dissenting.
I dissent. In my view, the majority misreads the applicable statutes and, in doing so, undermines some of the fundamental purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Law.
This case involves an application of the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Law, ORS 656.018, which provides in part:
“ (1) (a) The liability of every employer who satisfies the duty required by ORS 656.017(1) is exclusive and in place of all other liability arising out of compensable injuries to the subject workers, the workers’ beneficiaries and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from the employer on account of such injuries or claims resulting therefrom, specifically including claims for contribution or indemnity asserted by third persons from whom damages are sought on account of such injuries, except as specifically provided otherwise in this chapter.
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“(2) The rights given to a subject worker and the beneficiaries of the subject worker for compensable injuries under this chapter are in lieu of any remedies they might otherwise have for such injuries against the worker’s employer under ORS 654.305 to 654.335 or other laws, common law or statute, except to the extent the worker is expressly given the right under this chapter to bring suit against the employer of the worker for an injury.”
On review, plaintiff argues that the exclusivity provision does not bar a civil action against his employer because, although plaintiffs symptoms arose in the course and scope of his employment, plaintiff does not have a “compensable injury” as defined in ORS 656.005(7)(a). The majority agrees with plaintiffs argument.
Plaintiff and the majority are wrong. Plaintiff has a “compensable injury” within the meaning of ORS 656.005-(7)(a), even though he did not carry the burden of proving that he should receive benefits. Plaintiff and the majority blur the distinction between “compensable injuries” (the scope of the Workers’ Compensation Law) and “compensation” (entitlement to benefits). That distinction has been in the statutory scheme from its inception and, until now, the exclusivity *527provision has been construed to cover all “compensable injuries,” even those that do not result in the payment of “compensation.”
This court has established a method of construing statutes, which applies to the provisions in question. Our overriding aim is to discern the intent of the legislature. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). First, we examine the text and context of the statute. Id. at 610-11. When reading the text of a statute, certain principles apply, including the principle that the text means what this court’s prior interpretation thereof states. Stephens v. Bohlman, 314 Or 344, 350 n 6, 838 P2d 600 (1992). The context of a statute includes its historical development. Krieger v. Just, 319 Or 328, 336, 876 P2d 754 (1994). If the meaning of a statute is unclear from the text and context, the court looks to legislative history and then, if the meaning still is unclear, to “general maxims of statutory construction,” to determine the legislature’s intent. PGE, 317 Or at 611-12.
At present, ORS 656.005(7)(a) defines “compensable injury.” It provides, as relevant here:
“A ‘compensable injury’ is an accidental injury, or accidental injury to prosthetic appliances, arising out of and in the course of employment requiring medical services or resulting in disability or death; an injury is accidental if the result is an accident, whether or not due to accidental means, if it is established by medical evidence, supported by objective findings, subject to the following limitations:
“(A) No injury or disease is compensable as a consequence of a compensable injury unless the compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the consequential condition.
“(B) If a compensable injury combines with a preexisting disease or condition to cause or prolong disability or a need for treatment, the resultant condition is compensable only to the extent the compensable injury is and remains the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment.”
ORS 656.005(7)(a) supplies a two-step analysis. The first step is to decide whether a worker’s injury falls within *528the definition — i.e., whether the worker’s injury is a “com-pensable injury.” If the workers’ injury is a “compensable injury,” then the second step is to take into consideration the “limitations” in subparagraphs (A) and (B). Those subpara-graphs describe a subclass of “compensable injuries” for which workers will not receive benefits. In effect, subpara-graphs (A) and (B) say that, even if a worker has a “compen-sable injury,” the worker must prove that the “compensable injury” should be compensated; the worker must establish that the compensable injury in fact caused the harm complained of. Either the worker has a compensable injury for which the worker can receive benefits, or the worker has a compensable injury for which the worker can receive no benefits. Either way, however, every injury that is “an accidental injury * * * arising out of and in the course of employment” is a “compensable injury,” no matter how subparagraphs (A) and (B) affect the workers’ ability to collect benefits.1
The foregoing reading of ORS 656.005(7)(a) is based on the plain grammar, structure, and logic of the paragraph. That reading is even clearer when that paragraph is contrasted to ORS 656.005(7)(b). ORS 656.005(7)(b) provides:
“ ‘Compensable injury’ does not include:
“(A) Injury to any active participant in assaults or combats which are not connected to the job assignment and which amount to a deviation from customary duties;
“(B) Injury incurred while engaging in or performing, or as the result of engaging in or performing, any recreational or social activities primarily for the worker’s personal pleasure; or
*529“(C) Injury the major contributing cause of which is demonstrated to be by clear and convincing evidence the injured worker’s consumption of alcoholic beverages or the unlawful consumption of any controlled substance, unless the employer permitted, encouraged or had actual knowledge of such consumption.” (Emphasis added.)
