specially concurring.
I agree with the result which the majority reaches regarding the speedy trial issue, but I once again feel compelled to write separately because I disagree with the majority’s statement that a speedy trial analysis must consider both the constitutional test and the procedural rule because a constitutional violation could still occur even though the rule’s timetables have been met. I continue to espouse the viewpoint that W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) encompasses the constitutional guarantees provided by the Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), analysis and should be the exclusive framework by which we judge speedy trial issues.
The purpose of W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) was to move us past the laborious and subjective Barker constitutional analysis to a more clear and concise analysis under W.R.Cr.P. 48(b). *233Recent Wyoming precedent has disregarded this approach, and I believe that this disregard has complicated matters by requiring an analysis to be made under both Barker and W.R.Cr.P. 48(b). In my opinion, Sides’ speedy trial concerns could have been decided under W.R.Cr.P. 48(b), and the statement that both the constitutional test and the procedural rule must be utilized is incorrect and needlessly confuses the issue. I thoroughly explained my position in Hall v. State, 911 P.2d 1364, 1371 (Wyo.1996) (Macy, J., specially concurring), and in Yung v. State, 906 P.2d 1028, 1037 (Wyo.1995) (Macy, J., specially concurring). Those specially concurring opinions continue to reflect my position on this issue.