dissenting.
The majority concludes that the revocation notice that MVD sent defendant “substantially complied with the requirements of former ORS 809.620(2). 118 Or App at 196. The revocation notice that MVD sent defendant did not comply with the requirements offormer ORS 809.620(2), and the trial court erred by admitting evidence that his license had been revoked. Accordingly, I dissent.1
At the time MVD sent defendant the notice, former ORS 809.620(2) provided:
“A notice [that a person’s driving privileges will be revoked, because the person is an habitual traffic offender] shall inform the person of all the following:
“ * * * *
“(d) That the person may only obtain a hearing if the person requests, in writing, a hearing within 20 days from the date the notice was sent.
*199“(e) That the right to a hearing is waived if the person does not request a hearing within the time required.”2 (Emphasis supplied.)
I have no quarrel with the doctrine of substantial compliance. However, the state and the majority concede that the revocation notice said nothing about waiving the right to a hearing. It did say that “[r]equests must be in writing and received by the Hearings Branch within 20 days of the date of this notice.” That part of the notice satisfied the requirement of subsection (d), and that is all it did.
The majority asserts that the notice also conveyed the “obvious implication * * * that the recipient loses the right to a hearing if he does not make a timely request.” 118 Or App at 196. In.essence, the majority concludes that compliance with subsection (d) automatically constitutes compliance with subsection (e). That conclusion renders subsection (e) a nullity and violates a cardinal rule of statutory construction — “where there are several provisions [we] will give effect to all.” ORS 174.010. The fact that the legislature enacted subsections (d) and (e) reveals that it recognized that a recipient of that notice might not make the inference that the majority presumes would be made. The legislature intended to require MVD to furnish more information than was required only by subsection (d). The statute did not require a driver to make any inference or to anticipate any information that was missing from the required notice. It unambiguously required a revocation notice to include all of the information listed informer ORS 809.620(2).
In State v. Tooley, 297 Or 602, 687 P2d 1068 (1984), the court held that the driver could not be convicted of driving while revoked if MVD’s revocation notice did not adequately inform him of his rights regarding a revocation hearing. The court emphasized:
“We [will not. make] an assumption about what defendant would have done had he been fully and accurately informed about the avenues of recourse.” 297 Or at 609.
The majority makes an assumption that the Supreme Court has said it would not make. We should not, either. When the *200legislature gives a nondiscretionary command in unambiguous language, we should presume that it intended the plain meaning of the words in its edict. Former ORS 809.620(2) meant what it said.
The revocation notice that MVD sent to defendant did not say that defendant would waive the right to a hearing if he did not make a timely request for one. Because the difference between subsections (d) and (e) of former ORS 809.620(2) are subtle, a miss is as good as a mile in this case. The notice that MVD sent defendant did not comply with the statute, nor did it substantially comply. The habitual traffic offender order was void. The court erred by denying defendant’s motion in limine to exclude evidence that his license had been revoked. State v. Harper, 91 Or App 239, 754 P2d 916 (1988); State v. Hardt, 81 Or App 607, 726 P2d 953, mod 83 Or App 221, 730 P2d 1278 (1986), rev den 303 Or 73 (1987). Defendant could not be convicted of driving while revoked or driving while a habitual traffic offender on the basis of the faulty revocation notice that MVD sent him.
Durham, J., joins in this dissent.
I agree with the majority that OES 183.415 has no application to this case.
ORS 809.620 was repealed by Or Laws 1991, ch 702, § 20.