That is, paragraph (b) contains a list of exclusions from the definition of “compensable injury.” By contrast, in ORS 656.005(7)(a), subparagraphs (A) and (B) are worded as “limitations” on what kinds of “compensable injuries” are “compensable” (that is, entitling the worker to receive benefits). Subparagraphs (A) and (B) limit the “compensable injuries” that may be “compensated” to those compensable injuries that the worker can prove under a specified standard. They are not, however, excluded from the definition of “com-pensable injury.” For the purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Law, the legislature has defined what is a “compensable injury” in ORS 656.005(7)(a) and what is not a “compensable injury” in 656.005(7)(b). When the legislature uses different terms in different sections of the same statute, it is deemed to do so intentionally, and we give effect to the difference. See PGE, 317 Orat611 (statinggeneral principle). Here, the majority has failed to give effect to the distinction between exclusions from the definition of “compensable injury” (ORS 656.005(7)(b)) and limitations on benefits payable for a “compensable injury” (ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A) and (B)).
In short, ORS 656.005(7)(a) simply recognizes that some “compensable injuries” will not in fact be compensated. We next must examine ORS 656.018. The pertinent part of ORS 656.018 provides that “[t]he liability of every employer who satisfies the duty required by ORS 656.017(1) is exclusive and in place of all other liability arising out of compen-sable injuries to the subject workers.” (Emphasis added.) The phrase that we are called on to interpret is the emphasized one.
The wording of that phrase covers all “compensable injuries” by its plain terms; it is not limited to those “compen-sable injuries” for which benefits are paid. The context of ORS 656.018 likewise supports an expansive reading. The context includes the policy statement in the Workers’ Compensation Law, codified at ORS 656.012. ORS 656.012 suggests that the exclusivity provision should apply to all injuries *530that arise in the course and scope of employment. The legislature expressed its decision to reduce litigation, ORS 656.012(2)(b), and to expedite resolution of claims, ORS 656.012(2)(c). Those legislative decisions resulted from the legislature’s finding that court procedures concerning injuries arising in the course and scope of employment lead to unnecessarily “long and costly litigation” that is detrimental to the economic welfare of society. ORS 656.012(l)(b).
Another principle comes into play in this case. As noted above, when this court construes a statute, that construction becomes part of the statute construed. This court has construed the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Law, which has remained essentially intact since enactment in 1913, to cover all work-related events unless a specific statutory exception applies (such as the exception for willful and unprovoked aggression).
In Martelli v. R.A. Chambers and Associates, 310 Or 529, 533-35, 800 P2d 766 (1990), this court discussed the history of the Workers’ Compensation Law and of the exclusivity provision:
“Oregon’s Workers’ Compensation Law first came into being as an innovation adopted legislatively in 1913. Its original form included direct antecedents of present statutory provisions * * *. OregonLaws 1913, chapter 112, section 12, in part provided:
“ ‘[T]he right to receive such sum or sums [as workers’ compensation] shall be in lieu of all claims against his employer on account of such injury or death except as hereinafter specially provided.’
