These three related appeals involve contests between Chief of Police John F. Inman on one side and the City of Atlanta, the Mayor of Atlanta, one of his appointees, and the Atlanta City Council on the other side. For simplicity, the parties will be referred to as Chief Inman and the City.
The 1973 General Assembly enacted a new charter for the City which was effective January 7, 1974, except for the election of elected officers which took place in 1973.
The new charter provided in Sec. 7-104 for the initial administrative organization of the new government by the enactment of an ordinance according to the home rule procedures of Code Ann. § 69-1017 (b) (1).
The council enacted an initial organization ordinance on March 4, 1974, which was approved by the mayor on March 7, 1974. For purposes of these appeals, the effect of this ordinance was to create a Department of Public Safety headed by a commissioner. Included in the department were a Bureau of Fire Services, a Bureau of Civil Defense, and a Bureau of Police Services.
Chief Inman then filed suit (No. 29054) against the City to prevent any action pursuant to the ordinance that would tend to reduce the Police Department from its present status as a "department” of the city government. This suit also sought: to prevent the appointment of a Commissioner of Public Safety, to prevent interference with Chief Inman’s normal performance of duties as Chief of Police, a declaration that the ordinance was in conflict with Section 3-301(d) of the new charter, and a declaration that the ordinance deprived Chief Inman of property and contract rights that he had as Chief of Police.
The parties then entered into a stipulation of facts and agreed for the trial judge to hear and decide all issues in the case.
The trial judge did so, and on May 3,1974, he entered *567a judgment that: (1) denied permanent injunctive relief against the City; (2) declared that the ordinance shall not affect any salary or remuneration paid to Chief Inman prior to the ordinance, nor his salary rate after enactment of the ordinance; (3) declared that Chief Inman would be eligible for the office of Department Head Emeritus after having served twenty-five years with the City, eight years of which shall have been served in the position of Chief of Police or any comparable position provided in the future; (4) and denied all other declaratory relief sought by Chief Inman.
Chief Inman obtained an order superseding this judgment pending appeal, and he appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals transferred the case to this court since proper appellate jurisdiction is in this court.
After the entry of the May 3rd judgment in No. 29054, the City suspended Chief Inman as Chief of Police and appointed Clinton Chafin as acting head of the Bureau of Police Services.
On May 6, 1974, Chief Inman filed suit (No. 29026) against the City. He contended that his suspension was null and void, and he sought to temporarily and permanently enjoin the City from interfering with him in the performance of his duties as Chief of Police.
In May 21,1974, the trial judge conducted a hearing and entered a judgment that: (1) temporarily enjoined the City from implementing Chief Inman’s suspension, and (2) temporarily enjoined the City from interfering with Chief Inman in the performance of his duties.
The City then appealed to this court, and this is Case No. 29026.
After No. 29026 was docketed in this court, Chief Inman filed amendments in the trial court to his second suit. These amendments sought injunctive relief and attacked the constitutionality of the new charter of the City, and on June 19, 1974, the trial judge entered a judgment: (1) declaring the new charter unconstitutional, (2) enjoining the City from interfering with Chief Inman in the performance of his duties as Chief of Police, and (3) enjoining the City from conducting a trial of Chief Inman.
*568The City appealed to this court, and this is Case No. 29066.
Because of the public importance of the issues presented by these appeals, they were advanced on this court’s calendar for determination at the earliest practicable date. We now proceed to that determination.
The judgment in No. 29066 is reversed. This means that the City’s new charter is constitutional and valid.
' The judgment in No. 29026 is partly affirmed and partly reversed. This means that Chief Inman was not an appointed director of a department under Section 3-301(d) of the new charter and could not be suspended in accordance with its provisions. However, because of our rulings in the other two cases, the remainder of this judgment is reversed.
The judgment in No. 29054 is affirmed. This means that the City can proceed with reorganization under its new charter, but Chief Inman’s rights specified in the trial court’s judgment are preserved.
I.
The judgment in No. 29066 which declared the special Act of 1973 (Ga. L. 1973, p. 2188 et seq.), creating a "New Charter” for the City of Atlanta, to be unconstitutional is challenged in this appeal. We believe this issue was properly raised in DeKalb Superior Court and that court was authorized to decide the constitutionality of the City’s "New Charter.”
The trial court decided the legislature was powerless to adopt this "New Charter” for Atlanta. It determined the "New Charter” was a "very large amendment” to the existing charter which the City had authority to amend under general home rule laws. The Georgia Constitution (Code Ann. § 2-401) prohibits the adoption by the General Assembly of a special law covering a subject matter for which provision is made by an existing general law. The general laws available to the City for use in revising its government are those found in the 1962 and the 1965 Municipal Home Rule Acts, as amended. These laws were enacted by the General Assembly under the authority of the 1954 Home Rule Constitutional Amendment (Code Ann. § 2-8301). See Plantation Pipeline Co. v. City of Bremen, 227 Ga. 1 (178 SE2d 868).
*569The essential question we face in reviewing the constitutionality of Atlanta’s "New Charter” Act is whether this special Act was necessary to authorize the City to make the changes made in its government or whether these changes could be made by the City under the general home rule laws. We conclude the special "New Charter” Act was necessary because the existing general laws did not provide sufficient authority for the City to make the fundamental and substantive changes which have been made in the city government.
Some insight into the legislative purpose of the special "New Charter” Act of 1973 can be gained by reviewing its forerunner which created the City of Atlanta Charter Commission. In Ga. L. 1971, p. 4104, the General Assembly created and directed a charter commission to "completely revise the charter of the City of Atlanta” and provided that the revision "shall take the form of a new charter which . . . would supersede and replace [the] present charter.” The revision was to include "such substantive changes as the commission may deem necessary and appropriate for the improvement of the government of the City of Atlanta.”
