dissenting.
The majority concludes that multi-risk, excess liability insurance (umbrella) policies are subject to the requirements of the compulsory uninsured motorist statutes. ORS 742.500 to ORS 742.506. Because the majority erroneously employs the rules of statutory construction to reach a result that the legislature did not intend, I dissent.
The majority states that it “is not appropriate to consider extrinsic evidence of legislative intent when the language of the statute has a plain, natural and ordinary meaning.” 114 Or App at 351.1 agree with that statement, as far as it goes. However, it does not go far enough, because the majority ignores the distinction between clear language and clear intent apparent from that language.
Our role in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature. ORS 174.020. We begin with the words of the statute. ORS 174.010; Whipple v. Howser, 291 Or 475, 479, 632 P2d 782 (1981). However, when those words do not provide sufficient insight into the legislature’s intent, they are ambiguous, and we must look beyond those words to discern that intent. Mattiza v. Foster, 311 Or 1, 4, 803 P2d 723 (1991). No matter how apparent the literal meaning of a statute may be, if we cannot tell whether the legislature intended a statute to apply in a particular context, it is appropriate to resort to extrinsic aids to construction.
*354Umbrella policies provide excess insurance against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death arising out of numerous specified risks, including the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. ORS 742.502(1) provides:
“Every motor vehicle liability policy insuring against loss suffered by any natural person resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or the use of a motor vehicle, shall provide uninsured motorist coverage therein.”
Certainly, an umbrella policy could be included within that provision. Nevertheless, had the legislature unambiguously intended to include umbrella policies within that statute, it would have specified that its terms apply to excess insurance policies covering more risks than those specified. Conversely, had the legislature unambiguously intended to exclude umbrella policies from that statute, it would have specified that its terms do not apply to multi-risk excess insurance policies. Because the terms of ORS 742.502(1) neither clearly include nor exclude umbrella policies, the language of that statute does not reflect the intent of the legislature on that issue. See State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Ashley, 312 Or 169, 174, 818 P2d 1270 (1991). Accordingly, we must resort to extrinsic aids to construction.
A review of the legislative history of the UM statutes discloses that the legislature did not consider the issue of whether umbrella policies should be subject to the compulsory UM statutes.
“In such an instance we try to determine what the legislature would have done if they had considered the problem. In making this determination, the court’s view of the most desirable policy necessarily will be a consideration.” State v. Tipple, 269 Or 661, 665, 525 P2d 1315 (1974); accord Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. v. Short, 102 Or App 495, 499, 95 P2d 118 (1990).
Policy considerations militate against the construction advocated by defendant. One commentator notes:
“Umbrella policies serve an important function in the industry. In this day of uncommon, but possible, enormous verdicts, they pick up this exceptional hazard at a small premium.
*355fe* * * * *
‘ ‘However, because of the misunderstanding of the courts as to the nature of such coverages, they have been held to fall within the definition of automobile liability insurance. * * * It should be recognized that the generosity of the courts confers no favor upon the insuring public. Such decisions result either in such coverage being withdrawn from potential insureds or in premium rates being raised so substantially that they will become priced out of the range of most buyers. For every such extension there is a price to be paid.” 8C Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 5071.65 (1981). (Footnote omitted.)
Because I do not believe that, had the legislature actually considered the issue, it would have made umbrella policies subject to ORS 742.502(1), I dissent.