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“In return for immunity granted to his employer, the worker injured in the course of employment, and in a way defined by that act, was guaranteed compensation, regardless whether a fault or neglect on the part of the employer caused the injury. * * *
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“* * * [T]he compensation law was extensively revised in 1965 * * *. The immunity of an employer from any worker’s claims, other than for workers’ compensation, was continued in section 6 of the 1965 Act, as worded in the 1913 Act * * * and now phrased in modern terms, in ORS 656.018(1) * *
*531In Olds v. Olds, 88 Or 209, 213-14, 171 P 1046 (1918), the court held that the exclusivity provision of the 1913 Workers’ Compensation Law “confers a special privilege upon an employer, thereby releasing him from the common-law liability to respond in damages for a personal injury that has been caused by his negligence, unless he formally renounces the benefits thus bestowed.” That rule was restated in Reynolds et al v. Harbert et al, 232 Or 586, 591, 375 P2d 245 (1962); “[i]t is our conclusion that the statutory scheme was intended to provide that a workman covered by Chapter 656 must accept the benefits thereof as his exclusive remedy except in the enumerated situations mentioned in the statute.” (Emphasis added.)2 See also Bigby v. Pelican Bay Lbr. Co., 173 Or 682, 689, 147 P2d 199 (1944) (“When a workman has become subject to the act he can not recover from his employer for injuries sustained by him, unless the facts give rise to one of the exceptions specified in the act.”); Ellis v. Fallert et al, 209 Or 406, 413-14, 407 P2d 283 (1957) (“The Oregon Workmen’s Compensation Act offers compensation to workmen who are within its purview for negligent and for non-negligent injuries and provides that such compensation is ‘in lieu of all claims against his employer’ except as provided * * *. [T]he remedy under the act is exclusive.” (emphasis in original)); Shoemaker v. Johnson, 241 Or 511, 519, 407 P2d 257 (1965) (“the rights and remedies provided by the act are exclusive”). In some of those cases, such as Bigby, this court recognized explicitly that exclusivity barred the claim even though the plaintiff could obtain nothing under the workers’ compensation scheme. Bigby, 173 Or at 685-92.
When the legislature “continued” the exclusivity provision by simply updating its wording in 1965, the legislature effectively re-enacted the 1913 statute, with knowledge of how that statute had been interpreted by this court. See Billings v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 225 Or 52, 56, 357 P2d 276 (1960) (this court assumes that, when the legislature re-enacts a section of a statute, it does so with knowledge of prior rulings by this court construing that statute).3
*532This court has continued to read the post-1965 exclusivity provision to apply to all work-related injuries. Those interpretations are part of ORS 656.018 in its post-1965 form. See Stephens, 314 Or at 350 n 6 (stating principle).
In Leech v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 259 Or 161, 485 P2d 1195 (1971), this court concluded that the plaintiff, a dependent child of a deceased employee, was barred by the exclusivity provision of the workers’ compensation statutes from bringing a civil action. In reaching that conclusion, the court stated:
“Subsection (1) [of ORS 656.018], however, makes it clear that * * * it provides for the employer’s immunity from actions by workmen, their beneficiaries, ‘and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from the employer on account of such injuries, * * This provision indicates * * * that the legislature intended the remedy provided by compensation to be exclusive and that complying employers are not to be subject to negligence actions by persons omitted from the compensation benefit schedules.” 259 Or at 165-66 (emphasis added).
The court held that the rationale of Bigby survived the 1965 amendments to the workers’ compensation statutes and that exclusivity continued to bar claims related to on-the-job events even for those plaintiffs who could obtain no workers’ compensation benefits. Id. at 164-66.
In Duk Hwan Chung v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 276 Or 809, 556 P2d 683 (1976), a worker argued that the exclusivity provision should not control, because the employer had acted with the deliberate intention of causing injury or death to the employee; therefore, one of the statutory exceptions to the exclusivity provision applied. This court concluded that there was no evidence to suggest that the employer had acted with the deliberate intention to injure the employee or someone else, and it affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary *533judgment in the employer’s favor. 276 Or at 813-14. The court noted that “[t]he Workmen’s Compensation Law provides the sole and exclusive remedy for injuries sustained by a workman in the course and scope of his employment when the employer is subject to and fully complying with the provisions of the Act, unless the facts give rise to one of the exceptions specified in the Act.” Id. at 812. See also Nicholson v. Blachly, 305 Or 578, 581, 753 P2d 955 (1988) (“The exclusive remedy of injured employes against their employers for injuries suffered in the course and scope of employment is to receive workers’ compensation benefits.”).
