I concur in the conclusion reached by Justice Carter.
I believe that the question as to whether mandatory constitutional requirements have been met is essentially judicial in character and that the so-called “legislative process” theory has no application when relief is sought, as here, before the proposed legislation actually reaches the Legislature and upon the ground that there is no constitutional basis on which such proposed legislation can reach or be acted on by the Legisla-' ture. In such a case the procedure is not truly legislative; it cannot result in valid legislation; the Legislature acquires no jurisdiction to pass on the measure.
The majority suggest that the “legislation,” if enacted, can be declared void. If it is void it will be so solely because the constitutionally prescribed legislative process—the basis for that process—was not followed. If the legislative process is not being followed—if the act in question is merely an idle one, completely sterile because it is beyond the legislative process and can furnish no base for that process—why should it not be enjoined ?
Respondents’ petition for a rehearing was denied March 31, 3949. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing.