requirement clearly not met in this case.” (Emphasis in original.) Barry v. Stevens Equip. Co., 176 Ga. App. 27, 28-29 (335 SE2d 129) (1985). Thus, as much as I would like to embrace the ruling of the majority, I believe that the statute mandates otherwise and I must join Judge Beasley’s dissent.
I am authorized to state that Judge Sognier and Judge Pope join in this dissent.