This court has construed ORS 656.018 and its predecessors consistently to grant immunity with respect to all accidental injuries that arise in the course and scope of employment, i.e., all “compensable injuries.” At the same time, it always has been true that a worker can sustain a compensable injury (on-the-job event) but collect no compensation (benefits). Over the years, this court has recognized that fact in three categories of cases.
One category of such cases recognizes that a worker can sustain an on-the-job injury but collect no benefits due to an extrinsic reason, such as untimeliness of the claim. Rohde v. State Industrial Acc. Com., 108 Or 426, 217 P 627 (1923),is the earliest example. In Rohde, this court held that a worker who suffered an accidental injury in the course and scope of employment, but who failed to adhere to the procedural requirements of the statutes, was not entitled to relief. The court stated:
“The case, like so many other accidents, presents pitiable features, but whosoever claims under the statute must bring himself within its terms. This the claimant has not done in this instance, and as a matter of law he is not entitled to relief in these proceedings.” 108 Or at 441.
The court never has deviated from that holding and has restated it repeatedly. See, e.g., Dragicevic v. State Industrial Acc. Com., 112 Or 569, 571, 230 P 354 (1924) (court will not “entertain” claim that is untimely filed); Rosell v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 164 Or 173, 192, 95 P2d 726 (1940) (same); Landauer v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 175 Or 418, 421, 154 P2d 189 (1944) (same); Johnson v. Compensation Department, 246 Or 449, 452, 425 P2d 496 (1967) (same); Colvin v. *534Industrial Indemnity, 301 Or 743, 748, 725 P2d 356 (1986) (“a claimant may not avoid the notice requirements if the [employer] has clear procedures for reporting accidents and injuries and the employe knows or should know of and is able to follow the procedures, but does not”).
A second category of cases recognizes that a worker can sustain an on-the-job injury but collect no benefits due to an intrinsic reason, such as failure to sustain the applicable burden of proof. Vale v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 160 Or 569, 86 P2d 956 (1939), is the earliest example of a case in this second category. In Vale, the plaintiff, survivor of a deceased worker, claimed that the worker’s death was caused by an accident arising in the course and scope of the worker’s employment. The plaintiff argued that the worker’s death had resulted from contaminated food that the employer had provided to the worker. The court stated:
“In view of the vague character of the evidence which furnished the hypothesis for the medical testimony * * * we are constrained to hold that the plaintiff has failed to sustain the burden of proving that the decedent’s death was caused by contaminated food furnished by his employers.” 160 Or at 577.
Again, the court never has deviated from that holding and has restated it repeatedly. See, e.g., McKay v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 161 Or 191, 200, 87 P2d 202 (1939) (“there is no evidence [that worker’s being struck by lightening in the course and scope of employment resulted in] injury to the decedent’s heart. It is a mere possibility lacking proof’); Dimitroff v. State Ind. Acc Com., 209 Or 316, 323, 306 P2d 398 (1957) (“We have repeatedly held that a claimant under the Act has the burden of proof to show that he is entitled to compensation.”); Grandell v. Roseburg Lbr. Co., 251 Or 88, 91, 444 P2d 944 (1968) (upholding denial of benefits to worker because “work activity was not a material contributing factor in producing his heart attack”); Marston v. Compensation Department, 252 Or 640, 644, 452 P2d 311 (1969) (“[s]ince there is a total lack of medical testimony that the bumping of claimant’s head either caused or contributed to his condition, there is no evidence to support [an award of compensation]”); Weller v. Union Carbide, 288 Or 27, 30, 602 P2d 259 (1979) (worker failed to offer sufficient evidence to *535“establish * * * a worsening of the underlying disease”); Harris v. SAIF, 292 Or 683, 689, 642 P2d 1147 (1982) (in order to collect under the Workers’ Compensation Law, claimant “has the burden of proving that he is so disabled”).
