A hearing was held before a member of the Industrial Commission concerning claims arising out of the death of Carroll Graham which occurred during the course of his employment. Conflicting evidence was presented at the hearing concerning the existence or nonexistence of a common-law marriage between the decedent and Margaret A. Sanborn (Graham). In April 1978, before their divorces from others were final, the decedent and Margaret A. San-born (Graham) began living together. This arrangement continued, after their divorces became final, until decedent’s death on October 16, 1978. On February 13, 1980, the commissioner who conducted the hearing filed his memorandum decision in which he found that there existed a common-law marriage between the decedent and Margaret A. Sanborn (Graham). Later, however, the same commissioner after requesting and receiving from the parties proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and orders entered his findings of fact, conclusions of law and order in which he concluded that the evidence failed to establish a common-law marriage. The commissioner held that
“[t]he evidence in this matter is not sufficient to establish a mutual consent to establish a common-law marriage followed by a mutual assumption of marital rights, duties or obligations. The record only established consent and assumption of marital rights by Decedent; Claimant [Margaret A. Sanborn (Graham)] held herself out as a single person. Therefore, Claimant is not entitled to benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Law as a widow of Decedent.”
The Industrial Commission reviewed the record and confirmed, approved and adopted the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the commissioner as the Decision and Order of the Commission. Margaret A. Sanborn (Graham) and her two children were denied benefits. A motion for reconsideration or alternatively for rehearing was made before the Commission which was denied. Margaret A. Sanborn (Graham) on her own behalf and that of her two children appeals.
The principal issue on appeal is whether there exists substantial, competent evidence to support the finding by the Industrial Commission that there was no common-law marriage between the claimant Margaret A. Sanborn (Graham) and the decedent.
Appellate review of findings of fact made by the Industrial Commission is limited in scope. Idaho Const, art. 5, § 9; I.C. §§ 72-724, -732; Gordon v. West, 103 Idaho 100, 103, 645 P.2d 334, 337 (1982); Curtis v. Shoshone County Sheriff's Office, 102 Idaho 300, 303, 629 P.2d 696, 699 (1981); Sykes v. C.P. Clare & Co., 100 Idaho 761, 605 P.2d 939 (1980); Paulson v. Idaho Forest Industries, Inc., 99 Idaho 896, 591 P.2d 143 (1979). This review does not entail a de novo determination of fact. I.C. § 72-732. We are not concerned with whether this *826Court would have reached the same conclusion, but rather, with whether the findings by the Commission are supported by substantial, competent evidence. Idaho Const, art. 5, § 9; I.C. § 72-732(1); Curtis v. Shoshone County Sheriff’s Office, supra, 102 Idaho at 303, 629 P.2d at 699; Hamby v. J.R. Simplot Co., 94 Idaho 794, 797, 498 P.2d 1267, 1270 (1972) (review of Industrial Accident Board finding of no common-law marriage). “This Court only has the authority to reverse a decision of the Commission when its decisions are unsupported by ‘any substantial competent evidence,’ I.C. § 72-732(1), or are not supportable as a matter of law, Idaho Constitution, Art. 5, § 9.” Curtis v. Shoshone County Sheriff’s Office, supra, at 303, 629 P.2d at 699.
This case presents conflicting evidence on the issue of the existence or nonexistence of a common-law marriage. We continue to recognize the Industrial Commission as the arbiter of conflicting evidence, Hamby v. J.R. Simplot Co., supra, and the weight to be accorded evidence is within their particular province, Murray v. Hecla Mining Co., 98 Idaho 688, 571 P.2d 334 (1977); Gradwohl v. J.R. Simplot Co., 96 Idaho 655, 534 P.2d 775 (1975).
The doctrine of common-law marriage has been considered by this Court on numerous occasions. E.g., Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 103 Idaho 122, 645 P.2d 356 (1982); Hamby v. J.R. Simplot Co., 94 Idaho 794, 498 P.2d 1267 (1972); In re Brock’s Estate, 94 Idaho 111, 482 P.2d 86 (1971); In re Gholson’s Estate, 83 Idaho 270, 361 P.2d 791 (1961); In re Duncan, 83 Idaho 254, 360 P.2d 987 (1961); Strand v. Despain, 79 Idaho 304, 316 P.2d 262 (1957); In re Koshman’s Estate, 77 Idaho 96, 288 P.2d 652 (1955); In re Foster, 77 Idaho 26, 287 P.2d 282 (1955); Thomey v. Thomey, 67 Idaho 393, 181 P.2d 777 (1947); Lea v. Galbraith, 64 Idaho 724, 137 P.2d 320 (1943); Morrison v. Sunshine Mining Co., 64 Idaho 6, 127 P.2d 766 (1942); Nicholas v. Idaho Power Co., 63 Idaho 675, 125 P.2d 321 (1942); Mauldin v. Sunshine Mining Co., 61 Idaho 9, 97 P.2d 608 (1939); Estate of Tormey, 44 Idaho 299, 256 P. 535 (1927); Smith v. Smith, 32 Idaho 478, 185 P. 67 (1919); Labonte v. Davidson, 31 Idaho 644, 175 P. 588 (1918); Huff v. Huff, 20 Idaho 450, 118 P. 1080 (1911). Most recently in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, supra, the Court reviewed the doctrine, the element of consent by the parties required for a common-law marriage, and the evidentiary showing necessary for a proponent to raise a presumption that a common-law marriage exists. We stated that “[t]he pri- or decisions of this Court make clear that when a couple cohabit, assume the rights, duties and responsibilities of marriage, and hold themselves out as being married, a presumption of marriage arises which, if disputed, must be overcome by clear and positive evidence.” Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, supra, 103 Idaho at 127, 645 P.2d at 361 (emphasis added). While a common-law marriage may be proven by testimony of a party to that relationship, id. at 127, 645 P.2d at 361, we have also held that “the existence of such a [common-law] relationship may be negated by evidence that the parties held themselves out as single persons rather than as husband and wife.” Hamby v. J.R. Simplot Co., 94 Idaho 794, 796, 498 P.2d 1267, 1269 (1972). We do not perceive these holdings to be inconsistent.
