IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 95-11038
Summary Calendar
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In the Matter of: JOHN RICHARD SULLIVAN,
Debtor.
A. M. MANCUSO, Trustee,
Appellant,
VERSUS
SULLIVAN PLAN COMMITTEE; TCCP CALIFORNIA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Assignee and Successor in Interest to the RTC as Receiver of Sandia
Federal Savings Association,
Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(3:95 CV 1254 T)
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July 22, 1996
Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*
A.M. Mancuso, the trustee in this chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceeding, appeals a judgment affirming both the bankruptcy
court’s denial of his motion to strike certain objections to his
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances
set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
compensation by the FDIC and the RTC and its order requiring him to
disgorge a portion of his compensation. For essentially the
reasons contained in the district court’s opinion, we affirm.
I.
This appeal arises out of the chapter 11 bankruptcy of John
Sullivan. The bankruptcy court confirmed a plan of reorganization
in March 1992 and appointed Mancuso as trustee. The plan provided
for Mancuso’s compensation; it also provided that the Sullivan Plan
Committee (“the committee”) would represent the interests of
class 5 creditors under the plan. TCCP California Limited
Partnership (“TCCP”) is a class 5 creditor, as were the FDIC and
the RTC.
Section 6.6 of the plan governed Mancuso’s compensation:
The [bankruptcy] Court shall have continuing
jurisdiction over the determination of the amount of
compensation paid to the Trustee. Compensation shall be
paid to the Trustee at the rate of $200.00 per hour. The
Trustee shall be reimbursed for expenses incurred in
connection with this case including travel, lodging and
meal expenses.
The Trustee shall submit monthly invoices for such
compensation and reimbursement of expenses to the Plan
Committee. If, after the expiration of ten (10) days
from the date such invoice is sent, no objection thereto
is voiced by the Committee, the invoice shall be paid
from the Estate. If the Plan Committee has any objec-
tion, it shall present such objection to the Trustee. If
the objection cannot otherwise be resolved, the Trustee
shall file an appropriate pleading seeking resolution of
the dispute by the Court. The Trustee shall also be
permitted to retain professionals, including without
limitation, attorneys and accountants to assist him in
his duties, under the same terms and conditions as
professionals employed by the Plan Committee.
Pursuant to § 6.6, Mancuso began submitting invoices for
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compensation to the committee in April 1992. Through December
1994, Mancuso submitted invoices totaling $451,011.77. In January
1993, the committee began submitting objections to portions of
Mancuso’s invoices, which led Mancuso to withhold $24,767.01 of his
compensation. In June 1994, the RTC and the FDIC also began to
file objections to Mancuso’s compensation with the bankruptcy court
independently of the committee, although § 6.6 did not explicitly
authorize them to do so.
Mancuso moved to strike the objections of the RTC and the
FDIC, contending that they lacked standing to assert objections
independently of the committee under § 6.6. The bankruptcy court
denied the motion, ruling that § 6.6 vested it with continuing
jurisdiction over Mancuso’s compensation and that it could
therefore consider objections raised by any plan beneficiary. The
court then held a hearing on Mancuso’s compensation, determined
that it was excessive, and ordered him to disgorge $67,382.29 of
the compensation he had received. Mancuso appealed to the district
court, which affirmed.
II.
Mancuso raises four arguments on appeal. He contends that
(1) the bankruptcy court erroneously interpreted § 6.6 to vest it
with jurisdiction to consider any objection to Mancuso’s compensa-
tion, even if the objection was not properly raised by the
committee; (2) the bankruptcy court denied him due process by
departing from the procedures prescribed by the plan to consider
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objections to his compensation not raised by the committee; (3) the
bankruptcy court erred by denying his motion to strike the
objections of the FDIC and the RTC; and (4) the bankruptcy court
erred by finding his claimed compensation to be excessive.
The crux of this appeal is the proper interpretation of § 6.6.
Mancuso urges that under that section, only the committee may raise
objections to his compensation. The committee and TCCP, on the
other hand, focus on that part of § 6.6 that confers on the
bankruptcy court “continuing jurisdiction over the determination of
the amount of compensation paid to the Trustee.” They argue that
the bankruptcy court is thereby entitled to consider any objection
to Mancuso’s compensation, regardless of whether the committee
properly raises it.
Although both interpretations are plausible, the committee’s
interpretation is the better one. It is not necessary to set forth
our reasoning in detail; the district court’s opinion is thorough
and well-reasoned, and its reasoning is essentially the same as our
own. Because Mancuso’s first three objections either focus on the
proper interpretation of § 6.6 or assume the validity of his
interpretation, we need not consider them further.
Mancuso also contends that even if the bankruptcy court was
entitled to consider objections to his compensation not raised by
the committee, it should not have determined his compensation to be
excessive. Although Mancuso raises a number of objections to the
bankruptcy court’s finding, the district court’s opinion responds
to each of these objections comprehensively. We therefore AFFIRM
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for essentially the reasons contained in that opinion.
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