A third category of cases recognizes that a worker can sustain an on-the-job injury but collect no benefits due to statutory limits on the nature of benefits payable. Leech v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. is an example. In that case, a person (a dependent child of a deceased worker) was omitted from the compensation benefit schedule with respect to an on-the-job injury of the deceased worker. As noted above, the dependent child was barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision from pursuing a civil action. 259 Or at 170. See also Bigby v. Pelican Bay Lbr. Co., supra, 173 Or at 692 (beneficiary omitted from compensation schedule could obtain nothing under Workers’ Compensation Law, but still was barred from bringing a civil action). More recently, in Hathaway v. Health Future Enterprises, 320 Or 383, 386-87, 884 P2d 549 (1994), and Nicholson v. Salem Area Transit, 320 Or 391, 395, 884 P2d 864 (1994), this court recognized that “palliative care” is not compensable even though a worker has suffered a compensable injury for which the palliative care is given.
The foregoing cases, which span the whole history of workers’ compensation in Oregon, show that this court has recognized that workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy available to workers covered under the Workers’ Compensation Law for accidental injuries that arise in the course and scope of their employment, while at the same time recognizing that not all compensable injuries result in an award of compensation. The majority focuses on the words “liability” and “other liability” in ORS 656.018(l)(a), asserting that they imply “that there must exist, as a predicate for that freedom [from civil suit on the part of the employer], some actual liability under the Workers’ Compensation Law.” 320 Or at 518. The majority errs in that analysis. The term “liability” does not necessarily mean responsibility to pay money; it may refer to liability to defend against an action or claim, whether or not the employer ultimately is obliged to pay. There are two reasons why the latter reading, rather than the majority’s reading, is the applicable one. First, the *536context suggests it. ORS 656.018(2) contains a provision parallel to ORS 656.018(l)(a), which limits the worker to act under the workers’ compensation system for compensable injuries; “the right * * * to bring suit against the employer,” not an obligation to pay money, is the core concern. Second, this court’s prior cases — which are part of the statute — uniformly have interpreted ORS 656.018 in a manner that is at odds with the majority’s interpretation.
To use a metaphor: the land of workers’ compensation benefits that actually are available has never abutted the land of permissible civil actions. Between those lands has flowed a river of “compensable injuries” for which no benefits are available and for which no civil action may be brought. That river is formed by the three streams described above (intrinsic reasons why a compensable injury results in no compensation, extrinsic reasons for that result, and statutory limits on the nature of benefits payable). Today the majority makes a radical departure from those established principles.
The majority bases that departure on the 1990 amendments to ORS 656.005(7)(a), when the legislature amended the definition of “compensable injury” to include the “major contributing cause” “limitations” contained in ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A) and (B). The majority concludes that the 1990 amendments narrowed the definition of “compen-sable injury” and “so also the exclusivity provision narrowed.” 320 Or at 523. But the 1990 amendments did not narrow the exclusivity provision.
Before 1990, the Workers’ Compensation Law applied to all accidental injuries “arising out of and in the course of employment.” The current definition of “compen-sable injury” likewise encompasses all accidental injuries “arising out of and in the course of employment.” Accordingly, what is covered by the concept of ‘ ‘compensable injury’ ’ has not changed. The only thing that has changed is how much causation a worker needs to show to receive compensation for certain compensable injuries. A worker must now show that the compensable injury is the “major contributing cause” of the consequential condition, disability, or need for treatment in certain circumstances. Before 1990, there was no such statutory requirement. Thus, the 1990 change was a *537change of degree, not a change of coverage of the Workers’ Compensation Law.
To return to the earlier metaphor, the legislature can change the boundary line and create, for the first time, contiguity between the land of workers’ compensation benefits that actually are available and the land of permissible civil actions. The legislature also can narrow or widen the river that now exists between those lands — the river of compen-sable injuries for which no benefits are available and for which no civil action maybe brought (subject only to constitutional limitations, which, as noted below, are not at issue in this case). The question before us is which of those changes the 1990 amendment to ORS 656.005(7)(a) wrought. In my view, ORS 656.005(7)(a) plainly constitutes a slight widening of the river.
As the discussion above shows, the text and context of the Workers’ Compensation Law (including this court’s prior interpretations and the historical development of the statutes) make clear the definition of “compensable injury” contained in ORS 656.005(7)(a) and applied to ORS 656.018 and the legislative intent behind those provisions. Thus, the court’s inquiry should stop here. See PGE, 317 Or at 611 (explaining methodology).
The majority finds ambiguity in the statute where there is none, by confusing “compensable injuries” with “compensation” and by ignoring the difference between ORS 656.005(7)(a) and (b). Because of the alleged ambiguity, the majority then proceeds to analyze the legislative history of the 1990 amendments to the definition of “compensable injury,” ORS 656.005(7)(a). From that scant legislative history, the majority concludes that plaintiffs claim is not a “compensable injury” under the definition provided in ORS 656.005(7)(a) and, therefore, that the exclusivity provision does not apply. The majority thus concludes that the legislature made a geologic change that eliminated the river of compensable injuries for which no benefits are available and for which no civil action may be brought.
Assuming that the statutes are ambiguous and that an inquiry into legislative history is called for, the material on which the majority relies does not support its drastic result. *538First, the legislative history of the 1990 amendment to ORS 656.005(7)(a) is not clear. Conflicting testimony before the Joint Special Committee on Workers’ Compensation and statements on the House floor concerning how federal courts have interpreted other workers’ compensation statutes does not provide a clear indicator of legislative intent. Further, the statement on the House floor by Representative Dwyer, quoted by the majority — that he was “inclined to agree” that the major-contributing-cause test “may subject * * * an employer[] to tort action” — does not resolve this ambiguity in legislative intent, but rather heightens it. 320 Or at 524 (emphasis added). His is not a statement of certitude; it is a statement of possibility.
In addition, there was no amendment to ORS 656.018 before the legislature. Most of the discussion quoted by the majority related to witnesses’ and legislators’ understanding of ORS 656.018. 320 Or at 521-24. To the extent that legislators were commenting on their understanding of that long-existing provision, their comments have no bearing on what ORS 656.018 meant. See DeFazio v. WPPSS, 296 Or 550, 561, 679 P2d 1316 (1984) (“The views legislators have of existing law may shed light on a new enactment, but it is of no weight in interpreting a law enacted by their predecessors. ”).
The majority also discusses the legislative history of ORS 656.005(7)(a) without giving effect to the legislative history of the whole package of interrelated 1990 amendments to the Workers’ Compensation Law. The broader purposes of the 1990 amendments to the Workers’ Compensation Law are revealed by the legislative history of the 1990 special session during which the legislature revised that law extensively. The underlying theme of all the 1990 amendments was to make the system more cost-effective for employers and more efficient. See Exhibit B, Interim Special Committee on Workers’ Compensation, May 3, 1990 (letter from the Governor’s Workers’ Compensation Labor Management Advisory Committee to Governor Neil Goldschmidt proposing changes to Workers’ Compensation system, requested by Governor Goldschmidt, to “control the costs of Oregon’s workers’ compensation program”); Exhibit P, Interim Special Committee on Workers’ Compensation, May 3, 1990 (summary fiscal analysis provided by Legislative *539Fiscal Office concerning “anticipated premium reductions” associated with the proposed changes); Exhibit F, Interim Special Committee on Workers’ Compensation, May 7, 1990 (analysis provided by SAIF Corporation discussing cost savings under proposed changes); Testimony of Matt Hersee, Administrator, Workers’ Compensation Division, Department of Insurance and Finance, Interim Special Committee on Workers’ Compensation, May 7, 1990, Tape 26, Side A (discussing anticipated savings that will result from proposed changes). As the discussion below will demonstrate more fully, the majority’s interpretation of ORS 656.005(7)(a) is at odds with that theme.4
To summarize, the 1990 legislative history itself is unclear. The majority errs by relying on it.
If the majority were correct in finding an ambiguity, then, the second step in statutory interpretation (legislative history) would not resolve such an ambiguity. The third level of analysis would be required, that is, the application of maxims of statutory construction. See PGE, 317 Or at 612 (describing methodology). The majority’s result could not survive at that third level, because its reading of ORS 656.005(7)(a) violates the principle that a statute should not be construed to produce an unreasonable or absurd result. See State v. Garcias, 298 Or 152, 159, 690 P2d 497 (1984) (stating principle). As has already been mentioned, one of the chief objectives of the workers’ compensation statutes is to reduce the litigation and social costs of having workers and employers fully litigate claims concerning workplace injuries. By adopting a workers’ compensation system, the legislature hoped to reduce costs for all parties involved and find a comprehensive and efficient means of dealing with on-the-job injuries. See ORS 656.012(2)(d) (stating objectives of the *540Workers’ Compensation Law); see also Bigby, 173 Or at 692 (stating purposes of pre-1965 version of Workers’ Compensation Law). The position taken by the majority seriously undermines that objective by making the overall incentives of the workers’ compensation system topsy-turvy and irrational.
