State v. Castillo

*612BROWN, J.

(concurring in part, dissenting in part). What saves the sexual predator law from being unconstitutional is its requirement that DHSS provide the defendant with treatment in the least restrictive manner possible, not the least restrictive treatment that DHSS has available. Since the trial court found that the least restrictive treatment for Heriberto Castillo, Jr., was supervised community placement, the difficulty that DHSS faced in locating an appropriate facility was not legitimate grounds for later ruling that Castillo should instead be placed at the Wisconsin Resource Center.

Because of the mandate that is placed on DHSS, I dissent from the part of the majority decision holding that Castillo's alternative request to set aside his plea agreement is the narrowest and most appropriate grounds on which to decide this case. Majority op. at 596 n.l. As counsel for the attorney general noted at oral argument, setting aside the plea agreement and permitting Castillo to pursue a trial on the merits will not "solve the problem." Because the evidence almost certainly points towards a conclusion that Castillo is a sexual predator, the trial court will again face the task of crafting a proper dispositional order.

However, even with my concerns regarding the application of the sexual predator law to Castillo, I still join the majority's decision to reverse the trial court's amended dispositional order that directed Castillo to the Wisconsin Resource Center. See majority op. at 603-04. But as I explained above, I would not remedy Castillo's claim by remanding this case for further proceedings and a possible trial. Rather, I would act on the suggestion to get to the merits. Here, I construe ch. 980, Stats., to require that DHSS provide Castillo with the community placement that the trial court *613previously found appropriate and, accordingly, I would direct the trial court to enter an order demanding that DHSS adhere to the law.

In the paragraphs below, I will further outline my beliefs regarding the demands that the sexual predator law places on DHSS when the State seeks commitment of a sexual predator. I will then show how this analysis applies to Castillo's claim that he is entitled to the form of commitment outlined in the original dispositional order.

DHSS's duty to give alleged sexual predators treatment in the "least restrictive manner consistent with the requirements of the person" is what makes ch. 980, Stats., constitutional. See § 980.06(2)(b). This mandate is readily discernable upon examination of the history leading to the attorney general's defense of the law in State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis.2d 252, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995), and State v. Post, 197 Wis.2d 279, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995).

The legislature developed ch. 980, STATS., in response to the public's outcry over the Gerald Turner case. Post, 197 Wis.2d at 343, 541 N.W.2d at 138-39 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). The statements of the Governor and some of the other lawmakers, moreover, strongly suggest that the original intent of the law was to keep sex offenders locked away from the public at all costs. See id. at 343-45, 541 N.W.2d at 139. In fact, Justice Abrahamson grounded her dissenting conclusion that the law was unconstitutional on this evidence. Id. at 338, 541 N.W.2d at 136.

Nonetheless, when the attorney general's office had to defend attacks that the law had ex post facto and double jeopardy problems, it downplayed the confinement purpose and instead argued how the law *614was really aimed at treatment. In its brief to the supreme court,, the attorney general wrote:

The statute's primary purpose of commitment of dangerous, mentally disordered persons in order to protect the public is revealed by the language and structure of the statute, which provides for commitment to the department of health and social services for control, care and treatment with provisions for the least restrictive placement and periodic review of the person's condition .... This basic structure and emphasis on the person's current condition are wholly consistent with a mental health commitment statute and wholly inconsistent with punishment.

Brief for State of Wisconsin at 12, State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis.2d 252, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995) (Case No. 94-1898). The attorney general's office also tried to show the supreme court in Post how:

The statute is narrowly drawn to target those who are at highest risk to rape or molest again. It is narrowly drawn to serve only its legitimate public protection purpose — by incapacitation and treatment. The treatment is geared to reducing the risk of recidivism. And the incapacitation ends when that purpose is fulfilled.

Brief for State of Wisconsin at 45, State v. Post, 197 Wis.2d 279, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995) (Case Nos. 94-2356 and 94-2357). Based on such statements, the attorney general's office certainly understands that the acceptable purpose of the sexual predator law is to provide treatment, not to incarcerate or punish.

Of course, what is most important to my analysis is the supreme court's reaction to these claims. Here, I read the Carpenter and Post decisions to accept the *615attorney general's analysis that treatment and commitment to DHSS make ch. 980, STATS., distinguishable from a punitive sanction. For example, Justice Bradley, writing for the majority in Carpenter, explained how ch. 980 did not involve punishment because "a person found to be sexually violent is committed to the custody of DHSS for control, care and treatment, as opposed to the DOC for imprisonment." Carpenter, 197 Wis.2d at 266, 541 N.W.2d at 110. She further emphasized how "DHSS is required to 'arrange for control, care and treatment of the person in the least restrictive manner consistent with the requirements of the person ....'" Id. (quoting § 980.06(2)(b), Stats.).

Justice Geske appears to have also accepted the attorney general's analysis when she made the following statement:

We conclude that treatment is a bona fide goal of this statute and we presume the legislature will proceed in good faith and fund the treatment programs necessary for those committed under chapter 980.

Post, 197 Wis.2d at 308, 541 N.W.2d at 124. Although DHSS has had difficulty locating an appropriate facility for Castillo, and the attorney general's office now seems to be backing away from the claims it previously made in Carpenter and Post, this court has a duty to enforce the supreme court's conclusion that such treatment is "necessary" for persons subjected to commitment under ch. 980, STATS. See Post, 197 Wis.2d at 308, 541 N.W.2d at 124; see also § 980.06(2)(b).

