dissenting.
It has been the law of Georgia since the first eminent domain proceeding that the attorney fees were not a part of the "just and adequate compensation” to a condemnee except in the limited type cases authorized by the constitutional amendment ratified on November 7, 1972 (Code Ann. § 2-301 (2)). This was made very clear by the holding of the Court of Appeals: of Georgia in Bowers v. Fulton County, 122 Ga. App. 45 (176 SE2d 219) (1970), and affirmed by this court in Bowers v. Fulton County, 227 Ga. 814 (183 SE2d 347) (1971).
It would still be the law of Georgia except for the fortuitous circumstance of my disqualification in White v. Georgia Power, 237 Ga. 341 (227 SE2d 385) (1976)., Had I participated in that case, I would have definitely adhered to my position taken in Bowers v. Fulton County, 122 Ga. App. 45, supra, thereby sustaining the law of Georgia as it had existed for untold years.
In my opinion any change in this long standing legal conclusion of both appellate courts of this state addresses itself to the Legislature and the people of Georgia through the legislative and constitutional processes.
I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Justice Gunter and Justice Hall join in this dissent.