After today, an injured worker will seek to pursue a worker’s compensation claim as limply as possible, so as to achieve the goal of having the Workers’ Compensation Board declare the claim noncompensable.5 Once noncompensability is determined, the worker can then bring a civil action against the employer and avoid the exclusivity provision altogether. By creating a system in which workers have an incentive to pursue litigation to acquire damages for work-related injuries, the majority jeopardizes the receipt of “prompt” medical treatment and the assurance of income benefits (contraxy to the policies set out in ORS 656.012(2)(a), (c)) and increases litigation (contraxy to the policy set out in ORS 656.012(b)). Indeed, the more serious the worker’s condition, the greater the incentive to pursue a civil claim and the greater the trespass on the legislatively stated policies.
The implications of today’s decision for employers and their insurers are equally peculiar. The employer, who now has the incentive to resist workers’ compensation claims, will take up the position presently occupied by the injured worker, that is, attempting to have the claim declared com-pensable, so as to retain the protection of ORS 656.018. The workers’ compensation insurance carrier, who now has the same incentive as the employer to resist claims, will be opposed to the employer’s interest and will instead have the same goal as the worker, to have the claim declared noncom-pensable, so the insurer will not have to pay the claim — unless the same carrier also happens to cover the employer for general liability insurance.
Self-insured employers will pay non-meritorious claims to eliminate the risk of civil actions, and insured employers will encourage their insurers to do the same. That *541practice, although costlier than present practices, would be a reasonable way to avoid even greater costs, and potential awards of damages, associated with litigation. The greater costs will be passed on to consumers, workers, and employers. The speedy, efficient, and cost-effective resolution of claims concerning on-the-job injuries, desired by the legislature, will become more difficult.
In short, the majority’s reading of ORS 656.005(7) (a) undercuts the raison d’etre of the workers’ compensation system. The workers’ compensation system represents a legislatively mandated “bargain” between employers and workers. The system gives workers the opportunity to seek compensation for work-related injuries and diseases without the need to prove fault on the employer’s part; in exchange, workers give up the right to sue the employer for work-related injuries and diseases; Workers benefit from the security of knowing that, if they prove their claims, they will be compensated quickly; employers benefit from limited liability and reduced litigation costs. That bargain is implicit in the policy statement accompanying the Workers’ Compensation Law, ORS 656.012, and has been recognized by this court.
In Hale v. Port of Portland, 308 Or 508, 521-22, 783 P2d 506 (1989), this court described the bargain this way:
“[T]he Oregon legislature * * * eliminated the haphazard system of liability of employers to some employees for some injuries occurring under a limited number of circumstances, and replaced it with a system that made employers liable for the medical expenses of their injured workers without regard to fault. The scheme penalized some members of both camps — those plaintiffs who could prove actionable negligence of their employers, and so obtain damages beyond their medical expenses, and those employers who could defeat liability either because they had not been negligent or because they could show the worker was guilty of contributor negligence or assumption of the risk.”
See also McGarrah v. SAIF, 296 Or 145, 160-61, 675 P2d 159 (1983) (“In exchange for * * * relief under this no-fault recovery system, employes are limited to a fixed schedule of recovery and must abandon any common law right of action against their employers.”)
*542The overall bargain suggests that the employer is not civilly liable for on-the-job activities and conditions if the employer provides the required workers’ compensation coverage and if those activities and conditions fall short of being willful and unprovoked aggression. See ORS 656.018(3) (exemption from liability does not apply when injury caused by willful and unprovoked aggression of person otherwise exempt). The majority’s interpretation of the statutory definition of “compensable injury,” however, guts the bargain. Every claimant will have the opportunity and the incentive to try to “opt out” of the workers’ compensation system. The legislature did not intend that result.
