City of Thornton v. Replogle

Justice VOLLACK

dissenting:

The majority holds that the twelve-week limitation on mental impairment benefits under section 8-41-301(2)(b), 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.), of the Workers’ Compensation Act of Colorado operates only to limit permanent disability benefits and does not similarly limit temporary disability benefits. Maj. op. at 782-783. I disagree. Section 8 — 41—301(2)(b) unambiguously provides that claimants whose claims are premised on mental impairment are limited to twelve weeks of disability benefits, irrespective of whether those benefits are temporary or permanent. Because the statute explicitly restricts mental impairment benefits to a total of twelve weeks, I respectfully dissent.

I.

In order to discern the majority’s analysis, it is important to understand the benefit scheme created by the Workers’ Compensation Act. As the majority correctly recognizes, the Workers’ Compensation Act provides for two types of benefits to workers who are disabled by a work-related injury.

A worker who is temporarily disabled, either partially or totally, receives compensation which is calculated as a percentage of the worker’s average weekly wages. See §§ 8-42-105(1), -106, 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). Temporary benefits cease, generally, when the worker reaches. “maximum medical improvement,” which is a statutorily defined term. M4

The second type of disability benefit is available to workers who find themselves permanently disabled by a work-related injury. Those workers who suffer from a permanent medical impairment, but who are only *787partially disabled, receive permanent disability benefits according to a statutory schedule. See § 8-42-107(1), (2), 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). The schedule limits the number of weeks that permanent disability benefits are available for a variety of traumatic physical injuries, e.g., the loss of an eye or an arm. Id. Those workers with permanent medical impairments which are not included in the schedule receive benefits according to a rather complex calculation involving the extent of the medical impairment, an age factor, and other considerations. See § 8-42-107(8), 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). Disability benefits for workers who are both permanently and totally disabled are not limited in time, and may continue throughout the worker’s life.5 See § 8-42-111, 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.).

A claimant must first establish eligibility for disability benefits before any benefits may be awarded.6 Section 8-41-301, 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.), describes the “Conditions of Recovery” under the Act. Generally, an employee is entitled to compensation when the employee is injured, and when the injury arises out of and is in the course of employment. See § 8^41-301(1), 3B C.R.S, (1994 Supp.). In subsection (2) of section 8-41-301, the legislature included another “condition of recovery” under the Act: a description of and limitation to the disability benefits available for a claim based on the claimant’s mental impairment.7

II.

As with any case of statutory interpretation, the language of the statute is the starting point. Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355, 1370 (Colo.1993). Section 8-41-301(2)(b) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, the statutory section at issue in this case, provides as follows:

The mental impairment which is the basis of the claim must have arisen primarily from the claimant’s then occupation and place of employment. Notivithstanding any other provision of articles 10 to 17 of this title, ivhere a claim is by reason of mental impairment the claimant shall be limited to twelve iveeks of medical impairment benefits which shall be in an amount not less than one hundred fifty dollars per week and not more than fifty percent of the state average weekly wage, inclusive of any temporary disability benefits. This limitation shall not apply to any victim of a crime of violence.

(Emphasis added.)

The majority submits that the twelve-week limitation on mental impairment benefits restricts only permanent disability benefits because section 8 — 41—301(2)(b) states that the claimant is restricted to twelve weeks of “medical impairment benefits.” According to the majority, “medical impairment benefits” is a term of art in the Workers’ Compensation Act, which is used in section 8-42-107, 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.), to refer to permanent disability benefits only.8 Maj. op. at *788784. The majority reasons that since the legislature used the term “medical impairment benefits,” which refers to permanent disability benefits, the twelve-week limitation is akin to the schedule under section 8 — 42— 107(2), which limits permanent disability benefits but not temporary disability benefits. Maj. op. at 785. The majority also asserts that section 8 — 41—301(2)(b) did not need to similarly limit temporary disability benefits for mental impairment because those benefits cease when the claimant reaches “maximum medical improvement.” Maj. op. at 785. The majority therefore concludes that the legislature must have intended the restriction to apply to permanent disability benefits only.

A.

In my judgment, section 8 — 41—301(2)(b) unambiguously provides that claims for compensation based on mental impairment are limited to twelve weeks of benefits, regardless of whether the type of benefits sought are temporary or permanent. I would, therefore, enforce section 8^41-301(2)(b) as written.

Section 8-41-301 clearly provides that, “notwithstanding” or despite other provisions in the Workers’ Compensation Act which would otherwise control the extent of benefits awardable, when the claim for benefits ai’ises from a mental impairment, those benefits are limited to twelve weeks. Furthermore, the statute states that the limitation includes, or is “inclusive of,” temporary disability benefits. The majority claims that if the legislature had intended to impose the twelve-week limitation on both temporary and permanent disability benefits, it could have done so expressly. Maj. op. at 786. In my opinion, section 8 — 41—301(2)(b) is an express limitation on temporary and permanent mental impairment benefits.

