Dissenting opinion by
Justice KELLER.I respectfully dissent because I do not believe that the phrase “awaiting trial” contained in KRS 533.060(3) can be so broadly construed to apply to offenses committed after Appellant’s trial and guilty pleas.
Although I agree with the majority that it is this Court’s duty when interpreting statutes to give effect to the General Assembly’s intent, I “know of no rule of interpretation that would require us to utterly ignore the plain ... meaning of words in a statute.”1 To the contrary, “[t]he plain meaning of the statutory language is presumed to be what the legislature intended, and if the meaning is plain, then the court cannot base its interpretation on any other method or source.”2 Under the rubric of effecting the “General Assembly’s intent,”3 the majority opinion ignores the plain language of the statute and impermissibly fills in gaps left by the Legislature.4 When interpreting statutes, *61“we should not ignore the plain meaning of the words used ... simply because a different interpretation might further or more efficiently accomplish its ultimate purpose.”5 Only “when [it] would produce an injustice or ridiculous result” should we ignore the plain meaning of a statute.6 Here, although we may not desire the outcome, the plain meaning of the statute produces neither an injustice nor a ridiculous result.
KRS 533.060(3) plainly states that it applies “[w]hen a person commits an offense while awaiting trial .7 This provision has been consistently applied to situations where the defendant is actually “awaiting trial.”8 It has not previously been interpreted by Kentucky’s appellate courts as applicable either after a trial or after the possibility of a trial has been foreclosed. In Commonwealth v. Brasher,9 the Court of Appeals noted correctly that “[i]t is generally considered that one is not awaiting trial before indictment or after guilt is established.”10 In Moore v. Commonwealth,11 however, this Court expanded the limits on the front-end to include arrest. Now the majority opinion expands the limits on the back-end to a point clearly past the plain language of the statute.
Even if the words of the statute are broad enough to include the time period after an arrest, as this Court held in Moore, at least in that situation one can anticipate that the defendant will stand trial, but as in this case, once a guilty plea is entered or jury sentencing is waived, clearly a defendant is only awaiting final sentencing and is no longer awaiting trial. I believe that Brasher12 is correct and that once a defendant has pled guilty and is awaiting sentencing, KRS 533.060(3) no longer applies. When a defendant enters a guilty plea, he or she is considered to be *62convicted.13 At that point the opportunity for a trial has passed; the defendant no longer anticipates standing trial and is merely awaiting sentencing.
A review of KRS 532.110 and KRS 533.060 shows that the Legislature has enacted numerous provisions on sentencing for additional crimes committed at various stages of the criminal trial process and beyond: “while awaiting trial for another offense,”14 “while ... imprisoned in a penal or reformatory institution,”15 “during an escape from imprisonment,”16 “while ... await[ing] imprisonment,”17 or “while on parole, probation, shock probation, or conditional discharge.”18 Had the Legislature wanted to address crimes committed after conviction and before final sentencing, the Legislature could have done so. Perhaps, it assumed, albeit incorrectly, that no gap existed between trial and sentencing.
Nevertheless, two years after the Brasher decision, the Legislature had the opportunity to expand the application of the sentencing provision in subsection (3) when it amended a different subsection of KRS 533.060.19 Since the Legislature is presumed to know how the statute had been interpreted and applied since its original enactment, the fact that the Legislature did not alter subsection (3) at that time indicates its approval of the Brasher interpretation.20
Although statutes are to be liberally construed, the Court cannot entirely ignore provisions or add to provisions those words, phrases or meanings whose omission appears to have been an oversight.21 *63By applying KRS 533.060(3) to the period between conviction and final sentencing by the trial court, the majority opinion extends the words “awaiting trial” beyond any plausible meaning.22
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the sentence imposed by the trial court and remand with directions to disregard KRS 533.060(3)’s proscription against a concurrent sentence and to resentence Appellant.
LAMBERT, C.J., joins this dissenting opinion.
. Gold Trading Stamp Co. v. Commonwealth, 224 Ky. 136, 5 S.W.2d 910, 911 (1928). Cf. Powers v. Brewer, 238 Ky. 579, 38 S.W.2d 466, 469 (1931) ("[T]he principle that the statute is to be liberally construed does not mean that its provision can be entirely ignored.”).
. RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT § 4.2, at 38 (NITA, 2002) [hereinafter "STATUTORY INTERPRETATION”].
. Cosby v. Commonwealth, Ky., 147 S.W.3d 56, 59 (2004).
. Commonwealth v. Brasher, Ky.App., 842 S.W.2d 535, 536 (1992), overruled on other grounds by Moore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 990 S.W.2d 618 (1999) ("[T]he legislature nevertheless left a gap between trial and sentencing, as well as between arrest and indictment.”).
. Autozone, Inc. v. Brewer, Ky., 127 S.W.3d 653, 656 (2004) (citing Bd. of Educ. of Nelson Co. v. Lawrence, Ky., 375 S.W.2d 830, 831 (1963)).
