concurring in parts I and III and dissenting in parts II and IV.
I agree with the majority that the Oklahoma Teacher’s Retirement System’s (OTRS) designation of beneficiary does not meet the definition of a will as outlined in Miller v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 637 P.2d 75, 77 (Okla.1981), thus bringing the designation within 84 O.S. 1981 § 114.1 I also agree that the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that the appellant, Pepper, could not reasonably believe that his claim to the OTRS funds would prevail2 — whether Pepper held a reasonable belief in a reasonably doubtful claim must be resolved by the trier of fact. However, I am troubled with the majority’s determination that the contractual nature of the OTRS membership and the designation of beneficiary a fortiori prevents Pepper’s recovery of the OTRS funds and death benefit.
There are two possible theories of recovery established by Oklahoma law: 1) The accompanying facts and circumstances coupled with the resulting inequity should the ex-husband, the appellee, be allowed to retain the benefits presents a proper case for the imposition of a resulting trust in favor of the deceased’s estate and heirs. 2) The language of the divorce decree setting aside any personal property not enumerated in the decree to the party having poss-session at the time the decree was entered is sufficient to divest the appellant of any right of recovery of the OTRS benefits.
I
A PROPER CASE FOR IMPOSITION OF A RESULTING TRUST EXISTS, ABSENT A SHOWING OF FRAUD, WHERE IT MAY BE ASCERTAINED THAT SOME PERSON OR ENTITY OTHER THAN THE LEGAL OWNER WAS INTENDED TO ENJOY THE BENEFICIAL INTEREST
Trusts arise in Oklahoma in three instances: (1) by written instrument sub*28scribed by the grantor or his/her agent; (2) by an instrument under which a trustee claims an affected estate; and (3) by operation of law.3 Of those trusts arising by implication of law, this Court has recognized constructive and resulting trusts.4 Constructive trusts are imposed against one who by some form of unconscionable conduct has obtained or holds legal title to property which in equity and good conscience he/she ought not enjoy.5 There have been no allegations of fraud or unconscionable conduct on the part of Peacher, making the imposition of a constructive trust inapplicable. However, a resulting trust is presumed to exist where it appears from the surrounding facts and circumstances that the beneficial interest is not intended to be enjoyed with legal title. In such cases, a showing of fraud on the part of the legal owner is not essential to establish a resulting trust.6
In the instant case, the undisputed facts are: that at the time of the decedent’s and Peacher’s divorce, there was considerable hostility between the couple; that the divorce decree contained language that all personal property not specifically enumerated would become the sole property of the party in whose possession it remained; that the OTRS fund was not listed in the decree but that the decedent owned the fund when the decree was entered; and that there was no contact between the decedent and Peacher from the date of the decree, a period of approximately four and one-half years before Denise Pepper’s death.
Although intent is an essential element of a resulting trust, the intent need not be expressly stated;7 it may be implied by the nature of the surrounding transactions or circumstances.8 The undisputed facts and circumstances attending the present case support the contention that the deceased, Denise Pepper, intended that her former husband be divested of any beneficial interest in the OTRS benefits. Equity requires the imposition of a resulting trust. If a resulting trust were imposed, Peacher would remain the legal owner with the benefits of the OTRS fund accruing to the decedent’s estate and lawful heirs. Failure to impose such a trust results in an incongruous situation — a person completely removed from Denise Pepper’s life will benefit from her death.
II
LANGUAGE IN A DECREE OF DIVORCE SETTING ASIDE PERSONAL PROPERTY TO ITS POSSESSOR IS SUFFICIENT TO DIVEST A NONPOSSESSORY PARTY OF ANY INTEREST TO BENEFITS AS A DESIGNATED BENEFICIARY
Although this Court has not previously addressed the precise issue presented *29here — whether a divorce divests an ex-spouse named beneficiary of retirement or death benefits accruing after the decree— two cases have addressed the issue of whether a previous spouse named beneficiary in a life insurance policy is entitled to proceeds from the policy despite a divorce subsequent to the designation. In Pendleton v. Great Southern Life Ins., 135 Okl. 40, 273 P. 1007-09 (1929), and Baird v. Wainwright, 260 P.2d 1060, 1063 (1953), this Court held that a subsequent divorce was insufficient to divest the prior spouse of proceeds of the life insurance policy if the insured spouse died after the decree without having changed the designated beneficiary.
Both cases are distinguishable. In Pen-dleton, the divorce decree did not set aside personal property to the spouse in possession of the property at the time the decree was entered as did this decree. In Baird, the divorce decree set over the life insurance policy to the husband but the Court had before it testimony of the deceased husband expressing his intent that his former-wife should benefit from any residue under the policy at his death. There is nothing in the divorce decree between the deceased and Peacher to indicate that Denise intended Peacher to benefit from the OTRS fund upon her death. The only intent expressed in the decree was that all personal property in Denise Peacher’s possession was to remain her separate property. Additionally, all the surrounding circumstances, previously enumerated, demonstrate that her intention was to divest Peacher of any interest in any of her property including OTRS benefits.
