concurring specially.
While I agree with the holding of the majority opinion, I cannot agree with its implicit interpretation of Code Ann, § 22-403 (b). I recognize the ambiguousness of this unfortunately worded statute which gives rise to numerous viable interpretations.
Code Ann. § 81A-112 (a) requires that a defendant “serve his answer within 30 days after the service upon him, unless otherwise *197provided by statute.” (Emphasis supplied.) In the instant case I find that Code Ann. § 22-403 (b) otherwise provides, rendering the trial court’s grant of default judgment premature.
Service upon defendant-corporation in the case at bar was made pursuant to Code Ann. § 22-403 (b), which requires that “[a]ny service so had on the Secretary of State shall be answerable in not less than 30 days.” (Emphasis supplied.)
To the extent that Code Ann. § 81A-112 (a) mandates defendant’s answer to a complaint and summons within 30 days, while Code Ann. § 22-403 (b) proscribes such answer until the passage of 30 days, § 22-403 (b) and § 81A-112 (a) are clearly inconsistent. Therefore, in accordance with the provisions of both statutes, § 22-403 (b) must be said to control. That being true, since § 22-403 (b) would prohibit defendant from filing an answer within 30 days of defendant’s receipt of service of process, defendant cannot be said to have failed to timely respond to plaintiffs complaint by virtue of the fact that it, appropriately, waited 30 days before answering such complaint.
Although Code Ann. § 22-403 (b) does not specifically set forth a time limit within which a corporation must answer or risk default, it is my conclusion that once the time constraints of § 22-403 (b) pass, it is thereafter incumbent upon the defendant to respond to plaintiffs complaint and summons as otherwise required under Code Ann. § 81A-112 (a); in other words, within 30 days of the end of the 30-day grace period provided by Code Ann. § 22-403 (b).
Although I recognize that the Code does not clearly set forth the above temporal limitation (that is, while Code Ann. § 22-403 (b) plainly proscribes the filing of an answer within 30 days, it fails to state the time in which response must be made), I think the above interpretation is the only logical interpretation of the provisions of § § 22-403 (b) and 81A-112 (a). I therefore conclude that §§ 22-403 (b) and 81A-112 (a) (read in conjunction with one another) require defendant-corporation to answer service of process not less than 30 and no more than 60 days from receipt of service. Such an interpretation allows defendant the grace period apparently bestowed upon it by virtue of § 22-403 (b), yet limits it ultimately to the time period allowed any other defendant to respond to service of a complaint: 30 days.
The treatment given by the legislature of the State of Arizona to the Model Act provision on which Code Ann. § 22-403 (b) is based supports this interpretation. The section which provides for service on the Corporation Commission (serving the same function, in this context, as Georgia’s Secretary of State), in the event of the failure of a corporation to maintain a registered agent concludes as follows: *198“When service is made on the commission, whether under this chapter or any rule of court, the corporation shall have thirty days to respond in addition to the time otherwise provided by law.” Arizona Revised Statutes § 10-014 (B). It may be seen that the legislature in Arizona has made an interpretation of § 13 (§ 14,2d Ed.) of the Model Act similar to that which I have here set out. Since our legislature chose to enact the language used by the framers of the Model Act without interpretation, it falls now to this court to make such an interpretation.
Since defendant filed its answer within 30 days (Code Ann. § 81A-112 (a)) after the expiration of the 30-day waiting period (Code Ann. § 22-403 (b)), the trial court erred in striking defendant’s answer on the grounds that it was not timely filed. The trial court therefore erred in denying defendant’s motion to set aside the judgment under Code Ann. § 81A-160 (d).
Thus, I agree with the majority’s reversal, though I do so on additional grounds.