B.

The majority reaches the conclusion that the twelve-week limitation in section 8-41-301(2)(b) applies only to permanent disability benefits by construing that section’s use of the term “medical impairment benefits,” a term which is not defined in the Workers’ Compensation Act. Assuming the majority is correct and that “medical impairment benefits” refers to permanent disability benefits, the majority’s next analytical leap, that the Act’s use of that term means that the limitation applies only to permanent disability benefits, is not, in my opinion, logical.

Under section 8-42-107, claimants who have a permanent medical impairment, and who are otherwise eligible for benefits, will receive permanent disability benefits limited in time according to either the schedule for specific injuries under section 8-42-107(2), or by the impairment calculation under section 8-42-107(8). The majority declares that the twelve-week limitation on mental impairment benefits functions in the same way as the scheduled limitations.

The majority states that the real meaning of the language in section 8-41-301(2)(b), “inclusive of any temporary disability benefits,” is that amounts received by the claimant for temporary disability benefits can be set off against an award of permanent disability benefits. Maj. op. at 786. Not only does the majority’s conclusion conflict with the language in section 8 — 41—301(2)(b), it also conflicts with the majority’s analysis that the twelve-week limitation for mental impairment benefits is just like the scheduled limitations for permanent disability benefits under section 8-42-107(2). On the contrary, section 84ll-302(2)(b) limits mental impairment benefits, both permanent and temporary, to twelve weeks, whereas section 8^42-107(2) unquestionably provides that permanent disability benefits are awarded in addition to any temporary benefits already received.9

In essence, the majority has determined that temporary disability benefits for medical impairment and temporary disability benefits for mental impairment are treated iden*789tically under the Workers’ Compensation Act. I disagree. The legislature plainly carved out an exception to the statute’s overall benefit scheme, limiting mental impairment claimants to a total of twelve weeks of benefits. The limitation is included in the section entitled “Conditions of Recovery,” and it applies notivithstcmding other portions of the Act which otherwise prescribe the limitations on disability awards.

In my opinion, the legislature provided a clear distinction between the overall twelve-week time limitation for mental impairment benefits and the other provisions in the Act which limit disability benefits for other types of impairments. Section 8-41-301(2)(b) is unambiguously written to restrict mental impairment benefits to a total of twelve weeks. The court is not in the position to assess the wisdom of the legislature’s choice in limiting mental impairment claimants to twelve weeks of benefits. Our only task is to interpret the legislation in keeping with the intent of the legislature, and our best indication of that intent comes from the statute’s unambiguous language. I respectfully dissent.

I am authorized to say that Chief Justice ROVIRA and Justice SCOTT join in this dissent.

. Section 8-40-201(11.5), 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.), provides as follows:

“Maximum medical improvement” means a point in time when any medically determinable physical or mental impairment as a result of injury has become stable and when no further treatment is reasonably expected to improve the condition. The requirement for future medical maintenance which will not significantly improve the condition or the possibility of improvement or deterioration resulting from the passage of time shall not affect a finding of maximum medical improvement. The possibility of improvement or deterioration resulting from the passage of time alone shall not affect a finding of maximum medical improvement.

. Section 8-40-201 (16.5)(a), 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.), provides in relevant part: " 'Permanent total disability’ means the employee is unable to earn any wages in the same or other employment.”

. The statutory provisions dealing with the amount and extent of disability benefits, both permanent and temporary, are found in Article 42 of Title 8, which carries the heading "Benefits.” The statutory requirements for eligibility are included in Article 41 of Title 8, entitled "Coverage and Liability.”

. Section 8-41-30 l(2)(a), 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.), provides the following definition of "mental impairment”:

"[M]ental impairment” means a disability arising from an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment when the accidental injury involves no physical injury and consists of a psychologically traumatic event that is generally outside of a worker’s usual experience and would evoke significant symptoms of distress in a worker in similar circumstances.

.Section 8-42-107 provides, in relevant part:

Permanent partial disability benefits— schedule — medical impairment benefits — how determined. (1) Benefits available, (a) When an injury results in permanent medical impairment, and the employee has an injury or injuries enumerated in the schedule set forth in subsection (2) of this section, the employee shall be limited to medical impairment benefits as specified in subsection (2) of this section.

(b) When an injury results in permanent medical impairment and the employee has an injury or injuries not on the schedule specified in subsection (2) of this section, the employee shall be limited to medical impairment benefits as specified in subsection (8) of this section.

. Section 8-42-107(2) provides, in relevant part:

Scheduled injuries. In case an injury results in a loss set forth in the following schedule, the injured employee, in addition to compensation to be paid for temporary disability, shall receive compensation for the period as specified: ....

(Emphasis added.)