In construing a settlement agreement in a divorce action, a court is bound to ascertain and give mutual effect to the intent of the parties at the time of the contract.9 An agreement of the parties which may be reasonably construed as a relinquishment of the spouse’s right to insurance may terminate the rights of the named beneficiary to the proceeds of the policy.10 Likewise, a divorce decree setting aside all personal property to the possessor operates to divest the nonpossessory spouse of retirement and death benefit funds not specifically disposed of in the decree. In addition to reversal on the issue of whether the appellant held a resonable belief in at least a tenable right of recovery, the trial court should also be reversed insofar as it ruled that Baird precluded a divestment of the appellee’s rights to receive the OTRS funds and death benefits as a named beneficary.
. Title 84 O.S. 1981 § 114 provides:
“If, after making a will, the testator is divorced, all provisions in such will in favor of the testator's spouse so divorced are thereby revoked. Annulment of the testator's marriage shall have the same effect as a divorce. Provided, however, this section shall not apply if the decree of divorce or of annulment is vacated or if the testator remarries his former spouse.”
Although inapplicable to the present case, it should be noted that passage of 15 O.S. § 178, currently pending, would alter the outcome of a subsequent case with similar facts even under the majority opinion. The proposed section provides:
"A. If, after entering into a written contract in which provision is made for the payment of any death benefit (including life insurance contracts, annuities, retirement arrangements, compensation agreements and other contracts designating a beneficiary of any right, property or money in the form of a death benefit), the party to the contract with the power to designate the beneficiary of any death benefit dies after being divorced from the beneficiary named to receive such death benefit in the contract, all provisions in such contract in favor of the decedent’s former spouse are thereby revoked. Annulment of the marriage shall have the same affect as a divorce. In the event of either divorce or annulment, the decedent’s former spouse shall be treated for all purposes under the contract as having predeceased the decedent.”
. All that is required for forbearance to press a claim to constitute adequate consideration for a valid contract is that the party forbearing have a reasonable belief that the claim is tenable. Agristor Credit Corp. v. Unruh, 571 P.2d 1220, 1223 (Okla.1977) and State ex rel. Marland v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 189 Okl. 629, 118 P.2d 621, 628-30 (1941).
. Title 60 O.S. 1981 § 136 provides:
"No trust in relation to real property is valid, unless created or declared:
1. By a written instrument, subscribed by the grantor or by his agent thereto authorized by writing.
2. By the instrument under which the trustee claims the estate affected; or,
3. By operation of law.”
. Cacy v. Cacy, 619 P.2d 200, 202 (Okla.1980); Jones v. Jones, 459 P.2d 603-04 (Okla.1969); Catron v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa, 434 P.2d 263, 268 (Okla.1967).
. Cacy v. Cacy, see note 4, supra; Jones v. Jones, see note 4 at 605, supra; Catron v. First Natl Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa, see note 4, supra.
. Jones v. Jones, see note 4 at 605, supra; Littlefield v. Roberts, 448 P.2d 851, 856 (Okla.1969); Catron v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa, see note 4, supra; Kunze v. Wilkerson, 426 P.2d 340-41 (Okla.1967). Other courts recognizing resulting trusts as "intent-enforcing" trusts include: Guynan v. Guynan, 208 Neb. 775, 305 N.W.2d 882, 885-86 (1981); In re Estate of Wilson, 81 Ill.2d 349, 43 Ill.Dec. 23, 26, 410 N.E.2d 23, 26 (1980); Leonard v. Counts, 221 Va. 582, 272 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1980); In re Marriage of Heinzman, 198 Colo. 36, 596 P.2d 61, 63 (1979); Biggerstaff v. Ostrand, 199 Neb. 808, 261 N.W.2d 750, 754 (1978); Edwards v. Woods, 385 A.2d 780, 783-84 (D.C.1976); Hocking v. Hocking, 78 Ill.App.3d 29, 31 Ill.Dec. 451, 455, 394 N.E.2d 653, 657 (1979); Bilovocki v. Marimberga, 62 Ohio App.2d 169, 405 N.E.2d 337, 340 (1979); Levin v. Levin, 43 Md.App. 380, 405 A.2d 770, 775-76 (1979); Lewis v. Boling, 42 N.C.App. 597, 257 S.E.2d 486, 491 (1979); Howell v. Fiore, 210 So.2d 253, 255 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1968).
. Jones v. Jones, see note 4, supra.
. Cacy v. Cacy, see note 4, supra.
. Hollaway v. Selvidge, 219 Kan. 345, 548 P.2d 835, 839 (1976).
. Nunn v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the United States, 272 N.W.2d 780, 783 (N.D.1978); Hollaway v. Selvidge, see note 9, supra; Dudley v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 250 Or. 51, 440 P.2d 363-64 (1968); Sullivan v. Union Oil Co. of California, 16 Cal.2d 229, 105 P.2d 922, 925-26 (1940).