I concur in the majority opinion with regard to the definition of “substance” in determining quantity enhancements under Health and Safety Code section 11370.41 The statute is clear that the weight of a controlled mixture, not the weight of the pure drug, is to be used to determine the appropriate quantity enhancement. However, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that we may enforce what the majority perceive as the Legislature’s intent in enacting section 11370.4 notwithstanding unambiguous statutory language that would subject this section to the double-base-term limitation of former Penal Code section 1170.1, subdivision (g).
The People concede, and the majority do not dispute, that the statute is unambiguous; section 11370.4 as originally enacted was subject to the double-base-term limitation. I find this concession troubling in light of the principle we have enunciated repeatedly: “ ‘ “[wjhen statutory language is thus clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, and courts should not indulge in it.” ’ ” (People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 843 [218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380], quoting In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System (1979) 25 Cal.3d 339, 348 [158 Cal.Rptr. 350, 599 P.2d 656].)
Even assuming some ambiguity, a number of rules of construction, as well as a commitment to refrain from judicial legislation, should lead us to a different result. Former Penal Code section 1170.1, subdivision (g), expressly states the exceptions to the general rule that all criminal sentences are subject to the double-base-term limitation. Prior to its amendment in 1988, *905this section did not mention any crime associated with the sale or possession of cocaine. .....Under the familiar rule of construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, where exceptions to a general rule are specified by statute, other exceptions are not to be implied or presumed. [Citation.]” ’ ” (People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1082 [255 Cal.Rptr. 352, 767 P.2d 619].) Thus, we should be wary of implying an exception to the double-base-term limitation for drug-quantity enhancements. Nor is this rule a mere formalism; the fact that the Legislature did not create an express exception to the double-base-term limitation is powerful, if not conclusive, evidence of legislative intent.
“ ‘[Ajmbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.’ ” (United States v. Bass (1971) 404 U.S. 336, 347 [30 L.Ed.2d 488, 496, 92 S.Ct. 515].) This maxim applies to punishment and sentencing as well as substantive offenses. (Simpson v. United States (1977) 435 U.S. 6, 14-15 [55 L.Ed.2d 70, 77-78, 98 S.Ct. 909].) We have espoused this principle on numerous occasions. (See, e.g., People v. Over-street (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 896 [231 Cal.Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288]; People v. Weidert, supra, 39 Cal.3d 836, 848.) This principle, too, supports a decision affirming the Court of Appeal.
The majority note but do not adequately apply a third rule of construction: we read every statute with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain effectiveness. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 899, citing Clean Air Constituency v. California State Air Resources Bd. (1977) 11 Cal.3d 801, 814 [114 Cal.Rptr. 577, 523 P.2d 617].) It is true that the Legislature, in enacting section 11370.4, intended “to punish dealers of large amounts of drugs in direct proportion to the quantity of drugs involved.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 901.) But the majority do not consider the Legislature’s intent, when it enacted former Penal Code 1170.1, subdivision (g),2to prevent excessive punishment for the substantive crimes which underlie the “base” term of a sentence.3 The majority do not try to harmonize both of these principles but rather adopt one wholesale while ignoring the other.
Finally, the mere fact that this exception to the double-base-term limitation did not exist in statute when this case arose suggests that we should use *906restraint in implying an exception to the double-base-term limitation. We have noted that “[s]trict construction of penal statutes . . . guards against judicial usurpation of the legislative function which would result from enforcement of penalties when the legislative branch did not clearly prescribe them.” (People v. Overstreet, supra, 42 Cal.3d 891, 896.) Further, application of this exception runs counter to the constitutional requirement of due process: “When a new penal statute is applied retrospectively to make punishable an act which was not criminal at the time it was performed, the defendant has been given no advance notice consistent with due process. And precisely the same effect occurs when such an act is made punishable under a preexisting statute but by means of an unforeseeable judicial enlargement thereof. [Citation.]” (Keeler v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 619, 634 [87 Cal.Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617, 40 A.L.R.3d 420], italics in original.)
Instead of following these rules of statutory construction, the majority justify their holding on the principle that we will not give statutory language a literal meaning where “ ‘absurd consequences’ ” will attach. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 898.) The majority then cite a case on a state Treasurer’s confirmation (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727 [248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299]) to suggest that ‘“[t]he intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be read as to conform to the spirit of the law.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 899.)