Even though the supreme court accepted the attorney general's analysis about how the sexual predator law may be used without violating the *616Wisconsin or federal constitutions, I recognize that there is continuing debate over how the law should be applied to people like Castillo. Many of this state's citizens believe that sexual predators should be kept locked away from society regardless of the constitutional implications. Signs of this debate are indeed present within this record. For example, a newspaper article about the case quotes one of the law's sponsors, Senator Alberta Darling, who described the trial court's community placement order as "an outrage." I infer from her statements that she believes that Castillo, like all other sexual predators, should be placed at the Wisconsin Resource Center because the legislature specifically designated the facility to house such offenders. See § 980.065(1), STATS.

Nevertheless, the Carpenter and Post decisions reveal that the supreme court determined that the sexual predator law is a constitutional treatment statute, not an unconstitutional punitive statute, because the law accounts for the possibility that a sexual predator may not need to be secured away at the Wisconsin Resource Center to receive effective treatment. The supreme court read the law to place a duty on DHSS to ensure that sexual predators would receive the "least restrictive" placement possible. See § 980.06(2)(b), STATS. I am bound to that conclusion.

In fact, I draw a strong analogy between DHSS's duty to provide personalized treatment for accused sexual predators and its duty to provide persons set for conditional release from mental institutions with residential placement. See Rolo v. Goers, 174 Wis.2d 709, 717-18, 497 N.W.2d 724, 727 (1993). Although the Rolo court specifically addressed DHSS's duty under § 971.17, Stats., 1993-94, the plain wording of the sexual predator law shows that the legislature *617similarly intended that DHSS would provide accused sexual predators with community placement if that was what the trial court found to be the "least restrictive" treatment possible. See § 980.06(2)(b), Stats.

I acknowledge that one would not ordinarily expect sexual predators to be the "benefactors" of legislative largesse. Moreover, I think it is quite possible that the legislature (and the attorney general's office when it argued Post and Carpenter) never imagined that a prosecutor would face a case in which community placement of the sexual predator was the appropriate disposition. However, the plain words of the statute and the supreme court's interpretation of those words show that the legislature accounted for this remote possibility. And the legislature had good reason to do so — it wanted the sexual predator law to survive a constitutional challenge. See Carpenter, 197 Wis.2d at 268-69, 268 n.10, 541 N.W.2d at 111-12, 111 (addressing claim that treatment and early release provisions of ch. 980, STATS., were only included to make the law constitutionally "palatable").

Understanding that DHSS's role is limited to providing the services to sexual predators that the trial court deems are appropriate, I am puzzled by the suggestion made before this court by the attorney general's office that the sexual predator law was written "backwards" because DHSS is not able to participate in the formation of the dispositional order. The attorney general's office suggests that earlier involvement by DHSS would prevent Castillo's situation from reoccurring because then the trial court would know what was available before it developed a disposition.

*618But the law says that the trial court must determine what treatment is "consistent with the requirements of the person." Section 980.06(2)(b), Stats, (emphasis added). The legislature did not write § 980.06(2)(b) to say that the trial court must determine what treatment is "consistent with the requirements of the person and the resources of the department." Indeed, because the trial court is constitutionally required under Post and Carpenter to focus only on the treatment needs of the person, what resources DHSS happens to have available is simply not relevant to the calculus that the trial court performs when it writes the dispositional order.

Turning now to Castillo's specific appellate claims, I conclude that the trial court made a legal error when it modified its order calling for community placement. Although a trial court certainly has the inherent power to modify or vacate its orders, see § 807.03, Stats., its decision to do so must be properly grounded on the law and is subject to appellate review. Here, the trial court grounded its decision to modify the order solely on DHSS's inability to locate an appropriate facility. The majority also recognizes this fact. Majority op. at 598-99. But because the sexual predator law requires that DHSS provide a sexual predator with community placement when a trial court finds that such placement is warranted, the trial court made an error in law when it determined that DHSS's difficulties were a legitimate reason to modify the dispositional order.1

*?With regard to a remedy for the identified error, I would simply enforce the rule set out in Carpenter and Post which requires that a sexual predator's confinement be the least restrictive available. Although the attorney general's office argues that this court cannot make a state agency appropriate funds without violating the separation of powers doctrine, when the legislature wrote the sexual predator law it imposed a duty on DHSS to provide such facilities. My decision would simply enforce that directive. See Rolo, 174 Wis. 2d at 717-18, 497 N.W.2d at 727 ("the legislature must have provided for some governmental entity to fund residential placements and other services, or the entire process would be rendered meaningless-"). I would therefore reinstate the trial court's original dispositional order. I would then direct the trial court to issue an order compelling DHSS to fulfill its duty to provide Castillo with treatment consistent with that order.

The State also cites evidence demonstrating that Castillo's psychological condition had deteriorated in the time that passed between the formation of the original order and the hearing on its motion to amend that order. I nonetheless read the trial court's opinion to have rejected this evidence and I do *?not believe that the State has established that this finding was clearly erroneous. See § 805.17(2), Stats.