Concurring opinion by
Justice GRAVES.I concur with the legal reasoning supporting the majority’s opinion. I write separately to further elaborate on issues looming over, but not discussed, in the majority opinion.
Most striking to me is that this case chiefly concerns misdemeanors with a maximum penalty of six months in the county jail. Even though a grand jury em-panelled by the circuit court may indict, misdemeanors cannot be tried by the circuit court, but must be transferred to the district court for trial. Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 174 S.W.3d 451 (Ky.2005); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 806 S.W.2d 643 (Ky.1991). Since prosecution of misdemeanors must commence within one year of the date of the offense, it is now likely that the Attorney General’s decision to initiate grand jury proceedings will result in the dismissal of any subsequent indictment to be handed down by them not because of the Governor’s pardon, but due to the expiration of the statute of limitations (KRS 500.050). To approach cases of this nature through the use of a special grand jury now appears to be a strategic error as the dismissal of any misdemeanor indictment will be compelled due to the passage of time.
Courts have defined “independent and informed” to mean the grand jury must have all relevant evidence. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). Consequently, the grand jurors deserve full, complete, and accurate information regarding how the significant expenditure of their time and energy in an exhaustive investigation ef*368fects the ultimate disposition of the cases before it, that is, the cases must be dismissed.
I also believe a balanced perspective is needed as to why the pardon power can and does serve a useful and reconciliatory purpose in our constitutional framework at this time in our history.
The primary role and purpose of the executive pardon/amnesty1 is to bring necessary balance to the severity and force of criminal law enforcement. See Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120, 45 S.Ct. 332, 69 L.Ed. 527 (1925). The executive’s power to pardon was imported to this country from England, where the concept can be traced to the royal pardon prerogative that existed with the kings of England for centuries. Todd David Peterson, Congressional Power Over Pardon & Amnesty: Legislative Authoñty in the Shadoiu of Presidential Prerogative, 38 Wake Forest L.Rev. 1225,1230 (2003). Delegates at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 insisted that the pardon power be incorporated with the executive as a necessary component of our own federal constitution. Id. (“[I]t is not to be doubted that a single man of prudence and good sense, is better fitted, in delicate conjunctures, to balance the motives, which may plead for and against the remission of the punishment, than any numerous body whatsoever.”) (quoting The Federalist No. 71, at 378 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982)). Once called the executive’s “benign prerogative of mercy,” Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 71 U.S. 333, 380, 18 L.Ed. 366 (1866), the pardon/amnesty power has evolved to serve as a mechanism which simultaneously checks and balances the powers of the legislature (that make the laws), the judiciary (that interprets/enforces the laws), and the grand jury/prosecutor (that investigates/prosecutes the laws). Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. at 120-121, 45 S.Ct. 332.
Amnesties/pardons granted prior to accusation or indictment are most frequently exercised as an act of political reconciliation. Throughout the history of the United States, these types of pardons were granted to rebels (Whiskey rebellion, United States Civil War), draft dodgers (by Presidents Ford and Carter after the Vietnam War), and to a fallen United States president (President Richard M. Nixon). Guide to American Law: Everyone’s Legal Encyclopedia^ Amnesty, Vol. 1 (West 1994). While these acts of reconciliation / angered many at the time they were'' granted, they were also viewed as serving important and necessary public interests. In Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486, 47 S.Ct. 664, 71 L.Ed. 1161 (1927), Justice Holmes most eloquently stated:
A pardon in our days is not a private act of grace from an individual happening to possess power. It is a part of the Constitutional scheme. When granted it is the determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting less than what the judgment fixed.
In cases where the pardon power is determined by the legislature or the people to have been abused or misused2, the coordi*369nating checks and balances of our constitutional scheme allow resort to impeachment or deposition by popular election. Ex 'parte Grossman, 267 U.S. at 121, 45 S.Ct. 332.
In this case, the Attorney General summoned a special grand jury to investigate whether the state’s merit system hiring law had been violated by the newly elected Governor. At the time the special Grand Jury was empanelled, the allegations, if true, would have constituted misdemeanor crimes. Moreover, these same incidents were (and are) simultaneously being investigated by two other agencies with subpoena powers — the Kentucky Personnel Board and the Executive Branch Ethics Commission. In light of the circumstances, the filing of a complaint and the issuance of a warrant would have served just as well for the prosecution of these alleged misdemeanors. See Democratic Party of Kentucky v. Graham, 976 S.W.2d 423, 427 (Ky.1998) (“an indictable offense is a felony”) (interpreting Ky. Const. § 12); see also RCr 6.02. The cases could have been tried fairly, expeditiously, and economically as the law provides.
