concurring specially.
The trial court closed all pretrial evidentiary hearings in the murder trial of Marvin Earl Turner, Jr. to the press and public to avoid the dissemination of information that the trial court found presented a clear and present danger that Turner’s right to a fair trial would be prejudiced. Although the record in this case establishes that the articles adduced in support of the closure motion consisted of accurate, responsible, non-inflammatory recountings of the investigation of the crime and subsequent arrest and prosecution of Turner and his co-defendants, the majority found that certain information published in appellant newspaper was “highly inflammatory” and focuses on this information as “proof adduced [that] could well support” a closure order upon remand. Majority opinion, p. 93. While I can concur in the majority’s decision that the closure motion be remanded to the trial court for compliance with the explicit and exacting requirements of R. W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, 249 Ga. 576 (292 SE2d 815) (1982), as opposed to the perfunctory, superficial analysis applied by the trial court, see Southeastern Newspapers Corp. v. State of Ga., 265 Ga. 223 (454 SE2d 452) (1995), I cannot agree with the majority that the factually-accurate information disseminated by the press was “highly inflammatory,” nor, under the circumstances present here, can I agree that mere publication of this information can support closure.
The victim in this case was killed in a dreadful, depraved manner; the facts of the murder are such as to invoke disgust and horror even when reported dispassionately. When the articles adduced in support of closure here are viewed under the standard established for a lesser alternative to closure, change of venue, R. W. Page Corp. v.
*95Lumpkin, supra at 580 (4),2 it is readily apparent that the information imparted in the articles was not hysterical, speculative or emotionalistic, see, e.g., Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415 (5) (349 SE2d 717) (1986); Kesler v. State, 249 Ga. 462 (7) (291 SE2d 497) (1982), and was neither calculated to provoke hostility nor reflective of an atmosphere of hostility. See Tyree v. State, 262 Ga. 395 (1) (418 SE2d 16) (1992). Pretrial publicity that is not inflammatory enough to support the grant of a motion for change of venue will not alone support the grant of a motion for closure. See R. W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, supra. Even where a crime is as appalling as the one here, an accurate, neutral recounting of the facts should not qualify as “highly inflammatory” except in the rarest cases. This is especially valid given that the news media’s former power over public opinion has been substantially eroded by the media’s loss in credibility, including the public’s belief in the accuracy and completeness of news coverage provided by both newspapers and television. See Newspaper Credibility Building Reader Trust, A National Study Commissioned by The American Society of Newspaper Editors (April 1985). Based on my review of the articles adduced at the closure motion, I cannot agree with the majority’s characterization of the information disseminated in appellant newspaper’s articles as “highly inflammatory.” Compare Tyree, supra.
However, even assuming, arguendo, that the information set forth in the majority opinion was “highly inflammatory,” I do not agree with the majority that its publication can justify barring press and public access to pretrial proceedings. That is because the record establishes this information had been disseminated to the public by the district attorney herself in a press statement announcing and explaining the decision to seek the death penalty. This press statement, and the article accurately detailing it, predated by almost a month the first article in the record discussing pretrial hearings open to the press. The record reflects that the “highly inflammatory” information published by appellant newspaper was not gained originally from media attendance at pretrial proceedings; hence, barring access to pretrial proceedings would not have prevented the dissemination of this information. The few news articles in the record which actually discuss pretrial proceedings contain matters that were consistent with or identical to the district attorney’s prior pronouncements or could not be characterized as inflammatory.
The ability to avoid the dissemination of inflammatory matters *96that could prejudice a defendant’s right to a fair trial does not reside solely in the media. Both the prosecution and the defense should exercise restraint and due caution in statements made for public dissemination. While DR 7-107 sets forth the standards for permissible and prohibited conduct of a lawyer with respect to trial publicity, EC 7-33; see also Williams v. State, 258 Ga. 305 (2) (A) (369 SE2d 232) (1988), counsel must recognize that factual situations will arise in which DR 7-107 will represent the de minimis standard and that counsel should conduct themselves in a manner so as to achieve that goal of our legal system, namely, “that each party shall have his case, criminal or civil, adjudicated by an impartial tribunal.” EC 7-33.
Decided November 20, 1995 — Reconsideration denied December 15, 1995. Heyman & Sizemore, William H. Major, William B. Brown, for appellant. Cheryl F. Custer, District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Carla E. Brown, Peters, Townsend, Wilson & Roberts, R. Stephen Roberts, J. M. Raffauf, for appellees. Cook, Noell, Tolley & Wiggins, Edward D. Tolley, Ronald E. Houser, Dow, Lohnes & Albertson, Peter C. Canfield, James A. Demetry, James W. Kimmell, Jr., Sean R. Smith, Gerald R. Weber, *97Barnes, Browning, Tanksley & Casurella, Roy E. Barnes, Alston & Bird, G. Conley Ingram, Ben F. Johnson III, Judson Graves, Daniel A. Kent, Arnall, Golden & Gregory, Robert L. Rothman, Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, James C. Rawls, Anderson, Walker & Reichert, Walter H. Bush, Jr., amici curiae.*96In the case at bar, because the “highly inflammatory” information that the majority indicates as sufficient to justify closure was disseminated as a result of press coverage of the district attorney’s pretrial public statements, barring the press and public from pretrial proceedings will not alleviate or eliminate whatever prejudice to Turner that might have been created by the district attorney’s statements.3 Because of this circumstance, the State and the defense now face a more difficult and perhaps insurmountable burden of establishing by “clear and convincing proof,” Lumpkin, supra at 579 (4), that a “clear and present danger” currently exists to Turner’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial that would justify the proposed closure, as opposed to the alternatives to closure. See id.; see also majority opinion, p. 93, fn. 1. As demonstrated by this case, a trial court, in ruling on a closure motion, cannot limit its consideration to the mere fact that certain information has been disseminated, but must also figure into its deliberations the source of that information, before determining whether closure of pretrial proceedings is the only step available to afford a defendant a fair trial.
This Court in R. W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, supra, rejected the federal court rule allowing judges to consider other remedies as alternatives to closure, holding that “a Georgia trial court judge shall use” other remedies, including change of venue, as alternatives to closure. Id. at 579-580 (4) and fn. 8.
In this regard, the record reveals that defense counsel sought a gag order to prevent any further statements by the district attorney.