SOUTHEASTERN NEWSPAPERS v. State of Ga.

Carley, Justice.

Appellees Cedric Brown and Maurice Fleming are the defendants in a pending capital murder case. Joined by appellee State, they filed motions for closure of the pre-trial proceedings. The motions were opposed by appellant Southeastern Newspapers Corporation (Southeastern). The trial court granted closure only as to hearings on pretrial motions addressing evidentiary matters, finding that extensive and prejudicial publicity created a severe danger of rendering it impossible to secure a fair and impartial jury and that highly sensitive and prejudicial matters might be disclosed to potential jurors. The trial court also noted that the death penalty was being sought, and that, therefore, extraordinary measures must be used to preserve appellees’ right to a fair trial. Thus, the trial court determined that limited closure was necessary because the alternative remedies set forth in R. W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, 249 Ga. 576 (292 SE2d 815) (1982) would be insufficient. All that occurs in the closed hearings was ordered to be transcribed and made available to the press and public when the jury has been sequestered. It is from these closure orders that Southeastern brings this appeal.

Georgia law is more protective of the concept of open courtrooms than federal law and generally requires that the criminal trial itself and all its consequent hearings on motions be open to the press and public

unless the defendant or other movant is able to demonstrate on the record by “clear and convincing proof’ that closing the hearing to the press and public is the only means by which a “clear and present danger” to his right to a fair trial or other asserted right can be avoided.

Lumpkin, supra at 579 (4). However, it is “less burdensome for the movant to justify the closure motion in a pre-trial hearing due to the absence of some alternatives at this stage of the proceedings.” Lumpkin, supra at 580 (5), fn. 11. The primary alternative to closure that is unavailable at the pre-trial stage is sequestration of the jury. Other alternatives to closure at this stage either are unavailable or are rendered less effective in a death penalty case as a result of the prospect of interim review pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-35.1. After review*224ing the record, we hold that the trial court was authorized to find by “clear and convincing proof” that closing pre-trial evidentiary hearings to the press and public in this death penalty case is the only means by which a “clear and present danger” to the right of Brown and Fleming to a fair and public trial can be avoided. Furthermore, we find that the closure orders are “narrowly drawn” to avoid this danger to these rights. See Lumpkin, supra at 580 (6).

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Benham, P. J., Sears and Hunstein, JJ., who dissent.