The Attorney General has explained that he nonetheless chose to utilize extraordinary resources and efforts to summon an investigatory grand jury in this case because the grand jury is supposedly “independent.” Indeed, this Court has stated, “[t]he hallmark of the grand jury is its independence from outside influence.” Democratic Party of Kentucky, 976 S.W.2d at 426. Yet, this case sadly demonstrates once again that the independence of our revered grand jury system is little more than convenient legal fiction. See Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury Independence; 41 Am.Crim. L.Rev. 1 (2004); David A. Sklan-sky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 Geo. L.J. 683, 690 (2006) (“Today everyone seems to agree that a minimally competent prosecutor can get a grand jury to ‘indict a ham sandwich.’ ”)3.
In Kentucky (and most states, for that matter), reality demonstrates, more often than not, that grand juries are the domain and province of the prosecutors. Not only do prosecutors initiate the proceedings, but they preside as the sole investigator, advocate, and counsel before the grand jurors during these proceedings. See RCr *3705.06, RCr 5.14 (prosecutors may attend grand jury proceedings, may subpoena and examine witnesses, and give grand jurors legal advice “regarding any matter cognizable by them.”). No judge presides at grand jury proceedings and defendants have no right to present anything before the grand jury (or be present at the proceedings). RCr 5.08 and RCr 5.18.
Neither statute, decision, nor rule permits the grand jury to obtain outside investigatory assistance; it depends solely on the prosecuting attorney. The grand jury remains an appendage of the trial court, powerless to perform its investigative function without the trial court’s aid. It is the trial court’s process which summons the witness to attend and give testimony, and it is the trial court that must compel a witness to testify. The trial court may quash a grand jury subpoena if it infringes upon a vested right. Thus, the scope and direction of any grand jury proceeding is largely (if not exclusively) in the hands of the public prosecutor (and to some extent the trial court)4. Often the so-called grand jury investigation is really nothing more than a review of the prosecutor’s predigested evidence and a ratification of his conclusion.
Of course, grand juries certainly did not originate as the mere strong arm of public prosecutors. Rather, the institution evolved as an important and independent body of citizens determined to ferret out crime and governmental abuses, as well as protect the individual from unfair governmental oppression. See, e.g., Susan M. Schiappa, Preserving the Autonomy and Function of the Grand Jury: United States v. Williams, 43 Cath.U.L.Rev. 311 (1993); Lewis Poindexter Watts, Jr., Grand Jury: Sleeping Watchdog or Expensive Antique, 37 N.C.L.Rev. 290 (1958-59). ‘"Well into the nineteenth century, in both England and America, the apprehension of offenders and prosecution of criminal cases was a private affair, in which government participated only by offering rewards.” Sklansky and Yeazell, supra, at 691. In a world of private law enforcement, the grand jury was a useful and vital institution, serving to investigate complaints and to screen out those which were determined to be unfounded or without merit. Id. at 690.
By the late nineteenth century, however, public police and prosecutorial departments greatly expanded their scope and expertise in investigation and prosecution. Id. at 691. Eventually, grand juries were no longer needed to spearhead investigations or sort through citizen complaints. An extensive movement for legal reform materialized in the 1920’s and early 1930’s, advocating for the United States to follow the lead of our mother country, England, and abolish the antiquated institution. *371Watts, supra, at 290. Famous judges Roscoe Pound and Felix Frankfurter opined that grand juries were inefficient and unnecessary, since police, prosecutors, and trial courts had already absorbed the functions once embraced by grand juries. Richard D. Younger, The Grand Jury Under Attack, III, 46 J.Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 214, 215 (1955-56).