I do not consider a literal interpretation of the statute an “absurd consequence.” Section 11370.4 does not necessarily conflict with former Penal Code section 1170.1, subdivision (g), at all: in any particular case, the existence of another applicable exception to the double-base-term limitation would permit section 11370.4 enhancements to be applied in full. Even if one dismisses this possibility as unreasonably dependent upon a “fortuity,” as the majority do, the law as the Court of Appeal applied it (i.e., limiting the enhancement to the base term—three years in this case) does not yield an “absurd consequence” as that term has been used in prior case law. It is distinguishable from Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102 [145 Cal.Rptr. 674, 577 P.2d 1014], a case in which we held that despite the literal language of section 11361.5, we would not require destruction of criminal records for possession of marijuana where charges are pending, fines remain unpaid, or the sentence is not yet served.4 Here our holding *907would not operate to render unenforceable a criminal statute as in Younger-, instead we are merely asked to reconcile statutes that are arguably conflicting.
To justify their position, the majority argue that we have implicitly approved the correction of drafters’ oversights in People v. Jackson (1985) 37 Cal.3d 826 [210 Cal.Rptr. 623, 694 P.2d 736]. Although the majority opinion recognizes that Jackson is distinguishable from this case, it concludes that we need not abandon its reasoning. In Jackson, we held a five-year enhancement for prior serious felony convictions valid in spite of the double-base-term limitation. We contrasted the clear intent of Proposition 8 with a literal reading of the statutes added by that initiative, and concluded that the language of the statutes was not intended but was rather a “draftsman’s oversight.”
Our holding in Jackson, supra, 37 Cal.3d 826, should not be applied to this case. We hold initiatives to a different standard than enactments by the Legislature because of the nature of the initiative process. Initiatives are the direct expression of the people, typically drafted without extended discussion or debate. Of Proposition 8, a far-reaching criminal initiative passed in 1982, we have recognized that “it would have been wholly unrealistic to require the proponents of Proposition 8 to anticipate and specify in advance every change in existing statutory provisions which could be expected to result from the adoption of that measure.” (Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236, 257 [186 Cal.Rptr. 30, 651 P.2d 274].) In contrast to the proponents of initiatives, legislators and their staffs are entirely devoted to the analysis and evaluation of proposed laws. Indeed, we presume that the Legislature has knowledge of all prior laws and enacts and amends statutes in light of those laws. (See, e.g., Estate of McDill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 831, 839 [122 Cal.Rptr. 754, 537 P.2d 874].)
We cannot tell with certainty whether the Legislature’s 1988 amendment to the double-base-term limitation to include possession of cocaine and heroin represented an affirmation of the intent of the Legislature that enacted section 11370.4 or, instead, a revision to the law reflecting heightened concerns over drugs and drug-related crimes. It is plausible that the Legislature, in 1985, intended the maximum drug-quantity enhancement to be applied only in the circumstances where another exemption from former Penal Code section 1170.1, subdivision (g), applied. More likely, that Legislature never weighed its intent in enacting section 11370.4 against the intent expressed by the Legislature that enacted the double-base-term limitation. *908For us to attempt to fill in that blank for the Legislature is sheer speculation.
I am not convinced that this statute is susceptible to statutory construction. Further, assuming that ambiguity in the statutes exist, several basic rules of construction exist in support of the determination of the Court of Appeal; the conclusion the majority draw necessarily rejects these basic rules of construction. Finally, I believe that even if we were certain of the Legislature’s intent in enacting section 11370.4, extending Jackson’s analysis to encompass legislative “oversights” is an ill-advised and unnecessary precedent, especially in light of the Legislature’s amendment to the double-base-term limitation in 1988.
Mosk, J., concurred.
All further statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code unless otherwise indicated.
Former Penal Code section 1170.1, subdivision (g), was initially adopted as Penal Code section 1170.1a, subdivision (f).
It is obvious, however, that the Legislature is free to create new substantive crimes and sentencing guidelines in accordance with the severity of those crimes. The majority appear convinced that the Legislature that enacted section 11370.4 essentially intended to create a new substantive offense, wholesale or bulk distribution of a controlled mixture; if this was their intent, however, it is not apparent why the enacting Legislature did not simply amend the double-base-term limitation or create such a new substantive offense at the time.
The cases upon which Younger relies to establish “absurd consequences” are only distantly related to the facts of this case but serve to illustrate what outcomes we have found “absurd” in the past: People v. Barksdale (1972) 8 Cal.3d 320 [105 Cal.Rptr. 1, 503 P.2d 257] (“approval” of abortion within 20 weeks of conception does not implicitly authorize abortion at any time in the pregnancy); Bruce v. Gregory (1967) 65 Cal.2d 666 [56 Cal.Rptr. 265, 423 P.2d 193] (right to inspect public documents does not prohibit custodian from taking reason*907able actions to protect those documents); and Silver v. Brown (1966) 63 Cal.2d 841 [48 Cal.Rptr. 609, 409 P.2d 689] (apportionment based upon faulty geographic assumptions may be corrected in spite of statute).