dissenting as to sentence.
For the reasons stated in Part I of my dissenting opinion in State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 38, 292 S.E. 2d 203, 230 (1982), I believe it was prejudicial error for the trial judge to instruct the jury that it had a duty to recommend the death sentence if it answered certain issues favorably to the state.
For the reasons stated in Part II of my dissenting opinion in State v. Pinch, supra, I conclude that prospective juror Melton was improperly excused for cause in violation of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
Therefore I vote to vacate the death sentence and to remand for a new sentencing hearing. I concur in the majority’s conclusion that no prejudicial error occurred in the guilt phase of the case.