concurring specially.
I agree with the majority that the trial court erroneously dismissed the indictment in this case. It is clear that the child molestation statute was intended to protect children against the conduct alleged in the indictment. I write separately to address the dissent’s conclusion “that the legislature intended to treat obscene telephone calls, whether to minors or others, as misdemeanor offenses separate from the felony of child molestation.”
I agree with the dissent that obscene telephone calls to minors are governed by OCGA § 46-5-21. I do not believe, however, that a proscription against “obscene telephone calls” protects minors from the same type of harm as is proscribed by the child molestation statute. I also agree with the dissent that this issue is properly resolved by application of the rules of statutory construction. I believe, however, that the dissent has overlooked a critical distinction between the child molestation statute (OCGA § 16-6-4) and the statutes merely prohibiting the use of obscene language via telephone (OCGA §§ 16-11-39; 46-5-21).
The rules of statutory construction that are applicable in this case may be stated as follows: (1) determine the legislative intent giving meaning to the old law, the evil, and the remedy; (2) apply the ordinary signification to all words; (3) give meaning to each part of a statute and avoid constructions which render any portion mere surplusage; and (4) as stated by the dissent, statutes “in pari materia” are construed together. OCGA § 1-3-1; City of Buchanan v. Pope, 222 Ga. App. 716 (1) (476 SE2d 53) (1996). Upon application of these four rules, I conclude that child molestation is an offense that can be committed via the telephone, and that such construction does not render meaningless the prohibitions against using obscene language over the telephone as that conduct is prohibited under OCGA §§ 46-5-21 (a) (1) and 16-11-39 (a) (4).
*784OCGA § 46-5-21 (a) (1) proscribes using a. telephone to “[m]ake any comment, request, suggestion, or proposal which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent.” OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (4) similarly proscribes using such language “in the presence of or by telephone to a person under the age of 14 years which threatens an immediate breach of the peace.” Importantly, both statutes define the offenses as general intent crimes which merely prohibit the use of obscene or indecent language within the ambit of the respective statute. The Supreme Court of Georgia has observed “ ‘that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.’ ” Breaux v. State, 230 Ga. 506, 507-508 (1) (197 SE2d 695) (1973). In another context, this Court has described such language as “personally obnoxious.” Coleman v. Housing Auth. of Americus, 191 Ga. App. 166,169 (1) (381 SE2d 303) (1989). Our legislature has therefore criminalized in certain forums the use of such language, which under the terms of both statutes governs a broad spectrum of obnoxious and socially unacceptable speech. And, in order to discourage its use and protect the public from such conduct, the legislature has provided for misdemeanor sentencing. See OCGA §§ 46-5-21 (a); 16-11-39 (b).
Child molestation, in comparison, is a specific intent crime involving conduct of a far more serious nature. OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) does not merely criminalize immoral or indecent language when addressed or directed to a child under the age of 16 years. Rather, that statute includes the requirement that the perpetrator have the specific “intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the [perpetrator].” Id. Even if we assume, as the dissent finds, that there is no difference in the speech prohibited by the three statutes, under the child molestation statute, the phrase “any immoral or indecent act” must be read in conjunction with the specific intent requirement. See McCord v. State, 248 Ga. 765 (285 SE2d 724) (1982). It is only where the two requirements are construed together that the true harm of such conduct is realized.
We have observed that a “sexual offense committed against a young child requires a special lascivious motivation or bent of mind. . . . That is, it requires a unique bent of mind for an accused to desire to satisfy the sexual desires of a young child or his own sexual desires through the medium of using a young child’s body in some form.” (Emphasis supplied.) Adams v. State, 208 Ga. App. 29, 32 (2) (b) (430 SE2d 35) (1993). “The virulent inclination is the use of a young child as a sexual object. . . .” (Emphasis in original.) Id. It is the specific intent to sexually exploit a young child’s body in “some form” that makes the immoral or indecent “act” particularly harmful.
*785As the majority observes, the harm from such exploitation can be psychological as well as physical. See Thompson v. State, 187 Ga. App. 563, 564 (2) (370 SE2d 819) (1988) (“[a] child’s mind may be victimized by molestation as well [as a child’s body]”). The child victini of what may crudely be described as “phone sex,” although not physically harmed by such acts, certainly may suffer psychological harm. Accordingly, it is not necessary that the perpetrator be in close physical proximity to the victim to commit the offense and cause the harm. Rather, psychological harm can result whenever an individual commits an immoral or indecent act with the specific intent to sexually exploit the child victim. That is the evil, and the legislature enacted OCGA § 16-6-4 to protect child victims from that evil. See id. Furthermore, it is this evil, the specific and intentional use of a child as a sex object, and the harm that such conduct has on a child, that justifies the felony sentence.
The critical difference between the statutes which merely prohibit the use of obscene language and the child molestation statute is that the obscene language statutes do not protect children against psychological damage resulting from sexual exploitation. Although in some cases the same language may be described as immoral, indecent, obscene, vulgar, or profane, it is the specific intent of the perpetrator to use the child as an object of sex that makes it particularly damaging to the child victim. The legislature did not intend for OCGA §§ 46-5-21 and 16-11-39 to protect against such sexual exploitation. Neither are the misdemeanor sanctions imposed under those statutes sufficient to: (1) deter individuals from such sexual exploitation, and (2) punish those guilty of such acts.
Finally, I disagree with the dissent that the majority’s construction of the child molestation statute creates a substantial risk that the perpetrator will be unable to determine when the same conduct on his part renders him liable for child molestation instead of disturbing the peace or making obscene telephone calls. Knowledge of the victim’s age is not an element of child molestation, and it is no defense that the defendant did not know the victim’s age. See Tant v. State, 158 Ga. App. 624 (281 SE2d 357) (1981). Furthermore, the perpetrator knows, better than others, what his or her intent is in using the proscribed language, and it is for the factfinder to determine whether the defendant acted with the requisite intent. See Constantino v. State, 243 Ga. 595, 598 (1) (255 SE2d 710) (1979); Blanton v. State, 191 Ga. App. 454 (1) (382 SE2d 133) (1989).
I thus conclude, as does the majority, that the trial court erroneously sustained the demurrer and dismissed the indictment.
I am authorized to state that Judge Eldridge joins in this special concurrence.