To constitute a marriage under I.C. § 32-201, the parties with contractual capacity must consent and this “must be followed by a solemnization, or by a mutual assumption of marital rights, duties or obligations.” In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, supra, we further examined the element of consent necessary to form a common-law marriage under I.C. § 32-201. We held that
“consent to enter into a common law relationship may be implied and established from the circumstances and facts of the parties’ relationship in cohabiting, assuming the rights, duties and obligations of marriage, and holding out of themselves as husband and wife.” Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, supra, at 128, at 128, 645 P.2d at 362.
The record here contains conflicting evidence on the “holding out of themselves as husband and wife.” Id. Evidence *827is present that the claimant did not hold herself out as being married to the decedent. At its inception the relationship was not marital. The decedent and claimant lacked the capacity to marry because they were both still married to others. Once these impediments were removed by divorce, the Commission could have found a common-law marriage but such a finding was not inevitable or required as a matter of law. Testimony of several witnesses adequately supports the findings by the Commission that on several occasions during the summer of 1978 the claimant disavowed being married. Other testimony supports a finding that the claimant identified herself as the decedent’s “live-in.” Nothing in the record shows that before the decedent’s death that the claimant ever used the name Mrs. Graham or represented herself as the decedent’s wife. The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded the evidence is for the trier of fact. See In re Gholson’s Estate, 83 Idaho 270, 273, 361 P.2d 791, 793 (1961). Where the findings of the Commission are supported by substantial, competent evidence, the findings will not be disturbed on appeal. E.g., Curtis v. Shoshone County Sheriff’s Office, supra. The Commission found that the claimant did not hold herself out as married which finding was supported by substantial, competent evidence and supports the ultimate finding that there was no common-law marriage.
Appellants argue that inadmissible evidence as to the issue of the common-law marriage was allowed to be introduced over objection. Testimony was permitted regarding introduction made by a witness of the claimant to another person as “Mrs. Sanborn.” It was not established whether this introduction occurred before or after the parties possessed the capacity to marry; therefore, it was irrelevant to the issue of reputation. However, the Industrial Commission is not bound by the strict rules of evidence. Brooks v. Duncan, 96 Idaho 579, 532 P.2d 921 (1975). Because the appellants have failed to demonstrate the prejudicial effect of the testimony and there was other evidence on the issue, error if any was harmless. E.g., Obray v. Mitchell, 98 Idaho 533, 538, 567 P.2d 1284, 1289 (1977); see, e.g., Annau v. Schutte, 96 Idaho 704, 710, 535 P.2d 1095, 1101 (1975).
Appellants contend that testimony regarding statements made by the decedent was inadmissible under our holding in Morrison v. Sunshine Mining Co., 64 Idaho 6, 127 P.2d 766 (1942). This situation is distinguishable from that in Morrison. In Morrison testimony regarding a third-party’s statements with respect to a relationship with a decedent was held inadmissible. Here, the testimony concerned statements by the decedent that he was going to leave the claimant and go back to his ex-wife. The testimony, if a proper foundation was laid, was admissible with respect to the issue of the decedent’s consent to be married. Furthermore, even if inadmissible, the appellants have not demonstrated any prejudicial effect. The failure of claimant to prevail on the issue of the existence of the common-law marriage was based upon her failing to hold herself out as married not upon the decedent’s failure to so hold. The Commission found as fact that the decedent considered himself married. The Commission will not be reversed because this testimony was not material to the finding that claimant failed to show her consent to be married which was the basis for a finding of no common-law marriage.
The order of the Industrial Commission is affirmed.
No attorney fees allowed.
Costs to respondents.
BAKES, C.J., and McFADDEN and SHEPARD, JJ., concur. (McFADDEN, J., registered his vote prior to his retirement on August 31, 1982.)