dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, in case number 46387, to the grant of a new trial, a remedy neither party seeks. Based on the expense of the first trial, the cost of the second may well outweigh any remedial benefit.
Assuming the premium payments for both the health and life policies must be segregated from the equitable division of those marital properties and denominated periodic permanent alimony,4 the case need not be reversed. The jury plainly stated, as to the health insurance, that the husband should pay the premium beyond the wife’s remarriage. This they are authorized to do. OCGA § 19-6-5 (b). They made no such provision for the premiums on the policy insuring the husband’s life. Consequently, those payments by the husband must end on the wife’s remarriage. (The wife, as owner of the policy, or her estate, in the event of her death, could thereafter maintain the policy.) The trial court’s judgment to the contrary should be amended and I would affirm and remand with direction for just that purpose. This would leave the jury’s verdict intact, as contrasted to Stone v. Stone, 258 Ga. 716 (373 SE2d 627) (1988).
It is a mighty thin line between periodic payment and lump sum payment when referring to life insurance premiums. Surely, had evidence been offered of the cost of paid-up insurance, the jury could have given Mrs. Sapp, as a piece of marital property, the policy, with debt and premiums paid off.