Under a proper reading of ORS 656.005(7)(a), plaintiff has a compensable injury, because he has an “injury * * * arising out of and in the course of employment.” The Board found that plaintiff has “transient irritation of the upper respiratory tract and paranasal sinuses as a result of inhalation of substances found in his work place.” (Emphasis added.) The Board then held that “[t]he medical evidence, however, does not support the conclusion that [plaintiff] has a compensable disease,” because “[h]is symptomatic response to irritants is not a pathological process.” In other words, although plaintiff’s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment (was a compensable injury), the evidence adduced at the hearing did not entitle plaintiff to collect benefits.6
Whether or not plaintiff received benefits, defendant’s asserted liability here “arise[es] out of compensable injuries” and, therefore, the workers’ compensation system *543“is exclusive and in place of all other liability.” ORS 656.018(1). Plaintiff thus is foreclosed, under ORS 656.018(2), from pursuing the present action. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court should be affirmed.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Carson, C. J., joins in this opinion.The majority argues that this court recognized a more limited definition of “compensable injury” in SAIF v. Drews, 318 Or 1, 8, 860 P2d 254 (1993). 320 Or at 516 n 3. The majority is wrong, for three reasons. First, the majority takes the sentence that it quotes out of context. The majority omits the cautionary sentence that limited the court’s discussion to the narrow question presented: “As we interpret ORS 656.308(1) and 656.005(7)(a) together, they work in this case as follows!.]” Drews, 318 Or at 8. Second, and relatedly, Drews did not decide the issue that we must decide today. In Drews, this court was not faced with the question that we consider here, of defining the entire range of “compensable injuries.”
Third, in its discussion of Drews, as in the remainder of the opinion, the majority makes the mistake of freely interchanging the distinct concepts of “compensable injury,” “compensable,” “compensation,” and “compensated.”
The statutory exceptions included willful and unprovoked aggression, for example. ORS 656.156 (1961).
Before 1965, the Workers’ Compensation Law contained no separate definí*532tion of “compensable injury.” Rather, from 1913 to 1965, the definition was contained within the applicable exclusivity provision. From 1913 until 1965, the exclusivity provision applied to any employee “who * * * sustains an accidental injury * * * arising out of and in the course of his employment.” See, e.g., ORS 656.152 (1963) (so providing). That is the same phrase used in ORS 656.005(7)(a) to define a “compensable injury.” The scope of “compensable injury” covered under the Workers’ Compensation Law has always been the same; since 1913, it has applied to accidental injuries arising in the course and scope of employment.
This case presents an opportunity to make a general observation about the use of legislative history. Much of the majority’s discussion concerns statements of two witnesses before a committee and of two legislators. Much of the dissent’s discussion concerns the manifest general intention of the legislature in enacting the 1990 amendments to the workers’ compensation laws. In general, an examination of legislative history is most useful when it is able to uncover the manifest general legislative intent behind an enactment. By contrast, an examination of legislative history is most fraught with the potential for misconstruction, misattribution of the beliefs of a single legislator or witness to the body as a whole, or abuse in the form of “padding the record” when the views of only a small number of persons on a narrow question can be found.
The majority blithely assumes, by way of a footnote, 320Orat525n7, that an injured worker could not “elect to bypass the workers’ compensation system,” but fails to explain why not. For the purpose of this dissent, however, Í accept the assumption.
Plaintiff argues that such a result would be contrary to Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution, which provides in part that “every man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his person, property, or reputation.” Plaintiff did not preserve that argument below; therefore, this court should not consider it. See Leiser v. Sparkman, 281 Or 119, 122, 573 P2d 1247 (1978) (“The parties to an appeal are restricted to the theory upon which [the case was tried] in the court below.”).
I would note, however, that the workers’ compensation scheme has withstood Article I, section 10, challenges since Evanhoff v. State Industrial Acc. Com., 78 Or 503, 517-18, 154 P106 (1915). Recently, in Hale v. Port of Portland, 308 Or 508, 523, 783 P2d 506 (1989), this court again stated that, so long as the party injured is not left without a remedy, Article I, section 10, is not violated. As discussed above, plaintiff is not left without a remedy. Plaintiff has a remedy, because he had an opportunity to prove that his condition was compensable; he has simply failed to prove his case.