dissenting, in which THOMAS, Justice, joins.
In his offer of proof, appellant proffered the testimony of six witnesses to impeach the testimony of Officer Lauck. Each of these felons had been indicted by the same grand jury that indicted appellant, and each had been convicted through the testimony of Officer Lauck. The court disallowed the testimony proposed by appellant, citing various provisions of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence.
The majority in its opinion gives no effect to the discretion afforded the court in its evidentiary rulings. W.R.E. 608(b), permits evidence of specific instances of conduct in very limited circumstances but “in the discretion of the court.” W.R.E. 403, provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is*1155sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. (Emphasis added.)
Assuming arguendo that appellant’s proposed testimony was relevant, there is no indication that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting such testimony nor is there any explanation in the majority opinion why the court was not justified in excluding the testimony under W.R.E. 403. Evidentiary rulings will only be reversed upon appellant’s showing of an abuse of discretion. Miller v. State, 755 P.2d 855, 861 (Wyo.1988).
Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. [Citation.]
Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo.1986).
Under Rule 403 the court may exclude relevant evidence if such evidence tends to confuse the issues or mislead the jury. The testimony proposed by appellant is a classic example of evidence likely to confuse the issues and mislead the jury. If the court had allowed the alleged impeachment testimony proposed by appellant, then, to be consistent, the court should allow the state to produce witnesses to impeach the testimony of appellant’s witnesses. All of this could result in two dozen mini-trials to determine who had impeached whom. The jury would likely be so confused that it would lose sight of the trial issue, that is, the guilt or innocence of the accused.
An ancient and very successful trial tactic in criminal cases is for the accused to put the victim on trial and thus divert the jury’s attention. For example, in murder cases, the accused tries to produce evidence tending to show that the deceased was a bad man and society has suffered no great loss. In rape cases the accused tries to produce evidence designed to show that the victim was Jezebel reincarnated and deserved what she got. Here, there was no identifiable victim so appellant tried to divert attention to the state’s witness.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the impeachment testimony proposed by appellant. To allow such testimony would confuse the issue and mislead the jury. This court has held many times that:
Determinations of admissibility under Rule 403 are * * * committed to the discretion of the trial judge. His decision will not be reversed on appeal so long as a legitimate basis exists supporting it.
Ortega v. State, 669 P.2d 935, 944 (1983).
See also Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 126 (Wyo.1981); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1380 (Wyo.1981); Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802, 810 (Wyo.1980); Nimmo v. State, 603 P.2d 386, 392 (Wyo.1979); Elliott v. State, 600 P.2d 1044, 1049 (Wyo.1979); Sanville v. State, 593 P.2d 1340, 1345 (Wyo.1979).
Rule 403 also permits the court to exclude cumulative evidence. In this case appellant produced testimony that the state’s witness, Officer Lauck, used drugs. Therefore, the proposed testimony by the six witnesses was merely cumulative and not admissible.
I would affirm the conviction.