concurring.
In any challenge to a statute or ordinance under the due process clause of the Nebraska Constitution, the degree of judicial scrutiny is often dispositive of whether that statute or ordinance is upheld or struck down. See Robotham v. State, 241 Neb. 379, 488 N.W.2d 533 (1992) (citing Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 109 S. Ct. 1591, 104 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1989)). Thus, while I concur in the judgment in the instant case, I write separately to address Champoux’s contention that the Nebraska Court of Appeals erroneously applied the wrong level of judicial scrutiny in determining whether Lincoln Mun. Code § 27.03.220 (1994) withstands his due process challenge.
The Court of Appeals, quoting State v. Michalski, 221 Neb. 380, 377 N.W.2d 510 (1985), recited that “ ‘[classifications appearing in social or economic legislation require only a rational relationship between the state’s legitimate interest and the means selected to accomplish that end. The ends-means fit need not be perfect; it need only be rational.’ ” State v. Champoux, 5 Neb. App. 68, 72, 555 N.W.2d 69, 72 (1996).
In State v. Michalski, supra, the appellant challenged the constitutionality of a recently enacted driving while under the influence (DUI) statute which provided for the permanent revocation of a driver’s license for an individual with two or more prior DUI convictions. The appellant contended that the new DUI statute imposed harsher punishment upon those subject to permanent revocation who were employed than it did for those subject to permanent revocation who were not employed, because the statute failed to provide an exemption for those requiring the use of private transportation for the purposes of their employment.
We concluded that driving was not a fundamental right and that the right to possess a driver’s license was an entitlement, not a property right. As such, analysis of the appellant’s claim *778involved the lowest level of judicial scrutiny, the rational relationship test. Id.
Champoux points out that State v. Michalski, supra, is inapposite because it involved an equal protection challenge, that is, one involving a governmental act which divided affected citizens into separate groups and treated these groups differently. Champoux’s claim is one of due process, that being, that the city’s zoning ordinance interferes with his right to use his property. As such, Champoux asserts that Eckstein v. City of Lincoln, 202 Neb. 741, 277 N.W.2d 91 (1979), holds that a higher level of judicial scrutiny is applicable when a zoning ordinance is challenged on due process grounds.
In Eckstein v. City of Lincoln, supra, the appellant challenged a city ordinance limiting the use of private wells within the city limits for domestic purposes to only those properties where the city’s water distribution system was not available. We stated:
The right to full and free use and enjoyment of one’s property in a manner and for such purposes as the owner may choose, so long as it is not for the maintenance of a nuisance or injurious to others, is a privilege protected by law, and one of which a property owner may not be deprived without due process of law. The owner’s right to use his property is subject, however, to reasonable regulation, restriction, and control by the state in the legitimate exercise of its police powers. The test of legitimacy is the existence of a real and substantial relationship between the exercise of those powers in a particular manner, and the peace, public health, public morality, public safety, or the general welfare of the city. [Citation omitted.]
There must be a reasonable relationship between the object the ordinance seeks to accomplish and the means by which it operates. [Citation omitted.] There must be a clear, real, and substantial connection between the assumed purpose of the enactment and its actual provisions.
(Emphasis supplied.) Eckstein v. City of Lincoln, 202 Neb. at 744, 277 N.W.2d at 93.
Thus, Champoux asserts that consistent with Eckstein v. City of Lincoln, supra, the appropriate “level of scrutiny” to be *779employed in analyzing the Lincoln zoning ordinance at issue is not merely a rational relationship, but, instead, that there must exist a real and substantial connection between the governmental interest and the ordinance at issue. Champoux’s assertion is partially correct. Although we have not required a heightened “level of scrutiny” in such instances, we have required a greater nexus between the legitimate governmental interest and the zoning regulation at issue than a mere rational relationship. See id.
Generally, various levels of judicial scrutiny are defined by both the identification of a governmental interest (e.g., legitimate, important, or compelling) and a statement in regard to a requisite nexus between the governmental interest and the challenged governmental action (e.g., a rational relationship, a substantial relationship, or the least restrictive means). See 3 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law, Substance and Procedure § 18.3 (2d ed. 1992).