. Johnson v. Frankfort & C.R. R., 303 Ky. 256, 197 S.W.2d 432, 434 (1946) ("A cardinal rule for the interpretation of statutes — if there is any doubt from the language employed as to the intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting it — is that courts should avoid adopting a construction which would be unreasonable and absurd in preference to one that is ‘reasonable, rational, sensible and intelligent STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, § 4.3, at 40.
. KRS 533.060(3) (emphasis added).
. Cardwell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 12 S.W.3d 672 (2000) (Appellant had two pending charges against him that had not been resolved at the time he was charged with murder and first degree assault.); White v. Commonwealth, Ky., 5 S.W.3d 140, 142 (1999) ("[A]t the time Appellant committed the instant offense, he was released on bond awaiting trial for previous charges.”); Moore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 990 S.W.2d 618, 621 (1999) (“[PJersons are considered to be awaiting trial if they have sufficient knowledge of the first offense by means of arrest for that crime or crimes and are released on bond or otherwise incarcerated for the crimes charged.”); Commonwealth v. Martin, Ky. App., 777 S.W.2d 236 (1989) (While out on bond and awaiting trial, Appellant committed new offenses.); Rose v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 738 S.W.2d 835 (1987) (Appellant committed misdemeanors while on release awaiting trial on two previous felonies.); Handley v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 653 S.W.2d 165 (1983) (Appellant committed new offenses while awaiting trial on forgery charges.).
. Ky.App., 842 S.W.2d 535 (1992), overruled on other grounds by Moore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 990 S.W.2d 618 (1999).
. Brasher, 842 S.W.2d at 536-537.
. Ky., 990 S.W.2d 618 (1999).
. A comparison of Brasher and Moore reveals that Moore overruled Brasher only to the extent that Brasher stated that “one can only be considered awaiting trial after an indictment.” Moore, 990 S.W.2d at 620.
. Thomas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 95 S.W.3d 828, 829 (2003) (“When Appellant freely, knowingly, and intelligently entered a plea of guilty to first degree possession of a controlled substance, he acknowledged the fact of having committed a crime and accepted legal responsibility for a criminal act. Thus, Appellant’s status as a ‘convicted felon’ was established, and all that remained was the imposition of a sentence.”); Commonwealth v. Reynolds, Ky., 365 S.W.2d 853 (1963) (When a defendant enters a guilty plea or a verdict which ascertains and publishes the fact of guilt is returned, then the defendant has been convicted of the charge.); Grace v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 915 S.W.2d 754 (1996) (Defendant was a "convicted felon” for purposes of statute prohibiting possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, where he possessed handgun after plea of guilty to felony in prior case but before imposition of sentence.).
. KRS 533.060(3).
. KRS 532.110(3).
. Id.
. Id.
. KRS 533.060(2).
. 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 418, § 14.
. Rye v. Weasel, Ky., 934 S.W.2d 257, 262 (1996) (“The Kentucky and Federal courts have recognized the failure of the legislature to change a known judicial interpretation of a statute as extremely persuasive evidence of the true legislative intent. There is a strong implication that the legislature agrees with a prior court interpretation of its statute when it does not amend the statute interpreted.”); STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, § 9.3.1 at 149-150 (“[I]f the legislature reenacts the statute without rejecting the interpretations of the earlier act, it probably means to approve those interpretations.”).
. Commonwealth v. Harrelson, Ky., 14 S.W.3d 541, 546 (2000) (“Where a statute is intelligible on its face, the courts are not at liberty to supply words or insert something or make additions which amount, as sometimes stated, to providing for a casus omissus, or cure an omission.” (citation omitted)); Boone v. Commonwealth, Ky., 821 S.W.2d 813, 815 (1992) (quoting Hatchett v. City of Glasgow, Ky., 340 S.W.2d 248, 251 (1960)) (“ ‘[Cjourts are not at liberty to supply words or insert something or make additions [to statutes] which amount, as sometimes stated, to providing for a casus omissus, or cure an omission, however just or desirable it might [seem to] be to supply an omitted provision.” ').
. Flying J Travel Plaza v. Commonwealth of Ky., Transp. Cabinet, Dep’t of Highways, Ky., 928 S.W.2d 344, 347 (1996) (citing Ky. Ass'n of Chiropractors, Inc. v. Jefferson Co. Med. Soc’y, Ky., 549 S.W.2d 817 (1977)) (The Court has a responsibility "to ascertain the intention of the legislature from words used in enacting statutes rather than surmising what may have been intended but was not expressed.”). See also Commonwealth v. Harrelson, Ky., 14 S.W.3d 541, 546 (2000); Commonwealth v. Frodge, Ky., 962 S.W.2d 864, 866 (1998); Beckham v. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson Co., Ky., 873 S.W.2d 575, 578 (1994); Posey v. Powell, Ky. App., 965 S.W.2d 836, 838 (1998) (The Court is “not at liberty to add or subtract from legislative enactments.”).