(dissenting). The rule of law in Michigan, until today, at least, is correctly stated by the majority:
"This Court determined in Elias v Collins, 237 Mich 175, 177 (1926) that:
" 'It is a rule of the common law that a minor cannot sue his father in tort. The rule had its beginning in the interest of the peace of the family and of society, and is supported by sound public policy.’ ”
The majority undertakes to overrule Elias v Collins.
Its reason is that the parent-defendant is in*15sured against such liability. Again, from the majority opinion:
"As the Supreme Courts of our sister states Wisconsin and Minnesota have noted, the widespread utilization of liability insurance suggested that intra-family lawsuits would seldom upset the tranquility of the family. Writing for the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Justice Currie stated:
" 'Nevertheless, we consider the wide prevalence of liability insurance in personal-injury actions a proper element to be considered in making the policy decision of whether to abrogate parental immunity in negligence actions. This is because in a great majority of such actions, where such immunity has been abolished, the existence of insurance tends to negate any possible disruption of family harmony and discipline.’ Goller v White, 20 Wis 2d 402, 412; 122 NW2d 193, 197 (1963). Instead, an injured family member will merely be able to recover from an insurance company for injuries against which the company has been paid to insure.”
In the first place, we have no way of knowing whether there is or is not insurance in this case. The statute prohibits joining the insurance carrier in the action or referring to insurance during the trial. (MCLA 500.3030; MSA 24.13030.)
A layman might assume that Mrs. Plumley.was insured from the fact that her husband is suing her estate on behalf of her children. But there is no legal inference permitted.
But granting, arguendo, that the deceased defendant was insured against public liability, it does not follow that the insurance company " * * * has been paid to insure” against the risk of the liability the majority would impose.
Since Michigan insurers have no experience with intra-familial liability, they have had no basis upon which to charge premiums for it.
Of course, future premiums will have to go up.
*16The majority seems to recognize that fact, and it concludes with a very curious holding:
"We recognize that this new rule represents a final departure from Elias v Collins, supra. Therefore in the interests of justice and fairness, we hold that the new rule applies only to the instant case, and to all pending and future cases.”
This language is completely illusory. It is designed to give the reader the impression that the overruling of intra-familial immunity is prospective only, thus giving the insurance companies a chance to stay ahead by increasing their premiums to cover this new risk.
Of course, the quoted language does not make the ruling prospective at all.
There are only three kinds of cases, in point of time; past cases, pending cases and future cases. The only cases not mentioned are the past cases— a passing tribute to the rule of res judicata, or at least an acknowledgment that the dockets of Michigan could not tolerate a blanket reversal.
There is no basis in logic to interpret "future cases” as meaning "cases arising out of future accidents”. The adjectives pending and future both modify the noun cases. Certainly, there are no pending accidents, and it would be absurd to conclude that the word pending refers to cases and the word future refers to accidents. Additionally, such an interpretation would divide past accidents into two groups, those on which there are pending cases and those on which there are no pending cases. Such a capricious classification seems unlikely in view of this Court’s sensitivity to the demands of equal protection of the laws.
Indeed, the only possible conclusion is that the Court is requiring insurance companies to start *17paying intra-family damages right away, leaving them to make up their losses out of future premiums.
Of course, nowhere has the Court bothered to mention intra-family suits in which there is no insurance. The public policy which supported Elias v Collins would still apply in such cases.
I suppose the majority has concluded that a little tampering with family tranquillity is not too great a price to pay for the great benefaction of friendly intramural lawsuits at the expense of the premium-paying public.
I cannot help but marvel at the hue and cry of Bench and Bar over the current push for no-fault insurance.
Where in heaven’s name do they think the impetus for no-fault comes from, if not from cases like this.
In truth, and as this case clearly demonstrates, no-fault liability is already a fact of Michigan jurisprudence. Does anyone really suppose that Howard Plumley blames his wife for the death of his children? Or that he sees this lawsuit as a means of affixing responsibility upon her for the tragedy which has befallen him?
Indeed it must be presumed that he honors the memory of the woman who was his wife and the mother of his children.
And that this suit is in actuality a no-fault case, in which the allegations and proofs of negligence are not advanced to affix fault, blame or responsibility, but are tendered merely to satisfy the hypocritical fiction that this is a traditional action in tort.
Many members of the Bar, I think correctly, oppose any system of automobile injury compensa*18tion which limits recoveries to fixed dollar amounts.
But how can we justify opposition to a no-fault insurance system when we have already permitted or abetted the creation of a no-fault'system of liability through cases such as the one aR bar?