An examination of the new charter clearly reveals that the city government has been changed drastically from a strong commission form of government, under which the board of aldermen legislated and supervised 26 administrative departments of the city through committees, to a new form of government, with the mayor as the executive, and the council as the legislative body, requiring a classic separation of powers not contained in the old form of government.
Even a casual observer of Atlanta city government will recognize that the new charter was designed to create a new form of government structured to handle the burdensome and ever growing public demands imposed on the government of large urban areas. This was clearly intended to be accomplished by the 1973 special Act of the General Assembly creating a "New Charter” for Atlanta.
The General Assembly has reserved the legislative power to enact new charters for existing cities when such charters include drastic changes in the composition and *570form of city government and the election and terms of office of the members of the governing authority of cities as in this new charter for Atlanta. This specific power was expressly reserved by the General Assembly in the 1965 Home Rule Act and is found in Code Ann. § 69-1018 (a) 1.
It is argued that some of the powers given the City of Atlanta in the new charter can also be found in the Home Rule Statutes, and therefore this prevented the General Assembly from exercising its reserved legislative power. This argument is not persuasive as the City of Atlanta, through the exercise of general home rule powers, legally could not change the form and composition of its government and the election and terms of office of its elected officials without this special Act of the legislature. We believe the reserve power of the General Assembly was sufficient to authorize the creation of the new charter for Atlanta, and we see no reason why the General Assembly could not allow the City to continue exercising the existing general home rule powers the City already enjoyed in common with other municipalities.
In addition, we find no provision in the 1962 Home Rule Act which pre-empted the constitutional adoption of the 1973 special Act creating a new charter for the City of Atlanta. Therefore, we conclude that the power to adopt an entirely new charter such as the one here involved cannot be found in either or both of the present home rule statutes. Consequently, this legislative power still resides in the General Assembly under the Constitution. Code Ann. § 2-1301.
The contention is also made that Atlanta’s new charter constitutes a non-uniform delegation of legislative authority which is not permitted by the Constitution of Georgia. The uniformity requirements previously contained in the Constitution (Code Ann. § 2-8301) were replaced by the 1954 home rule amendment to the Constitution. The language of this constitutional section (§ 2-8301), as now amended, does not provide a uniformity requirement for new municipal charters and this was acknowledged by the decision of this court in Bobo v. Mayor &c. of Savannah Beach, 216 Ga. 12 (114 *571SE2d 374) (1960). Therefore, the General Assembly is constitutionally free to exercise its reserved legislative power on a non-uniform basis when it enacts a new charter for a municipality as it did for Atlanta.
In summary, it is our opinion the special Act of 1973 creating a new charter for the City of Atlanta is not subject to the constitutional attacks made on it in this case, and the judgment of DeKalb Superior Court declaring the Act unconstitutional is reversed.
II.
Having held that the City’s new charter is constitutional and valid, the only remaining issues relate to the rights and status of Chief Inman under the new charter. Section 3-301(d) of the new charter provides in part as follows: ". . . all present directors of departments serving under appointment of the mayor shall continue to serve until the expiration of their present term of office as now provided by law on the effective date of this charter. The mayor shall be authorized to suspend and/or remove directors of departments during their term of office but any removal shall not become effective for a period of twenty-one (21) calendar days following the date of the mayor’s giving of written notice of such action and the reasons therefor to said director with a copy thereof to the Council.”
We conclude that Chief Inman is not a director of a department of the City appointed under the provisions of the new charter but is an "interim” director pending reorganization under § 7-104 of the new charter. Therefore, he could not be suspended under § 3-301(d) of the new charter, which provides that only directors of departments appointed under the new charter can be suspended in the manner specified. As Chief Inman was not on May 3,1974 an appointed director of a department under the new charter, his attempted suspension on that date was null and void. However, following implementation of the new charter by the appointment of department and division heads under the charter, the position of "interim” director will no longer exist. The suspension or removal of department heads appointed or reappointed under the 1973 Charter, including Chief Inman should he be appointed thereunder, shall be *572governed by the provisions of the 1973 Charter.
Argued June 25, 1974 Decided July 3, 1974 Rehearing denied July 23, 1974.We hold that that part of the judgment in No. 29026 that temporarily enjoined the City from implementing Chief Inman’s suspension was correct, but that part of the judgment that temporarily enjoined the City from interfering with Chief Inman in the performance of his duties was incorrect.
hi.
We conclude that the judgment of DeKalb Superior Court temporarily enjoining the City Council of Atlanta from conducting a trial for the removal of Chief Inman under the provisions of the old charter of the City, pending appointments under reorganization, is erroneous. Under the new charter of the city, the council is the de jure successor to the old Board of Aldermen and it is the proper body to conduct such a trial. However, any such trial must be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the charter of the City in effect at the time Chief Inman was elected by the old Board of Aldermen.
IV.
The judgment in No. 29054 permitted the City to proceed with reorganization under its new charter. It also specified that Chief Inman had certain rights and status with the City. Chief Inman appealed this judgment, his main contention being that the City could not proceed with reorganization under the new charter. The City did not cross appeal and has not complained of the specified rights and status of Chief Inman with the City contained in this judgment. We, therefore, hold that the trial court’s judgment in No. 29054 was correct, and it is affirmed in its totality.
Judgment in No. 29066 reversed. Judgment in No. 29026 affirmed in part; reversed in part. Judgment in No. 29054 affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Gunter, J., who concurs specially in Division 3, and Nichols, P. J, and Undercofler, J., who dissent. *573Henry L. Bowden, Henry R. Bauer, Jr., John E. Dougherty, James H. Weeks, Charles M. Lokey, for Jackson. Wesley R. Asinof, Durwood T. Pye, for Inman.