Southland Exchange Joint Venture (Southland) and the South Carolina Employment Security Commission (Commission) appeal a Circuit Court Order finding Douglas Mickens (Mickens) entitled to unemployment compensation.
We affirm.
FACTS
Mickens was employed as a materials handler for Southland at its Hampton, South Carolina, plant. Upon his employment, he signed a “Confidentiality and Non-Competition Agreement” which states, in part:
I understand that during the course of my employment with Southland Exchange Joint Venture (the “Company”), I will become privy to certain confidential information which is proprietary in nature and strictly the property of the Company. Such information shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, technical information and data in respect of the Company’s products, plans, policies, programs, manuals, plants, processes, costs, *129equipment, operations, procedures, customer lists, contracts, and the chemical composition or quantity of waste delivered or processed. I will not during the course of my employment with the Company, or at any time thereafter, reveal such information to any other party except as is necessary in the course of my employment with the Company or as may be required by any laws or by any governmental regulatory authority without the prior written consent of the Company.
On March 20,1989, Mickens attended a press conference at which TV news reporters were present. Southland produced no evidence that Mickens made any comment at the conference.
Southland issued Mickens what it termed a “final warning,” stating that his attendance at the press conference had violated Company policy, and that “[a]ny further violation . . . may result in termination of employment.” When Mickens refused to sign the warning statement, he was fired.
Mickens’ claim for unemployment compensation was denied for a thirteen week period1 on the ground that he had been discharged “for cause.”
Circuit Court reversed, finding (1) the confidentiality agreement did not prohibit Mickens’ attendance at a press conference, (2) there was no evidence Mickens discussed any confidential information at the meeting, (3) his refusal to sign the warning under these circumstances could not be deemed misconduct, and (4) that Commission’s denial of benefits violated Mickens’ constitutional right of free speech.
ISSUES
1. Did Circuit Court correctly hold that' Mickens was not discharged for cause?
2. Did denial of benefits violate Mickens’ constitutional right of free speech?
*130DISCUSSION
I. DISCHARGE FOR CAUSE
Under the Administrative Procedures Act, S.C. Code Ann. § l-23-380(g)(5) (1986), Circuit Court’s scope of review was limited to whether there was substantial evidence that Mickens was discharged for cause. We agree with the trial judge that there was not.
Commission found that Mickens had violated the confidentiality agreement, thereby justifying Southland’s requirement that he sign the warning. His refusal to do so was held to violate the standard of behavior Southland had a right to expect.
In Lee v. S.C. Employment Security Commission, 277 S.C. 586, 291 S.E. (2d) 378 (1982), we interpreted the phrase “discharge for misconduct”2 to include “the disregard of the standard of behavior which an employer can rightfully expect from an employee.” 277 S.C. at 588, 291 S.E. (2d) at 379. (Emphasis supplied). We have not had occasion to determine what behavior an employer may rightfully expect. However, the general rule is that, where the employer’s request is reasonable, a refusal to comply will constitute misconduct, justifying a discharge for cause. See, e.g. Sandstrom v. Douglas Machine Corp., 372 N.W. (2d) 89 (Minn. App. 1985); Simpson v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board, 69 Pa. Cmwlth. 120, 450 A. (2d) 305 (PA 1982); Cf., Singleton v. Ross, 82 A.D. (2d) 952, 440 N.Y. S. (2d) 767 (1981). “What is ‘reasonable’ will vary according to the circumstances of each case.” Sandstrom, supra, 372 N.W. (2d) at 91. Not only must the reasonableness of the employer’s request be evaluated, but also the employee’s reason for noncompliance. Simpson, supra.
Here, nothing in the confidentiality agreement proscribes Mickens’ attendance at a press conference. Moreover, nothing in the record discloses that any confidential information was released at the conference. In short, there is no evidence that Mickens did, in fact, violate company policy. We find Southland’s requirement that Mickens sign a “final warning” prohibiting him from further violation of Company policy unreasonable. Such a restriction would render his *131mere attendance at a future press conference cause for discharge. As the confidentiality agreement did not prohibit Mickens’ attendance at such a meeting, his refusal to sign the warning was justified.3
II. FREE SPEECH
Southland cites Knopf, Inc. v. Colby4 for the proposition that, with respect to confidential information, an employee’s entry into a confidentiality agreement constitutes a relinquishment of First Amendment rights. It conceded at oral argument, however, that Mickens was entitled to exercise his constitutional rights of free speech,5 absent violation of the agreement.
As noted earlier, there was no evidence that confidential information was disclosed at the press conference. We find that Mickens’ right of free speech is abridged by Southland’s proscription of his attendance at future press conferences, irrespective of a breach of the agreement. See, Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 78 S. Ct. 1332, 2 L. Ed. (2d) 1460 (1958); Jannetta v. Cole, 493 F. (2d) 1334, 1337 (4th Cir. 1974). (denial of a valuable government benefit may not be predicated on one’s exercise of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights).
The judgment below is
Affirmed.
Gregory, C.J., and Finney and Toal, JJ., concur. Harwell, J., dissenting in separate opinion.Under S.C. Code Ann. § 41-35-120 (1986), if the Commission finds a discharge for cause the employee is ineligible for benefits for a period not less than five, nor more than twenty-six weeks.
S.C. Code § 41-35-120(2) (1976) was amended by 1985 Act No. 154, § 6 to substitute the term “cause” for “misconduct.”
The effect of the dissenting opinion is chilling: it holds an employee guilty of misconduct, rendering him ineligible for thirteen weeks unemployment benefits, for refusing to sign a document containing an admission of wrongdoing when, in fact and truth, there has been no wrongdoing.
509 F. (2d) 1362, 1370 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 421 U.S. 992, 95 S. Ct. 1999, 44 L. Ed. (2d) 482.
See U.S. Const., amend. I; S.C. Const, art. I, § 2.