With that in mind, Eckstein v. City of Lincoln, supra, identifies that when a zoning ordinance is claimed to effect a deprivation of an individual’s property right, the first step is to identify a legitimate governmental interest. Recognizing that a citizen’s private property rights are cherished under our state Constitution, we do, in Eckstein v. City of Lincoln, insist upon a tighter nexus between the legitimate governmental purpose and the zoning ordinance at issue than the mere rational relationship identified in State v. Michalski, 221 Neb. 380, 377 N.W.2d 510 (1985). Champoux is correct in asserting that we required a real and substantial connection between the legitimate governmental interest and the challenged zoning ordinance in Eckstein v. City of Lincoln, supra.
Notwithstanding the tighter nexus requirement, I concur in the judgment because Champoux has failed to rebut the zoning ordinance’s presumption of constitutionality with respect to his alleged injury. The validity of a zoning ordinance will be presumed in the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence to the contrary. Gas ’N Shop v. City of Kearney, 248 Neb. 747, 539 N.W.2d 423 (1995).
At the outset, it is important to recognize that Champoux is asserting a deprivation of his property right, that being, his claimed right to lease his premises to anyone he chooses. We are *780not concerned with any issues regarding the right of association, privacy, or any other deprivation of right which, arguably, one of Champoux’s tenants might assert on his or her own behalf.
Thus, with our focus solely on Champoux’s property right, the record is devoid of any evidence that Champoux has in fact been deprived of the use of his property. Certainly, Champoux is still able to lease his premises to a “family” within the meaning of § 27.03.220. Further, Champoux has failed to prove any diminution in value of his property so as to constitute a violation of his due process rights.
However, even accepting Champoux’s bare assertion that his property rights have been abridged, I nonetheless conclude that the legitimate governmental interests identified by the city bear a real and substantial connection to the zoning ordinance at issue.
In this context, it is clear that a city may designate certain areas as residential districts and limit such areas to specific uses pursuant to its police powers. See, e.g., 2 Kenneth H. Young, Anderson’s American Law of Zoning § 9.24 at 186 (4th ed. 1996) (“delegation of the power to establish residential districts is not in doubt”). Thus, having the authority to designate an area as a residential neighborhood, it necessarily follows that a city then has the authority to regulate living conditions it finds inimical to its concept of a residential neighborhood. Limiting the use of residences within such districts to single-family and two-family dwellings is clearly such a living condition which the city may regulate to effect its concept of a residential neighborhood. See id.
However, § 27.03.220 goes one step further by defining a “family” as only those related by blood, marriage, or adoption living as a single housekeeping unit and, in addition, not more than two persons who are unrelated. The State asserts that the city’s legitimate objectives furthered by this definition of family include the preservation of the “sanctity of the family, quiet neighborhoods, low population, few motor vehicles, and low transiency.” Brief for appellee at 17.
Champoux claims that there is absolutely no relationship between the ordinance’s limitation on the number of unrelated occupants of a dwelling and the city’s legitimate objectives. I disagree.
*781In the instant case, Champoux had leased one side of a duplex to five unrelated, single adults. These individuals were sharing the duplex not to function as a family, but for convenience and economics over a limited period of time. A houseful of unrelated adults, unlike a typical family, leads lives separate from one another. This means separate automobiles, separate jobs, separate comings and goings, and separate friends, all with their separate automobiles. Limiting this sort of household in what the city intends to be a residential neighborhood bears a real and substantial connection to the city’s objectives of quiet neighborhoods, few motor vehicles, and low transiency.
Moreover, excluding those related by blood, marriage, or adoption from this limitation bears a real and substantial connection to the city’s objective of preserving the sanctity of the family. Champoux asserts that the lack of a biological or a marital relationship between residents of a dwelling does not necessarily lead to the creation of problems in a residential neighborhood or a predisposition to transiency. While this may be true in certain instances, the fact that some families and certain individuals differ with respect to their habits and conduct in relation to the community does not render invalid the overall legislative judgment on how this type of occupancy will affect family life in residential neighborhoods as a whole. As the principal opinion points out, the definition of “family” in § 27.03.220 is an exercise in legislative line drawing. This line drawing is appropriately a legislative, not a judicial, function.
I cannot say that the line drawn by the city in this case, with respect to Champoux’s property right, is unreasonable, discriminatory, or arbitrary. Instead, the provisions of § 27.03.220 bear a real and substantial relationship to the public health, morality, and welfare of the city in promoting values that are important tó the community as a whole and maintaining a suitable quality of living for those in the community.
For these reasons, I concur in the judgment.
Connolly, Stephan, and McCormack, JJ., join in this concurrence.