Unfortunately, the grand jury today has evolved to be but a shadow of its former self. Grand juries are largely passive bodies, utterly dependent upon the prosecutor and the trial court for information and evidence. There seem to be several reasons for this. First, laws and crimes today are increasingly complex and technical. Citizens without legal training are incredibly vulnerable to becoming complacent with the recommendations and urgings of a prosecutor who is cloaked with the title of being their “legal advisor.” RCr 5.14; see also, Schiappa, supra, at 334-35. Unlike past centuries, grand jurors have no personal knowledge or ability to investigate cases on their own, but must wait for the prosecutor to bring them cases and feed them information at his or her sole discretion and will. Schiappa, supra at Id. Also, since grand jury proceedings are ex parte, prosecutors may question and subpoena witnesses and documents without any scrutiny from judges or adversaries, and thus, slant or portray the evidence as they deem fit. Krukes, supra at 3-4. When all these factors and circumstances are considered in their totality, motivated and well-meaning citizens have but little chance to take control of their own institution.
Thus, when the reality of the situation is truly considered (and not the legal fiction which has been fervently portrayed by this Court and others), the Attorney General’s claim that he summoned this grand jury to serve as an independent adjudicator of probable cause is, at best, unrealistic, and at worst, disingenuous. Cutting through the fog of rhetoric and setting aside the legal fictions compel the rational conclusion that this case indeed demonstrates the continued relevancy and reconciliatory purpose of executive pardons in a republic, notwithstanding polarizing polemics and unyielding arguments to the contrary.
Ultimately, if grand jury independence is to have any meaning whatsoever, then there can be no conclusion other than the one reached by this majority — a fully informed grand jury is paramount to ensuring (or perhaps encouraging) an independent grand jury. These reasons, coupled with the majority’s otherwise sound analysis, compel me to concur with the majority’s opinion.
. It has been generally understood that "[t]he distinction between amnesty and pardon is of no practical importance." Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601, 16 S.Ct. 644, 40 L.Ed. 819 (1896); see also Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 152-53, 13 Ct.Cl. 517, 24 L.Ed. 442 (1877).
. The statement in the dissent that the Governor’s blanket pardon is merely a "scheme to cover up alleged wrongdoing in his administration” lacks a factual basis in what is acknowledged to be an abbreviated record. Infra, at 403. Further such statements in this context may be perceived by some as a finding of guilt which would be inconsistent with *369this Court’s constitutional duty to act as an independent and impartial body whose primary function is to interpret the law. While such a presumption may well seem justified from random media reports, "this Court is without constitutional authority to pass on the wisdom of the [governor’s] action.” Majority op., ante, at 365.
. Contrary to the dissent's assertion, this so-called "ham sandwich” claim did not originate with the Governor (and I do not recall seeing it anywhere in his brief), but rather originated from a popular quip that has become a cynical idiom for describing the grand jury system in this country. As mentioned by Tom Wolfe in Bonfire of the Vanities 603 (1987), the "indict a ham sandwich” reference is attributable to former New York Chief Judge Sol Wachtler. The phrase is also mentioned in FN8 of United States v. Hayes, 376 F.Supp.2d 736, 741 (E.D.Mich.2005) and FN 69 of Improving the Quality of Justice: The Innocence Protection Act of 2004 Ensures Post-Conviction DNA Testing, Better Legal Representation, and Increased Compensation for the Wrongfully Imprisoned, 44 Brandéis LJ. 491, (2006). In United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 93 S.Ct. 774, 35 L.Ed.2d 99 (1973), Justice Douglas quoted approvingly Judge Campbell’s statement that " '[a]ny experienced prosecutor will admit that he can indict anybody at anytime for almost anything before any grand jury.' ” Id. at 23, 93 S.Ct. at 777 (quoting William J. Campbell, Delays in Criminal Cases, 55 F.R.D. 229, 253 (1972)) (Justice Douglas, dissenting).
. Ironically, the dissent actually illustrates this point by demonstrating the grand jury's utter dependence on the trial court’s instructions to it. First, the dissent speculates that the scope of the grand jury’s investigation was directed and defined by the trial court (and not the grand jury, as it once was). Infra, at 372 ("Although the trial court’s charge to the grand jurors is not found in this abbreviated record, the charge presumably directed them to inquire into the allegations of merit system violations and to find an indictment where they have received what they believe to be sufficient evidence to support it, i.e., probable cause.”). Next, the dissent describes how the grand jurors actually inquired about the effect, if any, the Governor's pardon had on their work. The trial court responded that the pardon had no effect on their work whatsoever and that at such time as the court determined that the pardon did effect its work, it would so advise. Infra, at 373. Thus, the jurors were essentially being directed as to how they should proceed. In the face of such stature and authority, could any reasonable citizen truly feel empowered (or even justified) to question the trial court?